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Abstract 
This study investigates the role of religious networks in the conflict transformation 
process in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) between 1999 and 2004. 
Religious groups are an important segment of Congolese civil society in that they wield 
enormous influence in the Congolese polity that has been characterised by years of 
arbitrary rule, crisis of governance and, most recently, state deflation/failure or declining 
state capacity arising from a deadly and complex conflict that has been labelled "Africa's 
First World War". Over the years, DR Congo's religious networks have demonstrated 
their comparative advantage in social service delivery in the face of maladministration or 
malfeasance and corruption on the part of the political elite. The onset of war in the DRC 
deepened the imperative for constructive engagement by faith-based groups in the public 
domain, not least in the area of peace building. 
Drawing from the eschatological underpinning of liberation theology as well as 
existential causalities, religious networks have undertaken a number of initiatives in the 
conflict transformation spectrum with a view to building sustainable peace in the DRC. 
This study, in its explication of the specific roles of faith-based actors in the DRC's 
peacebuilding process, contends that the involvement of religious networks in such 
activities as peace advocacy, humanitarian/relief provision, mediation, reconciliation, 
demobilisation/reintegration of ex-combatants and reconstruction necessitates the 
rethinking of the overarching paradigm which portrays religion exclusively as a negative 
factor in conflict situations. Hence, this study seeks to provide insight into the 
constructive role of religion in public life, albeit with due cognisance of its ambivalent 
character by which is meant the recognition of religion both as a force for bad and a 
resource for good. 
This study contextualises the positive role of religion in public life with reference to the 
involvement of religious networks in the DRC's conflict transformation process. It also 
seeks to replace the formal governmental peace process paradigm with a more 
encompassing framework that encapsulates important and powerful civil society/non-11 
governmental networks, of which faith-based organisations are a part, in peacebuilding 
processes in Africa using the DR Congo as a case study. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
Those who neglect religion in their analyses of 
contemporary affairs do so at great peril (Berger, 1999: 18). 
1.1 Introduction 
Berger's assertion is underscored by the realisation of the increasing socio-political role 
of religion in human affairs, or as Rubin (1994: 20) puts it, its 'profound political 
influence in public life' . 1 Paradoxically, religion (and its role in society) has been a 
subject of intense debate over the years. For most part of the twentieth century though, 
religion was ignored or marginalised in the analyses of social, economic, and political 
phenomena. This was due largely to the dominance of non-eschatological paradigms, 
which were influenced primarily by the Age of Enlightenment as well as the writings of 
philosophers. Haynes (1993: 6) notes that 'the analysis of political behaviour for the 
greatest part of the twentieth century was dominated by the modernisation or the political 
development paradigm, dependency/underdevelopment, neo-Marxist and other radical 
perspectives.' Religion was considered as purely tenacious and atavistic. At best, 
religion was ignored; at worst, it was regarded as 'an opium' (a la Marx) and completely 
denounced. 
The promise held forth by the dominant theories of liberalism, modernisation, and 
Marxism, spawned the prediction of the decline or demise of religion. Cox (1965: 1) and 
Wallace ( 1966: 264) had predicted that religion was to disappear and become consigned 
to history. In other words, the decline (and the possible extinction) ofreligion, in view of 
the inception of modernity, was expected. According to Rubin (1994: 21), it was 
anticipated - in the West during the 18th, 19th and ( early part of the) 20th centuries - that 
'modern ideas, such as science, technology, secularism, and humanism, would overcome 
the religious concepts that dominated premodern society'. Lubbe (2002: 237) notes that 1 It is instructive to note from the outset that religion has been implicated in a number of conflicts around 
the world. Although the focus of this study is to examine the positive role of faith-based organisations in 
peacebuilding, the researcher acknowledges the reality that religion has been and continues to be a factor in 
the fuelling of conflict. 
1 
this expectation was informed by the conviction that "modernity goes hand in hand with a decline in religion." The advent of the Cold War reinforced the fervour concerning the atrophy of religion as ideologies such as capitalism, socialism/communism, imperialism, and nationalism gained ascendance in the analyses of issues. Again, religion was viewed as "irrational and premodern" (Weigel, 1991: 27; Reychler, 1997). In the defunct Communist bloc, religion was officially stigmatised and repressed. In the West, it was regarded as a remnant of tradition. Religion was simply depicted as 'epiphenomena' (Haynes, 1993: 6). The tendentious treatment of religion in both academic circles and in the public domain promoted secularisation. The futuristic resurgence of religion was not anticipated. However, in deference to Crawford's (2002: 204) opinion that religion has a way of revitalising itself, the resurgence of religion (in the form of intensifying religiosity) has been witnessed in Africa and Eastern Europe, thereby stultifying the central propositions of Marxism, modernisation, and development paradigms vis-a-vis the future of religion. The 'crisis of modernity', according to Lubbe (2002: 240) is one of the three factors that account for the renaissance of religion. The inability of modernity (and secular philosophies) to furnish convincing explanations regarding the origin and destiny of human life has made religion attractive. Hence, Rubin (1994: 23) submits that 'the secret of the influence of religion in contemporary politics is that the modernization process, rather than causing religion to weaken and disappear, often makes its public role stronger and a more necessary part of the process of state-building or revolutionary transformation'. Furthermore, the contradictions of globalisation (such as the mass movement of refugees and economic immigrants across national boundaries, and the weakening of state boundaries) have resulted in the loss of identity and national self­confidence in many societies. The search for identity has led many to religion. In addition, 'political uncertainty and financial risks' associated with the globalised environment induce volatility and instability that necessitate considerable adjustment. Within this milieu, religion is seen as a stabilising factor since it "provides humanity with a sense of direction and destiny" (Lubbe, 2002: 240). 
2 
The above submissions find practical expression in many societies in the Third World, 
particularly in Africa, such that 'the political importance of religion reverberates with 
special strength in these societies' (Rubin, 1994: 22). For example, the Commission for 
Africa [CFA] (2005: 120) notes the astounding increase in religiosity in Africa, which is 
underpinned by certain causalities. The CF A argues that nationalism in Africa is 
exhausted and that its place has been overtaken by religion. Bunting (2005) adds that 
'politicians and state structures have lost almost all credibility or legitimacy'. 
Consequently, religion has emerged as a strong socio-political factor in galvanising 
people such that it cannot - and should not - be ignored in the analyses of contemporary 
issues - in Africa and elsewhere. Indeed, religion is assuming greater importance in 
many countries irrespective of their level of economic development (Thomas, 2000: 817). 
Given this context, therefore, it is apposite to examine the underlying dynamics of 
intensifying religiosity underway in Africa. One of such dynamics is the increasing 
importance of religion in the public domain ( especially in countries that have a weak state 
apparatus) such that faith-based actors are often co-opted into crucial local and national 
decision making structures and processes in that they are a key constituency in civil 
society. 
1.2 Statement of the problem 
Policymakers, diplomats, journalists and scholars . . . are 
still in the habit of disregarding the role of religion, 
religious institutions, and religious motivations in 
explaining politics and conflict, and even in reporting their 
concrete modalities. Equally, the role of religious leaders, 
religious institutions and religiously motivated lay figures 
in conflict resolution has also been disregarded - or treated 
as a marginal phenomenon hardly worth noting (Luttwak, 
1994: 9-10). 
The above commentary, which speaks to the marginal treatment of religion in scholarly 
analyses, is a carryover of the "Enlightenment prejudice" that has been challenged by 
ascendant religiosity and the increasing role of religion in national and international 
politics. More than ever before, religious leaders and networks are getting involved in 
activities that cannot go unnoticed for they typically have the greatest presence and 
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influence in society. In Africa and Latin America, for example, the religious 
constituency has often functioned as "the intellectual and social center of the masses" 
(Rubin, 1994: 24) in such a manner that it serves the purpose of interest aggregation, 
articulation and actualisation. Apart from 'rendering critical support for movements 
toward democracy around the world, religious networks also play a constructive role in 
the world's trouble spots in demonstration of the moral and social characteristics that 
equip them in unique ways to engage in efforts to promote peace' (Carter, 1994: vii-viii). 
However, the "other" reality speaks to the implication of religion in war or various forms 
of organised violence. In Africa, religion is identified more often than not in terms of its 
role in precipitating, fuelling or exacerbating conflict. The growing importance of faith­
based actors in peacebuilding, or generally, faith-based peacebuilding, is conveniently 
ignored in a manner that illustrates intellectual bias and perhaps a continuation of the 
"Enlightenment prejudice" by other means. 
Contemporaneously, the renaissance of religion in Africa has been accompanied by a 
bewildering profusion of (internal) conflicts. Indeed, one of the many challenges that 
African states have had to grapple with in recent times is the profusion of violent 
conflicts. It is beyond contention that Africa's share of post-Cold War conflicts is 
significant. Notable flashpoints of large-scale violence have been the Hom of Africa, 
West Africa (as typified by the crises in Liberia, Sierra Leone and, more recently, Cote 
d'Ivoire), and the Great Lakes Region. The Burundi conflict, the Rwandan conflict and 
genocide, the crisis in Uganda and, most remarkably, the conflict in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (given its regional and continental implications), put together, make 
the Great Lakes the most volatile of Africa's geopolitical regions. The 'conflicts in the 
region have many layers and overlapping set of actors' (Morten, 2004: 283) thus making 
them intractable. Colonial legacies, authoritarianism, ethnonationalism, scramble for 
strategic (mineral) resources (or vested economic/commercial interests), and poor 
leadership account for the eruption, continuation, and internationalisation of the conflicts 
in the Great Lakes Region of Africa. 
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Of all the countries in the region, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) [formerly 
Zaire]2 has been the most unstable. The country's 'biography' is steeped in conflict as its 
history attests. The recent/current conflict (discussed in Chapter Two) presents a case 
study not only in state deflation/collapse but also on how the prospect of economic gains 
can introduce or unleash highly destructive external dimensions and interventions into an 
otherwise local conflict. Indeed, military intervention by countries opposed to the regime 
in Kinshasa and their occupation of parts of the DRC's territory presupposed that the 
government was not in control of the entire country. Quite aside from the difficulties 
presented by local challenges to its authority, the government has had to deal also with 
the invasion and occupation of the DRC by foreign forces and, as such, has not been able 
to fulfil its responsibilities towards its people, typifying the failure of governmental 
authority and portraying a semblance of state collapse.3 Such a scenario gives non­
governmental, religious and international organisations a comparative advantage in 
assisting the affected to adjust to conflict as well as to stimulate and facilitate the search 
for peace. It is apposite to recall here that non-governmental, civil society organisations 
and religious networks had been active in DR Congo even before the onset of war and 
had channelled their energies towards expanding the country's political space through 
activism which was intended to emasculate Mobutu's authoritarianism (Nzongola­
Ntalaja, 2002: 244). The eruption of conflict, no doubt, necessitated increased activism 
by these organisations, not least in the sphere of peace building. 
2 The late President Laurent Kabila renamed the country Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) on 17 May 
1997 after his Alliance des forces democratiques pour la liberation du Congo-Zaire (i.e. Alliance of 
Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo) seized Kinshasa (the capital city) by force, ousting the 
regime of President Mobutu Sese Seko in the process (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002: 1; Nzongola-Ntalaja, 
1998a: 5; Rosenblum, 1998: 193). 
3 It is instructive to note that the DRC ranked second on the list of top ten failed states in 2005 and 2006, 
according to the "State Failure Index" released by the United States Foreign Policy Magazine and the 
United States-based think-tank - Fund for Peace (See Internet 27). The index measures the vulnerability of 
states, using twelve (12) indicators: (1) mounting demographic pressures (2) massive movement of 
refugees and internally displaced persons creating complex humanitarian emergencies (3) legacy of 
violence - seeking group grievance or group paranoia (4) chronic and sustained human flight (5) uneven 
economic development along group lines (6) sharp and/or severe economic decline (7) criminalisation and 
delegitimisation of the state (8) progressive deterioration of public services (9) suspension or arbitrary 
application of the rule of law and widespread violation of human rights (10) security apparatus operates as 
a "state within a state" (11) rise of factionalised elites and (12) intervention of other states or external 
political actors (See Internet 28 and Internet 29). Suffice it to say that the DRC has been plagued by most of 
these conditions encapsulated in the 'state failure index'. 
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Against the backdrop of the war in the DRC and the failure of the state to meet the 
expectations of the people, the pivotal role of religious groups in social services delivery, 
development processes and peacebuilding has become more salient and needs to be 
acknowledged. For example, this role is exemplified by the crucial roles of the Roman 
Catholic Church in belligerent and post-conflict(?) DR Congo. As the Commission for 
Africa (2005: 120) reports, the 'Catholic Church is the only reasonable coherent 
organisation in the country and functions as a post office in the absence of a national 
postal service'. This point reflects the extent to which DR Congolese state has failed and 
underscores the urgent need to reconstruct the DRC and to resuscitate state institutions. 
The involvement of the Roman Catholic Church in such activity typifies the important 
influences of religious networks in transforming conflict situations with a view to 
engendering sustainable peace and development. Accordingly, the study explores or 
investigates the role of religious networks in transforming the conflict situation in DR 
Congo between 1999 and 2004. 
1.3 Objectives of the research 
The main objective of this study is to examine and evaluate critically the role of DR 
Congo's religious networks in transforming the conflict situation to one that offers hope 
while also engendering sustainable development. This study seeks to replace the formal 
governmental peace process paradigm with a more encompassing framework that 
encapsulates important and powerful non-governmental networks, of which faith-based 
organisations are a part. Specifically, the study's core objectives are as follows: 
• To contextualise the involvement of religious networks in conflict transformation
against the background of failing government or declining statecraft in the DRC.
• To explore the specifics and extent of the role(s) ofreligious groups in the conflict
transformation process.
• To evaluate critically the involvement of faith-based organisations in the peace
process with a view to highlighting the success or failure of such engagement.6 
1.4 Scope of the study 
This study explicates the causalities in, and the character of, the involvement of faith­
based networks in DR Congo's conflict transformation process with reference to the 
period characterised by the eruption and continuation of conflict in the country. This 
study's primary task or objective covers a five-year period, namely 1999-2004 - a period 
which, arguably, is the most traumatic in the recent history of the DRC. It was a period 
during which the country was plagued by what has been labelled "Africa's First World 
War". The period is therefore most suitable for the analysis of any initiatives at 
attenuating the conflict, including the role of religious networks in the process of building 
peace in the DRC, which constitutes the focal point of the study. This research 
investigates the roles of the following religious organisations vis-a-vis peacebuilding 
during the said period: 
• The Roman Catholic Church;
• The Eglise du Christ au Congo (ECC) i.e. the Church of Christ in the Congo,
formerly Eglise du Christ au Zaire (ECZ) i.e. the Church of Christ in Zaire, which
represents a majority of the country's Pentecostal churches;
• The Kimbanguist Church - the largest indigenous religious movement;
• The Islamic society; and
• Minority religious networks/multi-faith international actors such as the Mennonite
Central Committee (MCC), the Salvation Army and Christian Aid, the
Community of Sant' Egidio and the United Methodist Church (UMC).
These organisations have made important contributions to the process of transforming 
DR Congo's conflict environment through a wide range of programmes. Given this 
context, this study examines the specifics of religiously motivated peacebuilding 
including post-conflict initiatives that fall within the realm of conflict transformation. 
Without a doubt, some limitations are inevitable in a study of this nature. An obvious 
challenge is the unwillingness of many prominent Congolese to volunteer information 
despite the assurances of confidentiality provided by the researcher. (There is a climate 
of fear in the DRC, and whatever one says or does may determine whether one remains 
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alive or not, even if such information were disclosed to friends or neighbours). The difficulties notwithstanding, a considerable number of respondents did provide relevant information that speaks to the primary task of this research. Moreover, the celerity at which events unfold in the DRC presents a formidable challenge in time-limited research. As such, giving tangential treatment to events that take place in the immediate aftermath of the research's timeframe may become imperative in order to engender a holistic appreciation of the subject-matter of the scholarly inquiry in question. Therefore, not only does this research examine the role of DRC's faith-based actors in the post-conflict epoch, it also prognosticates their involvement in the country's public domain. 
1.5 The significance of the study [Africa] is another part of the globe that urgently needs to be mapped in terms of its rapidly intensifying religiosity if we are to begin to understand what is happening there. (Bunting, 2005) The Commission for Africa (2005: 120-123) notes the growing importance of religious networks in many African countries. Such 'growing importance' of religious entities has not been adequately reflected in the analyses of contemporary African affairs, including the war in the DRC. This is despite overwhelming evidence gleaned from that country's religious demography and history which suggest that faith-based organisations have played decisive roles within DR Congo's socio-political space (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002: 173,190; Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2001: 310; Weiss, 1995: 165; Callaghy, 1984: 176, 305-06). These networks wield enormous influence over the Congolese and it is most apposite to examine their role in the DRC's peace process. The choice of the DRC is informed by its strategic importance not only in the Great Lakes region and in Central Africa but also in Africa generally. A number of analysts and policy makers find it "difficult to imagine a place more pivotal to the future of Africa than the [DRC]" (Doyle, 2004: internet document, hereafter i.d.). It is relatively easy to reach this conclusion about DR Congo in view of its geographical size and staggering 8 
-----
resource endowment.4 Franz Fanon (quoted in Nzongola-Ntalaja, 1998b) was so awed by 
the enormity of DR Congo's resources that he concluded that the DRC was (and still is) a 
"geological scandal". Paradoxically, it is the vastness and strategic importance of DR 
Congo's mineral wealth that has made it a major target for plunder. The country is of 
strategic importance in Africa, at least against the background of its geo-economic 
variables. Fanon (quoted in Nzongola-Ntalaja, 1998b) reckons: "Africa is a revolver; the 
trigger is the Congo." For a certainty, the DRC has a strategic value that cannot be 
ignored. The geo-strategic importance of DR Congo makes it an important subject of 
intellectual inquiry. This imperative takes on added significance against the reality of the 
instability in the country and its implications for Africa vis-a-vis the continent's drive for 
renaissance. 
This study seeks to contribute to the scholarship on rethinking the formal governmental 
peace process paradigm by highlighting a more encompassing framework that 
encapsulates significant role players such as faith-based organisations and other civil 
society actors in peacebuilding processes in Africa. More than that, it is expected that the 
study's findings will engender scholarly debate and stimulate further research into the 
dynamics of the involvement of non-governmental networks in African conflicts and 
peacebuilding processes. 
1.6 Methodology 
The methodology adopted for this study is qualitative, with reliance on both primary and 
secondary sources of data. It is instructive to point out that this researcher shares the 
sentiment expressed by McTeman (2003: xii) who posits that "[t]he problem one 
encounters when trying to access the role of religion in conflict is the lack of data." This 
4 The DRC is Africa's third largest country. It shares borders with nine states. It is arguably the richest 
African state in terms of natural resource endowment. DR Congo is blessed with minerals including 
cobalt, coltan, copper, cadmium, tin, zinc, gold, uranium, tungsten, columbite, tantalum, diamonds, iron 
ore, crude oil (offshore deposits), thorium, and other precious minerals used in leading edge industries such 
as electronics, aeronautics and nuclear medicine. The country is home to '50% of Africa's hardwoods and 
about 10% of the world's hydroelectric power potential'. The Inga Dam is emblematic of this potential. 
The Congo River (the second longest in Africa and the fifth longest in the world) can light up Africa from 
Cairo to Cape Town for 200 years. For details, see Swing (2003: 25); The Guardian (Lagos) 29 January 
2001: 63; and Nzongola-Ntalaja (1998b; 2002: 28). 9 
was one major challenge that confronted this study; there are very few published works 
on the role of religious entities in DR Congo's public sphere. Although a fairly large 
number of studies have been conducted on the ·conflict in the DRC, no systematic or 
comprehensive analysis of the role of religion in the conflict (especially as far as 
peacebuilding efforts are concerned) has been undertaken. Hence, the exploratory nature 
of this research which was intended to break new ground as well as furnish new insights 
into the nexus between religion and conflict. 
This research has been conducted through the use of overlapping research techniques. 
These research methods included historical analysis as well the examination of relevant 
literature on the topical issues in research. Sources such as books, academic/scholarly 
journals, magazines, newspapers and Internet articles were consulted and their contents 
analysed. However, the lack of sufficient information in secondary- sources necessitated 
the conduct of field research and the use of primary data sources. The administration of 
questionnaires and the use of interviews more than compensated for the lacunae in 
secondary data sources. Oral, written and e-interviews were conducted (with Congolese 
in the DRC and in South Africa) using interview schedules based on open-ended 
questions to engender a robust engagement with the issues in research. Interviews with 
religious leaders, their followers, community leaders (whose communities have been 
impacted by the activities of religious networks), academics, political leaders, media 
practitioners and civil society activists did help to provide critical insights into the study. 
This study synthesized data gathered from both primary and secondary sources so as to 
provide a holistic analysis of religion's role in conflict transformation in the DRC. 
1. 7 Structure of the study 
This study is organised into six chapters. Chapter One is an introduction to the study. It 
furnishes a background to the study, highlights the statement of the research problem and 
outlines the objectives of the study. The introductory chapter also deals with the scope of 
the study, highlights the significance of the study, explicates the methodology of research 
and presents an overview or structure of the study. 
10 
Chapter Two explores the religious landscape in the DRC with reference to the history of 
the country's major religious networks, the demographic character of religion and the 
socio-political function of religion in DR Congo. The chapter also provides an overview 
of the conflict in the DRC. 
Chapter Three is a thematic review of the relevant literature on the subject matters of this 
research. It offers a holistic definition of religion, explores the debate on the role of 
religion in conflict and synthesizes the arguments regarding the nexus between religion 
and conflict. The chapter also appraises the social construction of the concept of 
liberation theology. The notion of conflict transformation as a paradigm shift in conflict 
analysis is also addressed in Chapter Three. The chapter concludes with a review of 
some scholarly works on the conflict in the DRC. 
Chapter Four investigates the role of religious networks in the DRC's conflict 
environment vis-a-vis their transformational initiatives. It examines the roles played by 
faith-based actors such as the Roman Catholic Church, the Eglise du Christ au Congo 
(ECC) representing a majority of the country's Pentecostal churches, the Kimbanguist 
Church, the Islamic community and minority/multi-faith networks, in the conflict 
transformation process. 
Chapter Five critiques the roles of faith-based organisations in the DRC's peacebuilding 
process. It examines the local responses to religious networks' role in the peace process. 
The chapter concludes with an evaluation of the DRC's religious actors' conflict 
transformational initiatives. 
Chapter Six, the concluding chapter, draws logical inferences from the findings of the 
research and proffers suggestions for effective faith-based peacebuilding in the DRC. 
11 
----- --
CHAPTER TWO 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE, SEEDS OF CRISIS 
AND CONFLICT SKETCH 
2.1 Religion in DR Congo: history, demography and socio-political roles 
[Religious networks represent] a voice . . . in Congolese 
politics as major civil society actors (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 
2002: 51) [ emphasis mine]. 
Faith-based organisations are arguably the most important actors in DR Cong<;>'s civil 
society or non-governmental constituency. Not only do DR Congo's religious groups 
wield extensive influence over the people but they also play prominent s�ioyolitical 
roles that often disconcert the government. 5 The pre-eminence of these groups within 
DRC's socio-political space does not come as a surprise to those who are abreast with 
realities in the country. Decades of misrule, crises, plunder (by both local and external 
forces) and the incapacitation or implosion of civil rights movements implied that "[ o ]nly 
religious organizations had the possibility of retaining · some autonomy" (Nzongola­
Ntalaja, 2002: 173), which gave them considerable leverage in DR Congo's socio­
political space especially in the areas where governments typically have peerless 
competence. 
Remarkably, some of these religious institutions predate the emergence of the DRC as a 
sovereign entity as they played crucial roles in the extrication of the vast country from the 
shackles of (Belgian) colonialism. The plethora of religious movements that have been 
active in the DRC include the Roman Catholic Church, several Protestant Churches or 
denominations (which come under a loose agglomeration known as the Eglise du Christ 
au Congo [ECC], formerly Eglise du Christ au Zaire - ECZ), the Kimbanguist Church, 
the Greek Orthodox Church, Jehovah's Witnesses, and Islam among other numerous 
local syncretic religious groups and sects (Callaghy, 1984: 176, 303). However, the 
Roman Catholic Church, the ECC and the Kimbanguist Church have been the most 
politically active faith-based institutions in the DR Congo. This section restricts itself to 
5 For instance, Callaghy (1984) highlights the tensions between the government and the Roman Catholic 
Church in his lucid analysis of the state-society struggle during the Mobutu era in the former Zaire (now 
the Democratic Republic of Congo). 
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the exploration of the history of these more vibrant groups as an expedition into the 
historical trajectories of all DR Congo's religious networks is of marginal utility to the 
focus of this study. The history of the biggest and most powerful religious institution in 
the DRC, the Roman Catholic Church, comes first. 
Roman Catholic Church 
The history of the Roman Catholic Church, nay Christianity, in the DR Congo is 
associated with the advent of colonialism. Portuguese explorers had brought Christianity 
to the DRC (then known as Kongo) in 1482 when they made their first contact with the 
locals. A group of missionaries comprising Franciscan and Dominican priests returned in 
1491, baptised the Kongo king, Nzinga a Nkuwu and established a church within the 
territory the same year. King Nkuwu's son, Nzinga Mbebe (later Afonso) became king 
and reinforced the links between the Portuguese and his kingdom. King Afonso (who 
also became a Catholic and built many churches) sold slaves and ivory to the Portuguese 
in return for luxury goods from Europe. The king made Christianity (Catholicism in the 
main) the 'state' religion in his attempt at 'evangelising' the kingdom. This was 
significant because it marked the 'Christianisation' of the Kongo and the solidification of 
relations between the Kongo and the Portuguese which centred on missionary activities, 
mining and trade (Vansina & Obenga, 1992: 555-557). 
Remarkably, the conversion of King Afonso set the stage for the 'Christianisation' of 
more of his subjects. However, the slave trade - an infamous enterprise that engaged 
some of the missionaries and their compatriots - hampered the vitality of the Christian_
movement but did not culminate in its demise. A series of revolts by slaves and counter 
actions by the noble class resulted in the Jaga War of 1569, which destroyed the Kongo 
kingdom (Jordan, 1998) but the 'state' religion survived the crucible of 'kingdom 
collapse'. The colonial period, which began officially with the creation of the Congo 
Free State in 1885 under the absolute control of the Belgian monarchy, marked a 
watershed in the consolidation of the Roman Catholic Church's position in DR Congo. 
The 1884-85 Berlin Conference - noted for its partitioning of Africa - formally 
recognised Belgian King Leopold II as the sovereign over the Congo Free State thus 
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making him de facto owner of the territory. In his quest for the exploitation of the 
territory's resources, Leopold II despatched missionaries to the Congo Free State, granted 
them property, subsidies and the right to fulfil certain state functions as well as a virtual 
monopoly over education and medical services. The unbridled exploitation of the 
resources of the Congo Free State did not go down well with the locals who in turn 
protested the plundering of their resources. Such protestations were suppressed by the Force Publique in the characteristic brutality of the personal fiefdom which King 
Leopold II has been identified with. In 1909 (following sustained pressure and 
international opprobrium over the atrocities being committed by Leopold's agents in the 
territory), the Belgian Parliament compelled the king to cede the Congo Free State to the 
Belgian state (Hochschild, 1999). The Congo Free State was subsequently rechristened 
Belgian Congo. 
A "Colonial Trinity" or "Trinity of Power" which comprised the colonial administration, 
the Roman Catholic Church and large (private) foreign companies administered the 
Belgian Congo (Merriam, 1961: 1 ). The Roman Catholic Church lubricated the colonial 
enterprise, which undermined the emergence of a nationalist elite class while it 
simultaneously ( or paradoxically) established a fairly dense network of schools, churches 
and health centres. Beyond the provision of education and healthcare subsumed under 
the rubric of 'Benevolent Paternalism' (Merriam, 1961: 32), the 'Christianising' mission 
of the Church, 'in the logic of colonialism, helped to undermine African autonomy and to 
promote colonial domination' (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002: 39). The position of the Roman 
Catholic Church within the ruling 'tripartite alliance' bestowed advantages on the 
Church, much to the indignation of Protestants who felt marginalised. Although the 
Roman Catholic Church initially believed in the 'intrinsic necessity of colonialism' 
(Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002: 40), the Church 'in 1956 not only opposed the colonial system 
by its disapproval of the injustices perpetrated by the colonial administration against the 
Congolese but also began its advocacy on their behalf (Presbyterian Church USA, n.d.). 
This political reorientation on the part of the Roman Catholic Church endeared many 
Congolese to the Church thus 'helping it to retain significant control and to play major 
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socio-political roles after independence in 1960'. By that year, the Church "had almost 
700 mission stations and some 6,000 missionaries in educational, medical, philanthropic 
and social services" (Presbyterian Church USA, n.d.). The Church's influence in the 
country's post-independence political economy could only grow given its massive human 
and material base. However, in an attempt to consolidate the absolutist state, the regime 
of the late dictator Joseph Desire Mobutu (later Mobutu Sese Seko) in the late 60s and the 
70s sought to undermine the influence of the Roman Catholic Church which was then the 
most formidable societal group in the vanguard of the masses (Callaghy, 1984: 302-304). 
The late 60s was marked by the Roman Catholic Church's virulent criticism of Mobutu's 
regime. The Church denounced the 'injustices, corruption, crass materialism, and the 
authoritarian/centralising tendencies of the Mobutu government' (Callaghy, 1984: 304). 
Mobutu (who had renamed the country Zaire from the Congo and proclaimed himself the 
Founder-President of the Nation, the Enlightened Guide, and the Leopard) viewed the 
Roman Catholic Church as a threat to his sovereignty.6 Nzongola-Ntalaja (2002: 173) 
notes that the Roman Catholic Church, 'inspired by the theology of liberation, became a 
powerful voice of dissent against the Mobutu regime'. 
Consequently, the late dictator, in what could be described as an onslaught against the 
church, promulgated a decree banning the use of Christian names, outlawed the 
observance of Christmas as a national holiday, abolished religious instruction in public 
schools in preference for courses in 'Mobutuism', banned all religious publications, 
ordered the removal of the Pope's photographs from public places while replacing them 
with his, and took over the entire school system. Mobutu even threatened to close the 
churches (Callaghy, 1984: 304-305). Suffice it to say that these actions were taken to 
silence the Roman Catholic Church and to undermine its political influence in Zaire as it 
was then known. To Mobutu, it was politically expedient to crush any force that stood 
against the survival of the absolutist state. 6 It is instructive to note that these titles adopted by Mobutu Sese Seko typify nothing but absolutism. He 
claimed "authentic right to exercise absolute power over his 'children', the Congolese". His full name, 
Mobutu Sese Seko Koko Ngbendu Wa Za Banga, which he adopted in 1972, also depicted absolutism. The 
meaning of his name goes thus: "the all-powerful warrior who, because of his endurance and inflexible will 
to win, will go from conquest to conquest, leaving fire in his wake" (Encyclopcedia Britannica's Guide to
Black History 2005 [online version], Internet 1). 
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The cumulative effect of these draconian measures against the Roman Catholic Church 
was a rupture in relations between the Mobutu government and the Church. However, 
reconciliatory gestures (including the restoration of rights and privileges denied the 
church) on the part of Mobutu after mid-1975 led to improved relations between the 
government and the Church. Yet, the thaw in government-church relations did not 
obliterate the tension between them (Callaghy, 1984: 307). 'Following the government's 
reversal of its diminution of the Catholic Church's influence, the church's fortunes in 
public life continued to rise'. As a matter of fact, the powerful influence of religious 
networks in DR Congo's socio-political space finds expression mainly in the huge stature 
of the Roman Catholic Church. Schatzberg (n.d.) describes the Roman Catholic Church 
as "[DR Congo's] only truly national institution apart from the state;" it operates an 
extensive network of hospitals, schools, clinics, farms, ranches, stores, and artisans' 
shops in addition to holding the allegiance of approximately half of DR Congolese 
population. The preceding harmonises with Callaghy's (1984: 176) observation: 
[t]he Catholic Church is the strongest non-ethnic
intermediary authority in Zaire [now the DRC]. It is so
because it possesses . . . good organization throughout the
country, a clearly established and recognized hierarchy,
immense resources, control of much of the country's
health, wealth, educational, and publications activities, and
strong external ties. The new central elite began to view
the church as a sort of proto-state. [emphasis added]
In addition, the church (over the years) has provided 'certain facilities, credit, advice and 
equipment which were unavailable from any other source including the state to aspiring 
entrepreneurs' (Schatzberg, 1988: 122). Callaghy (1984: 304) adds that the Roman 
Catholic Church has also been involved in the delivery of social services such as the 
construction of roads, and notes that its "logistical infrastructure is far superior to that of 
the state." Haynes (1996: 116) posits that 'the church moved in to fill the gap as the state 
withdrew from its responsibilities'. Little wonder that the Roman Catholic Church in the 
DRC is viewed as a "proto-state".7 Apart from its opposition to the defunct Mobutu 
7 It is not uncommon to find a few Congolese who would go as far as equating the church with the state. 
Cardinal Joseph Malula, a former head of the Roman Catholic Church in DR Congo, once argued: "[f]or 
our people, the Church was the state and the State was the Church" (Internet 2).
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regime, the church played a central role in the convocation of the conference nationale 
souveraine (CNS) (sovereign national conference) in 1991 and its reopening in 1992 after 
a halt to its proceedings following violence by Mobutu's forces (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002: 
189-208). Remarkably, Monsignor Laurent Monsengwo, the Archbishop of the Roman
Catholic Church in Kisangani, presided over the CNS. His appointment by Mobutu, 
although apparently informed by parochial considerations, was in itself a recognition of 
the significant position of the Catholic Church in DR Congo's public space. 
Protestant Churches 
The history of Protestant churches in the DRC is traced to the arrival of Baptist 
missionaries in the Kongo in 1878. Thirteen years later, American Southern 
Presbyterians arrived in Luebo and established ministries at Kasai and Kananga. 
American Baptists had also been working in the Lower Congo province even as 
Scandinavian Baptists engaged in missionary work around Bandundu and the Lower Uele 
areas. Conservative Baptists, on the other hand, focused their ministries in Goma. 
Another group, the Disciples of Christ, arrived before the tum of the century and 
established their presence in Bolenge following their take over (in 1899) of the 
missionary activities previously undertaken by American Baptists (Presbyterian Church 
USA, n.d.). In 1912, the African Inland Mission established a mission at Kasengu and 
extended its work to the north eastern part of the country. American Methodists began 
missionary work in the Shaba province a year later. In 1915, some members of the 
Assemblies of God came to northern Shaba and Kalemie from the United States. Their 
counterparts from the United Kingdom worked in Isiro and Kinshasa while those from 
Norway and Sweden took charge of Bukavu. The period before DR Congo's 
independence witnessed the influx of missionaries representing diverse religious 
networks namely the Christian and Missionary Alliance, the Christian Brethren, 
Mennonite groups, the Salvation Army, and the Seventh-Day Adventist Church. At the 
time of DRC's independence, "there were 46 Protestant missionary groups at work in 345 
scattered mission stations, staffed by 2,511 missionaries of 11 different nationalities" 
(Presbyterian Church USA, n.d.). 
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Suffice it to say that there were early attempts at collaboration between the diverse 
Protestant churches and groups operating in the country. The first significant step in the 
series of these collaborative efforts was the setting up of "a committee to maintain 
contact and national cooperation and to minimize internal competition" (Presbyterian 
Church USA, n.d.). It was absolutely necessary to work towards cooperation and 
harmonious coexistence between and among these religious networks given that they did 
not restrict themselves to the 'Christianisation' of the people but engaged in commercial 
ventures that were bound to engender friction around such issues as mining rights, 
mission employees' recruitment, and produce marketing. Cooperation between and 
among Protestant groups in the country received a boost with the formation of the Congo 
Protestant Council in 1924. The council metamorphosed into a union of Congolese 
Protestant Churches - a precursor of the Eglise du Christ au Zaire (ECZ) i.e. Church of 
Christ in Zaire, which was established in 1970 (Presbyterian Church USA, n.d.).8 Since 
its formation, the ECC has been the second most influential religious group (after the 
Catholic Church) in DR Congo's history. 
The ECC, which has institutions that serve needs common to its members such as 
missionary guest houses and book stores, has played substantial roles in national life 
through "educational and social ministries" either independently or in collaboration with 
the Catholic Church (Presbyterian Church USA, n.d.). A significant role in the 
promotion of learning and scholarship was the establishment of the Universite libre du 
Congo (ULC) (the Free University of the Congo) at Kisangani by the Protestants in 1963 
(Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002: 174) but the institution was nationalised by the Mobutu regime 
in 1971 as part of his [Mobutu's] implementation of 'authenticite', a policy that sought to 
promote 'Zairianess'. It should be stated that the nationalisation of the university was 
part of a grand scheme by Mobutu to undermine social forces, including religious groups, 
that seemed to constrain his absolute rule. Remarkably, the Protestant churches did put 
up with Mobutu's campaign of 'authenticite' as its implementation hit the Roman 
Catholic Church the most. The diminution of the Roman Catholic Church, the 8 The Eglise du Christ au Zaire (ECZ) is now Eglise du Christ au Congo (ECC) i.e. Church of Christ in the 
Congo, following the rechristening of the country from Zaire to Democratic Republic of Congo by the late 
President Laurent-Desire Kabila on May 17, 1997. 
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Protestants ostensibly reckoned, would compensate for the low profile that Protestantism 
had during colonial rule and the immediate post-independence period. In other words, 
"the Protestants apparently considered that what was bad news for the Catholics 
necessarily was good news for them" (Internet 3). 
Therefore, the Protestant churches were not as vehement as the Roman Catholic Church 
in their condemnation of the regime's excesses as they sought to maximise their "gains" 
from the friction between Mobutu and the Roman Catholic Church. In fact, it has been 
argued that 'Protestant churches, particularly the then ECZ leadership, were consistently 
supportive of Mobutu, and that this made them an attractive potential partner whereby the 
ECZ served the state interests where church-state interests coincided'. However, the 
Mobutu regime shot itself in the leg when it 'announced the process of popular 
consultation' in the early 90s. Seizing the momentum, the ECZ criticised the regime, 
denounced its excesses and simultaneously called for change (Internet 4). It was the 
activism by the leaders of the ECZ, the Roman Catholic Church and other civil society 
groups that compelled Mobutu to acquiesce to the demand for the convocation of a CNS 
in 1991 (supra, p. 17). Over the years, the ECZ (now the ECC) has been the voice of 
Protestant Churches and has dealt directly with the government on their behalf. 
Kimbanguist Church 
The third major religious group and the largest independent church in the DRC is the 
Kimbanguist Church, officially known as l 'Eglise de Jesus-Christ sur la Terre par le 
Prophete Simon Kimbangu (EJCSK) (the Church of Jesus Christ on Earth by the Prophet 
Simon Kimbangu). The EJCSK is an indigenous, syncretic religious movement, which 
emerged from the charismatic activities of Prophet Simon Kimbangu around the Bas­
Congo areas in 1921. Kimbangu claimed that God had appeared to him and commanded 
'him to preach the gospel of liberation from all forms of oppression, negative customs 
and white domination' (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002: 48). His "messianic movement had 
heavy political undertones" (Callaghy, 1984: 308) in that he decried the colonial 
enterprise and espoused pan-African views about "racial pride, liberation and self­
reliance" (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002: 49). Nzongola-Ntalaja (2002: 49) recalls that 
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"thousands of workers abandoned their jobs in government agencies, private companies 
and white households to see" and listen to Kimbangu's sermons. Suffice it to say that the 
people readily identified with his radical views. According to Callaghy (1984: 308), 
Kimbangu's movement "alarmed the colonial administration" and expectedly, "the 
colonial trinity of the state, the Roman Catholic Church and major private companies 
reacted quickly and vigorously" (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002: 49). How? "Kimbangu was 
arrested for preaching the subversive ideas of Pan-Africanism, tried and condemned to 
death for sedition" (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002: 49). However, the death sentence was 
commuted to life imprisonment, 'which he served at the infamous Kasapa Prison at 
Lubumbashi until his death in 1951' (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002: 49). But his death did not 
signal the demise of the movement. 
It is on record that Pan-African ideas influenced Kimbangu's ministry and activism. As 
far as Kimbangu and his "comrades" were concerned, "the realisation of the Pan-African 
ideal of 'Africa for the Africans was God's will, indeed" (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002: 49). 
And according to Muzong Kodi (quoted in Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002: 50), "Kimbanguism 
had two concomitant goals: the salvation of the soul and the liberation of the Congo from 
Belgian colonialism" [emphasis added]. The foregoing underscored the involvement of 
Kimbanguists in anti-colonial resistance and 'the radical questioning of oppressive 
authority' for which many of them were incarcerated in camps (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002: 
50, 51). It is instructive to note that Kimbangu and his followers strongly resisted 
colonialism "at a time when Catholicism was a pillar of the colonial system and 
Protestantism an advocate for mild reforms" (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002: 51). In spite of the 
ban on the religious group and the bitter persecution of the Kimbanguists between 1921 
and 1959, the movement grew stronger and "several politico-religious movements of 
Kimbanguist inspiration arose to occupy the political space" (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002: 
51) such that it had a strong hold on workers and peasants in particular and Congolese in
general. Belgium granted legal recognition to the EJCSK on December 24, 1959 and ten 
years later, the movement became a member of the World Council of Churches. 
20 
As noted earlier, the Kimbanguist Church played a significant role in the struggle for DR 
Congo's independence. In the Mobutu era, members of the movement were 'less 
apolitical than the Protestants and sought good relations with the Mobutu regime, and in 
tum the latter always responded well to Kimbanguists' overtures by expressing state 
support for the movement (Callaghy, 1984: 308). It is interesting to note that 'during the 
height of the tension between Mobutu's regime and the Catholic Church, Mobutu visited 
several Kimbanguist schools and social centres to show his pleasure with this group that 
had manifested its cooperation with his regime' (Callaghy, 1984: 308). It is on record 
that the Kimbanguist Church, an outcast during colonial rule, was Mobutu's close ally 
whereas the former ally of the colonial government - the Roman Catholic Church -
became an outspoken critic of the Mobutu regime and expectedly, bore the brunt of his 
draconian rule (Internet 5). 
An understanding of the history and socio-political roles of the three major religious 
groups in the DR Congo is pertinent to this narrative on the country's religious 
demographics. However, what comes across in the comparison of figures on religious 
affiliation is the imprecision of statistics as a majority of Congolese, for instance, 'belong 
to one Christian church or another'. Hence, DR Congo's religious configuration exhibits 
overlapping affiliations, which make exclusive categorisations difficult. In addition, 
religious identity in DR Congo (as with class and ethnic identities) is often situational and 
based on pragmatism (Internet 6). That said, the DRC - with 60,085,804 inhabitants in 
2005 - has a huge Christian population (put at 80%), predominantly Roman Catholic. 
Approximately 50% of the DRC's population is Roman Catholic, 20% is Protestant, 10% 
is Kimbanguist, 10% is Muslim while the remaining 10% comprises other religious 
organisations, syncretic sects and traditional religions.9 It is stated elsewhere that 16.5% 
of the population is Kimbanguist and that Islam 'counts only a small number of adherents 
in DR Congo, perhaps 1 % of the population and principally clustered in a few cities' 
(Internet 6). This is significantly divergent from the 10% estimation given above. 
Regardless of the percentage adopted, it is evident that 'Islam has relatively little impact 9 Although there are conflicting statistics as to religious networks' membership profile in the DRC, these 
figures have gained wide acceptance in official circles. See Internet 7; Internet 8; and Internet 9. 
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in the DRC' (Presbyterian Church USA, n.d.). The figure below ts a pictorial 
representation of DR Congo's religious demography: 
Figure 1: Religious affiliation in DR Congo (in%) 
Others 
Kimbanguist Roman Catholic 
As noted above, the three major religious groups in the DRC namely the Roman Catholic 
Church, the ECC and the Kimbanguist Church wield tremendous influence as a result of 
their membership, immense resources and strong external ties. It can be argued that the 
influence that these networks have on the generality of the Congolese rivals (if not 
surpasses) that of the state in view of the latter's failure to meet basic human needs. 
Evidence from my field research suggests that the generality of Congolese construe faith­
based organisations as an oasis of social service provision and harbingers of hope in the 
wilderness of crises and disillusionment arising from state deflation. Haynes (1996: 116) 
makes a potent observation against the backdrop of these churches' towering influence in 
the face of state incapacitation: 'the state virtually gave up its developmental role, passing 
it to the three churches: Catholic, Protestant and Kimbanguist.' The twin facts that these 
religious institutions are 'autonomous structures beyond the state's control' and that they 
'provide development goods which the state has been unable or unwilling to supply' 
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(Haynes, 1996: 116) make them important civil society actors. It goes without saying 
that their pre-eminence as civil society actors in DR Congo's public space stems from 
their character as forces for social mobilisation and from their economic, social and 
political roles. This point will be dilated later, albeit in relation to their role in 
peace building. 
2.2 The seeds of crisis and the conflict in the DRC 
The crisis in [DR] Congo cannot be understood as an event 
in isolation; it is the result of a series of postcolonial 
tragedies that exacerbated the legacies of a harsh 
colonialism and a miscalculated independence (McCalpin, 
2002: 33). 
The DRC -Africa's third largest country (The Guardian [Lagos] 17 January 2001: 4)­
has been the epicentre of a deadly and complex conflict since 1998. However, this is not 
to suggest that the country has always been at peace with itself and neighbours prior to 
1998. As a matter of fact, the DRC has been the most unstable s>L&ll.tht;LCOJJPJ:ri�s in the 
Great Lakes Region of Africa. This mineral-rich country at the heart of Africa has been 
besmirched by @precedented crisis since the attainment of independence from Belgium 
-- .. ------ �:,-.:.·.----•·-=--,-,......,.=-==-....... .., =---.-,.,-=-=-�""= 
in 1960. That DR Congo's 'biography' is steeped in conflict is indeed obvious. A series - _,.. -� 
of post-colonial traumas illustrate the country's perennial tempestuousness: the mutiny in 
the immediate post-independence epoch (exacerbated by the ill-fated secession of the 
C ' 
mineral-rich Katanga province) coupled with the assassination of Patrice Emery 
Lumumba, with the conspiracy of Western nations (mainly the United States' Central 
Intelligence Agency) and United Nations observers (Lumumba-Kasongo, 2001: 7; 
McCalpin, 2002: 39; Ibeike-Joriah, 2001: 2; Babatope, 1981: 43-48; Stockwell, 1978); 
the Shaba invasions of 1977 and 1978, led by the Angolan-based Front national 
deliberation du Congo (FNLC) or the National Front for the Liberation of the Congo; 
several uprisings- often with external support-against the defunct Mobutu regime (Ojo, 
1985); Laurent Kabila's Alliance des forces democratiques pour la liberation du Congo­
Zaire (Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo -AFDL) rebellion 
(1996-1997) which ousted Mobutu; and the anti-Kabila rebellion which culminated in the 
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receding(?) war (1998-?). 10 It is trite to say that the Congolese have never experienced 
real peace over a sustained period in the post-colonial period. 
The quotation at the outset of this section speaks to the fact that DR Congo's 
recent/current traumas have their roots in the country's historical trajectory. For a 
certainty, the Belgian colonial policy of "benevolent paternalism" (Merriam, 1961: 3 5) 
had done little to prepare the Congolese for governance (Clark, 2002: 2) and, as such, DR 
Congo's gravitation towards state failure was only a matter of time. The Belgian failure 
to prepare the DRC for nationhood and to instil a sense of cohesion and nationalist 
fervour in the people did not take long to manifest itself. The DRC was plagued by chaos 
barely a week after independence when the Force publique (Public Forces - FP) mutinied 
on 5 - 9 July 1960 (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002: 270). The violence that ensued snowballed 
into a national crisis that eventually consumed the first democratically elected Prime 
Minister, Patrice Lumumba. Taking 'advantage' of the crisis, Colonel (later General, and 
from December 1982, Marshal) Joseph Desire Mobutu (later Mobutu Sese Seko) seized 
power through a coup d'etat in September 1960 (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002: 271). 
Although Mobutu relinquished power in February 1961, he again seized the reins of 
governance on November 25, 1965 and declared himself president. Mobutu Sese Seko 
held the country's political firmament for an uninterrupted period of thirty-two years 
during which "an extraordinary personalization of political rule resulted [ and] a cult of 
personality flourished" (McCalpin, 2002: 42). The Mobutu regime was characterised by 
repression and tyranny; its record of brutality was nonpareil. 
Perhaps it should be stated here that Mobutu's brutal regime was actively supported (and 
consolidated) by Western powers. Nzongola-Ntalaja (2002: 160-161) predicates external 
support for the Mobutu regime on three interdependent premises: first, the need to 
prevent or contain the spread of communism in consonance with the logic of Cold War 
politics; second, "the need to support loyal friends, regardless of their behaviour towards 
10 John Stockwell's In Search of Enemies: A CIA Story (New York: W. W. Norton, 1978) offers a fairly 
convincing eyewitness account of the complicity of the CIA in the assassination ofLumumba. Stockwell is 
a former CIA officer who served in Central Africa in the 1960s. He became a critic of United States 
government policies after he resigned from the agency in 1976. 
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their own people" - still another strand in the logic of Cold War politics; and third 
(perhaps the most important), "the need to use the [DR] Congo to promote Western 
interests in Central and Southern Africa". Given the foreign policy priorities of the 
Western powers during the Cold War, unflinching support for an ally - a bulwark of 
some sort against communism - was an absolute imperative. In essence, the fight against 
communism and the need to curtail Soviet influence in Africa were the rationale for 
Western support for Mobutu. Also at stake were the strategic and economic interests of 
the United States in particular. Hartung and Moix (2000) in a report prepared for the 
World Policy Institute posit that in order to keep this puppet regime in power, the United 
States assisted Mobutu by building his 'arsenal' through a "steady supply of rifles, 
ammunition, trucks, jeeps, patrol boats, and communications equipment. By the time the 
dictator was ousted in 1997, the U.S had delivered more than $300 million (measured in 
constant 1998 dollars) in military hardware to Mobutu's regime." Besides, the United 
States reportedly "trained 1,350 of Mobutu's soldiers at a cost of more than $100 
million" (The Guardian [Lagos] 30 January 2001: 61). The West not only kept or 
sustained Mobutu in power but also put a 'hearty arsenal of deadly weaponry' at his 
disposal in spite of his egregious human rights record. The cumulative effect of 
"Mobutuism" was the undermining of the Congolese state and the jeopardising of its 
prospects for survival. "In terms of political economy", Clark (2002: 2) argues that "the 
internal logic of Mobutu's .. . state was such that it evolved inexorably toward collapse." 
It can be said that the Western nations betrayed the Congolese in at least two instances: 
first, their culpability in the assassination of DR Congo's first prime minister and Pan­
Africanist, Patrice Lumumba; and second, their ignominious support for Mobutu and his 
dictatorship. "[T]hese shameful episodes of betrayal" (The Guardian [Lagos] 30 January 
2001: 61) illuminate the holistic understanding of the causalities in DR Congo's 
postcolonial traumas, including the current crisis. The contradictions of Belgian 
colonialism, 'Mobutuism' (and its legacies) as well as Western complicity invariably lurk 
at the background of the crisis in the DRC. As McCalpin (2002: 46) aptly observes, 'the 
only constant in more than three decades of DR Congo's independence had been 
patrimonialism, authoritarianism, and political decline'. Perhaps it should be added that 
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this constant characterised no other regime but Mobutu's. Hence, the armed rebellion 
against Mobutu, which crystallised with the formation of the AFDL in 1996, did not 
come as a surprise to many observers. The AFDL, under the leadership of (now 
deceased) Laurent-Desire Kabila, and with support from Rwanda and Uganda, swept 
through the DRC as Mobutu's poorly motivated soldiers offered little or no resistance to 
the insurrection. By May 1997, it became apparent that the Mobutu regime had had its 
days. AFDL troops seized Kinshasa on May 17, 1997 whilst Kabila renamed the country 
and proclaimed himself president. 
As stated at the outset of this section, the DRC has been in the throes of conflict since 
1998. On August 2 of that year, President Laurent-Desire Kabila's (former) allies in the 
AFDL launched a rebellion in eastern DR Congo signalling a rupture in the alliance that 
brought Kabila to power in 1997. 11 The schism in the alliance dashed expectations that 
Laurent Kabila's assumption of political power would engender peace. Rwanda and 
Uganda - two countries that had backed Kabila in the rebellion that overthrew Mobutu -
took up arms against Kabila, mainly on the grounds of Kabila's unwillingness to do the 
biddings of Kigali and Kampala. Rwanda accused Kabila of failing not only to take 
decisive action to protect Congolese Tutsis (whose safety and interests were dear to the 
government in Kigali) but also to 'liquidate' the Interahamwe (remnants of the extremist 
Hutu militia) and ex-FAR (Forces Armies Rwandaises or Rwandan Armed Forces) 
responsible for the Rwandan genocide - groups which were now taking refuge in DR 
Congo and constituting security threats to Rwanda. Given these factors, the Rwandans 
justified their invasion of ( or intervention in) the DR Congo on "humanitarian and 
defensive grounds" (Longman, 2002: 128). On the other hand, Kampala accused the 
Kabila regime of undermining Uganda's national security since Kinshasa was allowing 
subversive elements and rebel movements, including the Allied Democratic Forces 
(ADF), to launch attacks on Uganda from within DR Congo's territory (Owoeye & 
Amusan, 2000: 173). The foregoing marked the beginning of the conflict that later 
snowballed into a regional war. 11 The ousting of Mobutu as well as the eruption of the anti-Kabila revolution is well documented in several 
works on the conflict in the DRC. See for instance, Nzongola-Ntalaja (2002); Clark (2002); lbeike-Jonah 
(2001); and Weiss (2000). 
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The intervention of Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe in support of the government in 
Kinshasa "widened" the war. Although the motivations of these countries differed, their 
intervention in the DR Congo war was apparently in response to Kabila's diplomatic 
overtures, mainly the request for assistance in dealing with the aggression and invasion of 
the DRC by Rwanda and Uganda. Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe predicated their 
support for Kinshasa on ( or under the guise of) the logic of mutual defence as provided 
for in the security and defence framework of the Southern African Development 
Community- SADC (Rupiya, 2002: 96; Dunn, 2002: 64). 
However, various chapters in Clark's (2002) compendium illustrate the fact that each 
(intervening) state had its own motivation(s), interest(s) and agenda(s) even though the 
SADC countries that intervened foiled the attempt by the Rwanda and Uganda-backed 
rebels to overthrow Kabila. In the case of Angola, its role in the DRC conflict was 
premised on three key elements: (i) the fight against the Uniiio Nacional para a 
Independencia Total de Angola (the National Union for Total Independence of Angola -
UNITA), "especially by interdicting its supplies"; (ii) the need to protect the oil 
installations that finance Luanda's war efforts; and (iii) the need "to maintain a 
favourable or compliant regime in Kinshasa" (Turner, 2002: 75). Namibia's intervention 
in the DRC has been predicated largely on the economic interests of private individuals 
including former President Sam Nujoma's family members. Many of his family 
members were reportedly deeply involved in the mining industry in the diamond rich 
Mbuji-Mayi in the Kasai province of the DRC (Owoeye & Amusan, 2000: 176). 
At least three factors underpinned Zimbabwe's involvement in the DR Congo war: (i) 
President Robert Mugabe's desire to become Southern Africa's premiere statesman and 
'kingmaker' as a counterpoise to the growing influence of a post-apartheid South Africa; 
(ii) the formal request by the government of the DRC to the SADC; and (iii) economic
motives of Mugabe and his family members (Rupiya, 2002: 96-97; Owoeye & Amusan, 
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2000: 176). 12 Suffice it to say that the involvement of Rwanda and Uganda (on the side 
of the rebels) and Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe (on the side of the government) 
exacerbated the conflict. 
Indeed, the war in the DRC has been characterised by complexities that previously had 
not been witnessed in African conflicts. At one time the war drew in the armies of nine 
African countries - "directly or through the medium of proxy militias, mafia-style 
business networks or ethnic links" (Doyle, 2004: i.d.) - and as many as twelve irregular 
non-governmental militia groups, thus giving it the "qualities of a civil war and an 
international war" (Ross, 2004: 53). Elsewhere, I have described the war in the DRC as 
an internationalised intrastate conflict (Whetho, 2001: 62). Interlopers/foreign forces 
with divergent motivations have allied themselves with or fought against Congolese rebel 
groups in this brutal war of partition and plunder. It has been a conflict involving 'a 
variety of shadow networks, states, mafias, private armies, "businessmen" and assorted 
state elites from both within and outside Africa', with concomitant social, political and 
ecological dislocation for the whole of Central Africa (Taylor, 2003: 45). 
The involvement of several actors (and their divergent but vested interests and agendas), 
including global businesses (Latham, Kassimir & Callaghy, 2001: 2) and profiteering 
networks has given the conflict the labels of "Africa's First World War" (Taylor, 2003: 
45) and "Africa's First Continental War" (Weiss, 1999: 4). The conflict has equally been
described as "the most deadly war ever documented in Africa or anywhere in the world 
during the past half-century" (Clark, 2002: 1). The DRC's conflict, characterised by a 
"game of alliances" in which every actor has been guided by "my enemy's enemy is my 
friend" logic (Reyntjens, 1998: 10), is undeniably Africa's biggest war since the end of 
the Cold War. And according to the International Rescue Committee (2006c: i.d.), a 
12 In tenns of the economic interests of the Mugabe regime vis-a-vis Zimbabwe's involvement in the DRC, 
Rupiya (2002: 96-97) argues that "whatever economic interests Zimbabwe subsequently acquired in [DR] 
Congo were not part of its initial calculus of intervention." However, the validity of Rupiya's claim is 
challenged by the "other" view that Mugabe was "lured by [DR] Congo's rich natural resources" and that 
"Kabila and Mugabe had signed a US$200 million contract involving corporations owned by Mugabe and 
his family" (Internet I 0). The foregoing, it should be stated, does not lend credence to the subordination of 
economic motives to other factors in the intervention calculus. 
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global agency involved in peace work, the DRC conflict is "the deadliest since World 
War II". 
That said, natural resources, ethnicity and security concerns are at the hub of the conflict 
in the DRC. Furthermore, the war in DR Congo, and specifically the intervention of 
Rwanda, can also be situated within the larger Hutu-Tutsi rivalry in the Great Lakes 
region. For instance, it was noted above that Kigali predicated its military invasion of 
DR Congo on the imperative to 'liquidate' the genocidaires/remnants of the ethnic Hutu 
army (the Interahamwe) as their presence in the DRC was/is a threat to Rwanda's 
national security. However, Rwanda's (legitimate) security concerns, as Longman (2002: 
141)argues, are obliterated by its desire for enrichment, which apparently has been ( or is
being?) satisfied by its exploitation of DR Congo's natural resources as well as the 
misdemeanour of its troops in the DRC. As a matter of fact, the underlying motivation 
for the (external) actors' involvements in the conflict has been primarily economic, 
clearly defined as the attraction to DR Congo's resources (Afoaku, 2002: 109-128; Clark, 
2002: 145-68; Weinstein, 2000). Dunn (2002: 70) notes rather potently that 'the DRC 
has become an economic colony for most of the combatants, with its resources being 
drained to the east and south.' 
The allure of the vast mineral wealth of the DRC and the profitability of resource looting 
for foreign governments, rebel militia movements, and individual officers has not only 
made the war intractable but also has vitiated the incentive to end it (Ross, 2004: 53-54), 
thereby giving credence both to the high correlation between natural resources and ( civil) 
war, and to the continuation and expansion of its geographical scope (Fearon, 2004; 
Buhaug & Gates, 2002: 417-33). Granted, ethnicity and security imperatives are crucial 
factors in the war, but the economic motives and the vested commercial interests of 
parties have undermined their saliency, which indubitably have made the resolution of 
the conflict difficult. 
Combatants have adopted a number of strategies in this war of partition and plunder. 
Afoaku (2002: 120) describes the rebels' strategy as one of blitzkrieg or quick victory 
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reminiscent of the AFDL's modus operandi for the overthrow of Mobutu. Hence, the 
rebels embarked on swift combat operations leading to the seizure and control of strategic 
mineral-rich areas including the 'Kivu provinces and portions of the Orientale and Bas­
Congo provinces en route Kinshasa. But the rebels could not capture Kinshasa as the 
government received military support from Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe' (Afoaku, 
2002: 120-121). Amnesty International (2003: i.d.) reports that belligerents have adopted 
such strategies as pillage, forced conscription of young persons and torture in pursuing 
their "war for profit" agenda. The DR Congo conflict - a multilayered war between local 
forces (such as Hema-Lendu ethnic fighting in Ituri in early 2001) and regional forces 
(such as armies of Rwanda against those of Uganda in Kisangani in August 1999 and 
May-June 2000) (Murison, 2002: 227) - is one that has had concomitant repercussions in 
terms of human casualties, social dislocation, economic downturn. and the further 
destruction of already deficient infrastructure. According to the International Rescue 
Committee (2006a: i.d.), 
nearly 4 million people [have been] killed from war-related 
causes since [the eruption of the war in] 1998, the largest 
documented death toll in a conflict since World War II. In 
a matter of six years, the world lost a population equivalent 
to the entire country of Ireland or the city of Los Angeles. 
The figures released by the International Rescue Committee (2006b: i.d.) 'indicate that 
almost 38,000 persons die in DR Congo every month, above what is considered a 
"normal level" for the country'. Although military operations have claimed a great 
number of lives, war-related consequences such as food shortages, hunger, diseases and 
the collapse of health infrastructure have accounted for more deaths. Apart from deaths, 
the conflict in the DRC has precipitated social dislocation and generated a stream of 
refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), resulting in a complex humanitarian 
crisis. The war - going by current estimates - has produced over 2 million IDPs 
(International Rescue Committee, 2006c: i.d.) and over 400,000 refugees (United Nations 
High Commission for Refugees, 2005: i.d.). It is instructive to note that the magnitude 
and ramifications of the crisis in the DRC underpin its description "as the world's 
deadliest emergency" (International Rescue Committee, 2006c: i.d.). 
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Having said that, efforts have been made both at regional and global levels to end the 
conflict in the DRC. The SADC, the defunct Organisation of African Unity - OAU (now 
the African Union - AU), and the United Nations (UN) have at various times taken steps 
to bring peace to DR Congo. Significant developments in the peace process include but 
are not limited to: 
• The signing of the Lusaka Peace Accord ( or the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement) in
July 1999 - a culmination of third-party intervention by the SADC under the
direction of former Zambian President, Frederick Chiluba (The Guardian on
Sunday [Lagos] 11 July 1999: 7).
• The efforts of Sir Ketumile Masire (the former president of Botswana) as OAU's
neutral facilitator of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue (ICD). [Masire's efforts were
however frustrated by the late President Laurent Kabila who accused the former
of favouring the rebels and subsequently rejected not only Masire but also the
Lusaka Accord] (Dunn, 2002: 68).
• The assassination of Laurent Kabila and the subsequent accession to power by his
son, Joseph. The young 'Kabila's break from his father's legacy' gave fillip to
the peace process in that he not only 'resuscitated the Lusaka Peace Accord but
also cooperated with Masire to convoke the ICD as well as to allow the
deployment of the UN observer force' (Dunn, 2002: 69).
• The establishment of a two-phase peacekeeping force by the UN in November
1999. The force, known as Mission des Nations Unies en Republique
Democratique du Congo (United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of
Congo - MONUC), has over 16,000 troops [otherwise referred to as the "blue
helmets"] in what is the "[UN's] biggest peacekeeping operation" in the world
(Sundaram, 2005: i.d.).
• The convocation of the ICD at Sun City, South Africa in April 2003. The ICD
established the framework for the current transitional government in the DRC.
The transitional authority, in turn, produced a draft constitution which was
endorsed by the Congolese in a national referendum in December 2005 (Interview
with PMA, Pietermaritzburg, 03 January 2006). General elections sheduled for
July 2006 ("180 degrees", SABC AFRICA, 07 March 2006 - 08:00 Central
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African Time) were held as planned. The presidential elections in July 2006 did 
not produce an outright winner thus necessitating a second round ( or run-off) 
between the two leading candidates - incumbent President, Jospeh Kabila, and 
opposition leader, Jean Pierre Bemba - whose supporters clashed in Kinshasa 
after the declaration of the results. The second round of elections, held on 29 
October 2006, produced Joseph Kabila as president-elect, but not without 
controversy as Jean Pierre Bemba denounced the results (Internet 11). It is hoped 
that the conclusion of the elections - the final phase of the transition process -
will climax with the inauguration of the new government and the nurturing of 
peace and stability in the DRC. 13
Although the overall political situation in the DRC suggests some stability, ethnic 
conflicts and fratricidal combat between signatories to the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement 
and among former allies as well as rebel groups in eastern DR Congo intensified for a 
while after the closure of the ICD in April 2003 (Boshoff & Rupiya, 2004: 29; 
Vlassenroot & Raeymaekers, 2004), the year in which the war was officially declared 
over. Expressed differently, the significant saltations in the peace process - represented 
mainly by the Lusaka Agreement (in 1999) and the remarkable ICD which culminated in 
the current transitional government in Kinshasa (Alusala, 2004: 93-6; Smis & Trefon, 
2003: 672), and the presence ofMONUC forces- did not result in the complete cessation 
of conflict in the DRC. And only time will tell if the conclusion of the democratic 
transition process will usher in sustainable peace. However, it must be said that the 
deployment of MONUC troops brought about relative security in the country, expanded 
state authority over substantial segments of the country's territory, and created conditions 
under which elections could be held as scheduled. Nonetheless, in my 
discussions/correspondences with a cross section of Congolese, I learnt that the eastern 
region of DR Congo (predominantly the two Kivus - North and South Kivu - and the 
Ituri region) remained a theatre of war and continues to be plagued by conflict, even as at 
the time of writing. This presupposes that more effort is needed to attain sustainable 13 The concluding chapter of this study highlights the implications of the elections for DR Congo's future. 
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country-wide peace. The next chapter reviews scholarly works that are integral to the 
subject-matter explored by this thesis. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
A REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE 
Religion is part of culture ... [it] is an essential hue in the human mosaic. 
3.1 What is religion? 
(Jordan & Rowntree, 1990: 190). 
Religion is one thing to the anthropologist, another to the 
sociologist, another to the psychologist (and again another 
to the next psychologist!), another to the Marxist, another 
to the mystic, ... and yet another to the Jew or Christian ... 
There is consequently no universally accepted definition of 
religion, and quite possibly there never will be (Crawford, 
2002: 3). 
The concept of religion is plagued by definitional complexities ascribable to the plurality 
of belief systems and cultures. The motley of beliefs, persuasions and philosophies about 
religion, its intent, its functions, formalism and relevance makes it difficult to advance an 
all-encompassing generalisation about the concept. Put differently, religion is a 
heterogeneous and multidimensional entity, which does not lend itself to a universally 
acceptable definition. The problem of definition is of such critical magnitude that Park 
(1994: 32) posits: "the difficulties of defining 'religion' are a vocational hazard." 
However, this 'hazard' should neither detain us here nor obviate the need to proffer a 
working definition as a prelude to explicating the perspective of religion, which this study 
adopts. That said, an exploration of the various definitions of religion is requisite to an 
operational generalisation. 
Barrett (1982: 841) defines religion as "a system of faith and worship, centrally 
concerned with the means of ultimate transformation." It is "an attitude of awe towards 
God, or gods, or the supernatural, or the mystery of life, accompanied by beliefs and 
affecting basic patterns of individual and group behaviour" (Bulllock & Stallybrass, 
1981: 53 7). Stark and Bainbridge (1979: 119) point out the quintessence of the 
supernatural in their definition of religion as "solutions to questions of ultimate meaning 
which postulate the existence of a supernatural being, world, or force, and which further 
postulate that this force is active, that events and conditions here on earth are influenced 
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by the supernatural." Broek and Webb (1973: 134) posit that religion "comprises any 
form of faith from monotheism to ancestor worship and even magic, insofar as it contains 
an element of reverence for the supernatural." The quest for ultimate transformation 
and/or group identity/consciousness informs and reinforces belief in the supernatural. In 
fact, the foregoing can be described as the essence of religion. Against this backdrop, 
Said and Funk (2001: i.d.) define religion as "a path of ultimate transformation, 
comprised of systems of symbols and guidelines [which] shape the individual and group 
subconscious from which social practices and interactions are all given meaning." 
Crawford (2002: 1, 201) quotes a number of definitions of religion as put forward by 
sociologists and scholars of comparative religion: 
• "A system of beliefs and practices by means of which a group of people struggle
with the ultimate problems of human life." - J. M Yinger.
• "Any beliefs which involve the acceptance of a sacred, trans-empirical realm and
any behaviour designed to affect a person's relationship with that realm." - P.
Connolly.
• "A religion is a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things,
that is to say, things set apart and forbidden, beliefs and practices which unite into
one single [moral] community called church, all those who adhere to them." - E.
Durkheim.
• "Religion is a revolutionary urge, a psycho-social impulse to generate a new
humanity." -A. Pieris.
• "Beliefs, actions and institutions, which assume the existence of supernatural
entities with powers of action or impersonal powers or processes possessed of
moral purpose." - S. Bruce.
The above definitions presuppose that religion has to do with personal experience with 
the extra-terrestrial, that it is a catalyst for change and that it creates a bond between 
adherents who, in turn, may form a close-knit unit for the sake of (re)asserting or 
achieving social solidarity. Hence, it can be said that a functional definition conceives of 
religion as doing something in, and for, a society. Apart from religion's influence on an 
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individual, it has the capacity to shape social dynamics in fundamental ways. In other 
words, it does exert tremendous influence on individuals in their various clusters, 
including their social formations. For one thing, its inherent potential to give meaning to 
life and eschatological phenomena is portrayed in these definitions. And the latent 
functions of religion, as Wilson (1982: 32) notes, underscore its definition as 'an 
obligation, a necessity, the 'given' means of coping with the world.' The functionalist 
theory of religion postulates that religion serves as a 'means of coping with the world' 
through its offer of psychological reassurance otherwise expressed as hope (Wilson, 
1982: 32). In fact, it is more of what religion does (functional), rather than what it is
(substantive), that informs and resonates in most definitions. 
The search for a working definition necessitates the analysis of the various definitions on 
the basis of their relational aspects i.e. whether these definitions are substantive or 
functional. In other words, it is necessary to categorise these definitions according to 
their contextual syllogisms with a view to arriving at an operational definition of religion, 
which not only encapsulates the substantive and functional aspects but also suits the 
sense in which the concept is used in this study. The various definitions (whether 
substantive or functional), according to Crawford (2002: 3-7, 192-202), can be grouped 
into the following broad categories: ethical, legal, ritual, institutional, credal, personal 
and political. 
An ethical definition of religion stresses the importance of morality and ethical values 
including good conduct and the 'dignity of the human person'. Almost (if not all) faiths 
emphasize certain virtues or ideals that should guide one's relationship with the 
supernatural and even one's neighbour. The ethical definition of religion puts these 
values as well as adherence to them ahead of every other trait of belief systems. 
Therefore, it can be said that the primacy of idealism - the cardinal thrust of the ethical 
definition - pretermits other traits that are religious in character and thus require a 
mention in any definition. Undoubtedly, religion involves much more than morality. 
Besides, the ethical definition ignores the darker side of human nature (Crawford, 2002: 
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193). Consequently, a purely ethical definition of religion 1s both restrictive and 
defective. 
A legal definition conceives of religion as a legal instrument, which regulates human 
interaction with the supernatural. All known faiths have established codes of conduct 
which guide their adherents. Anyone who ascribes to the code of a particular faith is thus 
said to profess or belong to that religion. However, religion is much more than a 
collection of laws. The spirituality of adherents is a critical component of religious ethos. 
As Crawford (2002: 194) notes, 'the inner condition of the heart' of those who profess a 
particular faith is of importance and as such should be factored into any definition that 
will pass as panoptic. 
A ritual definition of religion derives from the performance of rites. Crawford (2002: 
194) argues that a definition that encapsulates morality, law and rites would appear
appropriate. But such a definition ignores one important aspect of religion - its 
institutional character by which is meant the grouping of people into differentiated 
religious clusters. The foregoing therefore underscores the imperative of a broad 
generalisation that takes cognisance of morality, law, rites and faith-driven 
social/institutional formations. 
The above brings us to the institutional definition of religion. Crawford (2002: 195) 
notes that 'many people cannot think about religion except in the institutional sense'. 
Although he does not elaborate this point, it is understandable in view of the fact that 
religion creates and sustains social identity often along organisational lines. Religion 
articulates and aggregates ideas that appeal to persons who in tum identify themselves 
with the group or institution, which propagates those ideas. Expressed differently, 
persons who profess a particular faith are almost always united under an institutional 
framework. Hence, Johnston (1994: 4) reckons, "the term religion is meant to imply an 
institutional framework within which specific theological doctrines and practices are 
advocated and pursued, usually among a community of like-minded believers." 
However, a central institution could be lacking where there are different philosophical 
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perspectives ( even) within the same faith. The institutional definition suffers a setback 
where an institution does not ( exist to) coordinate the elements of morality, law and rites 
in the expression of spirituality. 
Whereas institutions may not always be present, creed is the sine qua non of all religions. 
"All religions have beliefs" (Crawford, 2002: 196) hence the credal definition of religion. 
These beliefs are intended to provide overall guidance for adherents in both minuscule 
and fundamental matters. The issue of creed is so important that any adherent who 
intentionally deviates or undermines the system of beliefs incurs the charge of heresy. It 
should also be stated here that above all else, it is creed that distinguishes one faith from 
another, thus making it the one element that should come across in any definition of 
religion. 
Personal definitions emphasize the experiences of individuals as opposed to institutional 
attributes. For instance, Alfred Whitehead (quoted in Crawford, 2002: 197) contends that 
religion is experienced in solitariness; it has to do with the individual rather than 
institutions. In a similar vein, James (1985) focuses on the personal dimension of 
religion as he argues that inner dispositions and conscience of the individual are the focal 
points of religion. On the strength of his convictions, James (1985: 26) defines religion 
as "the feelings, acts, experiences of individual men in their solitude, so far as they 
apprehend themselves to stand in relation to whatever they may consider the divine." 
Clearly, it is necessary to reflect the experiences of the individual in any definition of 
religion. However, the problem with personal definitions is that they ignore institutions 
as crucial factors, which can give character and substance to their members' religiosity. 
Indeed, more often than not, faith-based organisations are not only instrumental but also 
provide the context and transformative impulsion for their members' spiritual 
metamorphoses and journey. This reality needs to be given expression in any definition 
or generalisation about religion. 
Finally (and more importantly for the purpose of this study), there is the political 
definition, which derives from the functionalist theory of religion. Pieris' definition 
38 
( quoted above, supra, p. 3 5) of religion as a "revolutionary urge [ and] a psychological 
impulse to generate a new humanity" coheres with religion's role in bringing about 
(either positive or negative) change in society. The performance of such role is 
essentially a political undertaking. Crawford (2002: 198) suggests that the political 
definition takes liberation theology as its point of departure since it emphasizes the 
involvement of religious actors in the affairs of the state. The reality is that organised 
religion has been involved in the politics of many states, even in the affairs of secular 
states. In view of the fact that religion permeates national life in many societies, the 
political facet of religion deserves mention in an all-embracing definition. 
Having considered the vanous sub-thematic constructs under which the different 
definitions of religion could be placed, it is axiomatic that a working definition should be 
broad enough to reflect the totality of religious manifestations. Yet, arriving at such all­
encompassing definition is difficult, if not impossible. The reason being that religion is a 
heterogeneous concept, which creates an analytical paradox. Against the backdrop of the 
paradox of religion, Davie (1990: 395) asserts that "it is difficult to imagine a field of 
enquiry containing a greater number of apparent contradictions." Despite the 
contradictions within and between religions, Crawford (2002: 201-202) proffers a 
definition which he describes as 'neither too broad nor too narrow, short, inclusive' and 
applicable to all major religions: "[r]eligion is a belief in God, who is the unconditioned 
ground of all things, and in spiritual beings, resulting in personal experience of salvation 
or enlightenment, communities, scriptures, rituals, and a way of life." 
Crawford's definition encapsulates not only the substantive and functional aspects of 
religion but also the ethical, ritual, credal and personal facets of religious expression. 
However, it is silent on the institutional aspect as well as the religious expression in the 
political realm. In view of the focus of this study - religion's peacebuilding capacity in 
the public space - Crawford's characterization is of limited applicability since it omits 
two critical dimensions of religious manifestation which are fundamental to this study. 
Although Johnston's definition (quoted above, supra, p. 37) stresses the institutional 
element, it ignores the political. This study contends that the involvement of faith-based 
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institutions in the public space makes them religio-political movements and that this 
realisation should be reflected in a working definition. 14 The point here is that a 
definition - insofar as it relates to the subject-matter of this study - should (to a large 
extent, if not entirely) embrace all the attributes of religion as highlighted above. 
Writing on the place of religion in Third World politics, Haynes (1993: 28) opines that 
the term 'religion' is "a multi-faceted concept with three distinct, yet interrelated, 
meanings." In the first context, religion refers to "religious establishments (including 
priests and officials) and groups sponsored by religious organisations." Second, religion 
"pertains to models of social and individual behaviour that help to organize everyday life; 
it is to do with the idea of transcendence, i.e. it is associated with supernatural realities; 
with sacredness, i.e. as a system of language and practice that organizes the world in 
terms of what is deemed sacred." Finally, religion has to do with ultimacy, i.e. it "relates 
people to the ultimate conditions of their existence" (Haynes, 1993: 28) [ emphasis 
original]. Haynes classification illuminates the definitions highlighted above and situates 
the concept of religion within discrete but related contexts. The usage of the term 
'religion' to imply 'religious establishments, groups sponsored by religious organisations, 
spiritual belief patterns and models of behaviour that help to organize everyday life' is 
the most appropriate for this study. 
Against this background, this study advances an operational definition of religion as an 
institutional framework through which like-minded believers are galvanised into action 
anchored in the idea of transcendence and in personal/social imperatives that express 
their spirituality. Such expression of spirituality could be geared towards improving 
existential realities or towards attaining/strengthening the bond between man and the 
supernatural force no matter how defined. This definition takes cognisance of the 
contemporary manifestation of religion as an ideological movement, which exerts 
considerable influence on social as well as political dynamics within and between nation­
states. In addition, religion is not just an epiphenomenon whose domain is strictly in the 
14 It should be stated here that while such a definition may suit the purpose of this study, it may prove 
inadequate or even inappropriate where religion is analysed in relation to other subject-matters. 
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subconscious of the individual; it is a potent factor that engenders group identity and 
mobilises people to action in fundamental ways be it in the instigation of violence, the 
resolution of conflicts, post-war reconstruction or the facilitation of sustainable 
development. In fact, religion features prominently in public life in relation to many 
social phenomena. For example, Wilson (1982: 34) aptly notes that religion often serves 
'to legitimise the purposes and procedures of society; sustain men in their struggle; 
justify wars; provide explanation for misfortunes; function as a platform for dispute 
resolution; and prescribe techniques with which people could undertake daily tasks or 
once-in-a-lifetime enterprise.' One sphere of human activity where religion has featured 
prominently relates to the conduct of warfare; thus, it necessitates scholarly interest and 
analysis of the nexus between religion and conflict. 
3.2 Contested ground: religion and conflict 
"[R]eligion appears in history both as a world-maintaining 
and as a world-shaking force" (Berger, 1969: 100) 
One of the significant motifs in conflict research is the role of religion in conflict. Has 
religion played a constructive (i.e. peacebuilding) or a destructive role in conflict? There 
are two schools of thought with regard to the analyses of this nexus in conflict discourse. 
On the one hand, it is argued that religion precipitates and exacerbates conflict. On the 
other hand, the positive role of faith-based networks in facilitating inter-faith dialogue, 
reconciliation, and development lends credence to the notion � religion is a resource 
for _p�;3.�e. The question of whether religion is inherently a source of conflict or whether 
it is a resource for peace remains a subject of intense debate among scholars and policy 
makers alike. As will be seen in this section, these two perspectives (and/or the debate 
itself) reflect the social ambivalence of religion. This study subsequently examines the 
premises and evidence adduced thereof to support the arguments of these diametrically 
opposed perspectives, starting with the analysis of the view _!hat expresses religion's 
culpability in the eruption and the perpetuation of conflict. 
Reychler (1997: 21) writes that 'wars have been fought in the name of different gods and -·-
goddesses' since the awakening of religion. He adds: "[s]till today most violent conflicts
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contain religious elements linked up with ethno-national, inter-state, economic, territorial, 
cultural and other issues." McTeman (2003: ix) puts it succinctly as he argues that "[i]n 
the past twenty years the world has witnessed a dramatic increase in the number of 
conflicts where religion has become a salient factor." The reality that there are (or have 
been) numerous conflicts in different parts of the world in which adherents of all the 
major world faiths can be found ( or had been found) justifying atrocities on the grounds 
that their cause is righteous informed the title of McTeman's book, Violence in God's
Name: Religion in an Age of Conflict. Similarly, Haught (1995) 'offers a sobering 
chronicle of the many acts of cruelty, molestation, and slaughter of innocents that have 
been perpetrated in the name of one religion or another.' His book, entitled Holy Hatred: 
Religious Conflicts of the '90s gives details of religiously-motivated violence in twenty­
five nations. 15 Haught' s reportage ranges from extra-judicial murders to large-scale 
conflicts, all of which have been carried out in the name of a holy cause. Table 1 below 
enumerates some of 20th century conflicts with a religious dimension: 
15 Haught's book highlights the incidents of violence with religious undertones in Afghanistan, Bangladesh, 
Cyprus, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Kuwait, Nigeria, Northern 
Ireland, Pakistan, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, the defunct Soviet Union, Sri Lanka, Sudan, 
Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey and the United States. 
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Table 1: Conflicts with a religious dimension 
Country Main Actors Period Casualties (estimates) 
Myanmar/Burma Buddhists vs. Christians 1948 - 1977 20,000 - 40,000 
Israel/Palestine Jews vs. Arabs; Muslims vs. Christians 1968; recurrent 25,000 - 36,000 
Northern Ireland Catholic vs. Protestants 1969; sporadic 7,000- 10,000 
Philippines (Mindanao) Muslims vs. Christians (Catholics) 1970s 50,000 - 75,000 
Bangladesh Buddhists vs. Christians 1970s, 1980s 300,000 
Lebanon Syria-backed Shiites (Amal) vs. Iran-backed Shiites (Hezbollah) 1970s, 1980s 25,000 - 35,000 
Ethiopia (Oromo) Muslims vs. Central government 1976 NIA 
Egypt Muslims vs. Central government vs. Coptic Christians 1977 NIA 
Tunisia Muslims vs. Central government 1978 NIA 
India (Punjab) Sikhs vs. Central government 1982 16,000 - 20,000 
Sri Lanka Hindus vs. Muslims 1983 18,000+ 
Sudan Muslims vs. Native religions 1983; sporadic 1,000,000 - 2,000,000 
Algeria Muslims vs. Central government 1988; sporadic 100,000+ 
Uzbekistan Sunni Uzbeks vs. Shiite Meschetes 1989 NIA 
Azerbaijan Muslims vs. Christian Armenians 1990 25,000+ 
India (Kashmir) Muslims vs. (Hindu-controlled) Central government 1990; sporadic 20,000 - 40,000 
Indonesia (Aceh) Muslims vs. Central government 1990 10,000 - 12,000 
Nigeria Muslims vs. Christians 1990s; recurrent 18,000-46,000 
Iraq Sunni Muslims vs. Shiite Muslims 1991 - 1992 40,000 
Yugoslavia (Croatia) Serbian Orthodox Christians vs. Roman Catholic Christians 1991 - 1992 25,000 
Yugoslavia (Bosnia) Orthodox Christians vs. Catholic vs. Muslims 1992 - 1995 175,000 
Afghanistan Fundamentalist Muslims vs. Moderate Muslims 1992 NIA 
Tajikistan Muslims vs. Orthodox Christians 1992 40,000 - 50,000 
India (Uthar-Pradesh) Hindus vs. Muslims 1992 3,000 
Sources: Compiled by researcher and also adapted from Reychler (1997). 
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The literature on religion and conflict is replete with copious scenarios m which 
"religious differences have often been a cause or a pretext for war" (Carter, 1994: vii). 
Expressed differently, religion has been adjudged as the leitmotif of war, genocide and 
terrorism ( all the more so following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United 
States). Historically and currently, religion has been implicated in numerous conflicts 
and, as such, it is not surprising tha!____the]it_�ra!Ure on the culpa�ility of religion in mc!_ss 
slaughter is extant and burgeoning. It is difficult to embark on a comprehensive review 
of such literature in this section, and in this study. For the want of time and space, 
therefore, this study highlights the scholarly works that have been published on this 
subject-matter rather than engage in an extensive review of the many cases of religious 
conflicts. 
Drake (1998:53-85), Juergensmeyer (1997), Hoffman (1995), and Martin (1989) posit 
that religion is often used as a justification for terrorism. Other scholars such as Zitrin 
(1998) and Rapoport (1991) stretch the argument further by contending that violence is 
an intrinsic element of religion. Regardless of the veracity or mendacity of this claim, 
writes Fox (2004:58), there is ample evidence that "many religious groups see themselves 
at war with various enemies, be they secular or from another religion." In another 
context, Fein (1990:49) posits that religion contributes to genocide. Fein's argument is 
substantiated by the ignoble role of faith-based networks, for example, in the infamous 
Rwandan genocide in 1994. The works of McCullum (n.d.); Gourevitch (1998); Rittner, 
Roth and Whitworth (2004); Dallaire (2003); and Eltringham (2004) provide intriguing 
details of the culpability of churches in the Rwandan genocide. 
Writing on the extent to which Christian churches were implicated in the Rwandan 
genocide, Longman (2001: 163) notes that 'churches served as the country's killing 
fields, were a major site for massacres, and many Christians participated in the slaughter, 
including church personnel and lay leaders.' Whereas some pastors and priests 
participated in the slaughter, leading death squads, other church leaders failed to 
denounce the violence - thus giving it tacit support (Des Forges, 1999:245-248). A 
number of church leaders are standing trial or have been indicted for genocidal crimes at 
44 
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in Arusha, Tanzania. 
Undoubtedly, the infamous episode in Rwanda is illustrative of religion's dark side. 
Elsewhere, religion has been at the heart of, or at least has been implicated in, 
intermittent or intractable conflicts vis-a-vis the issues of ethnicity and resource 
distribution, including power. In the Sudan, for instance, 'religious differences have been 
imputed as a major factor in the wars between the Sudanese government and southern 
insurgents' (Assefa, 1990: 255). Apart from 'couching the north-south conflict in the 
Sudan in religious terms, northern soldiers have inflicted unrestrained cruelty on 
Southerners because they felt there was religious license for their behaviour', and vice 
versa (Assefa, 1990: 259). By and large, religious nationalism (mainly Muslim 
fundamentalism) in the Sudan has 'created a sense of incompatibility, has given license to 
behave inhumanely towards those who do not share the same religion and has thus 
exacerbated conflict' (Assefa, 1990: 261 ). It is instructive to note that while significant 
progress has been made towards the resolution of the conflict in the Sudan, the country is 
still grappling with the contradictions of the polarisation of its society along ethno­
religious lines. In fact, Sudan's religious demography as well as the irreconcilability of 
different religious convictions (along the Christian/Animist-Muslim divide) has been a 
major impediment to the resolution of the country's conflict (Interview with a Sudanese 
student in Pietermaritzburg, South Africa, 05 August 2005). 
Further, religion has been implicated in several conflicts in Nigeria (Haynes, 1996: 212-
15). However, it is trite to say that religion has often masked the deeper issues of skewed 
federalism, the citizenship question, and the struggle for power and resources in many of 
the conflicts in Nigeria. And whereas ethnic and regional antagonisms often overlap with 
religious strife, Nigeria, stricto sensu, has had a fair share of religiously-motivated 
violence. "Religion has remained a core, largely divisive part of the politics of regions 
and ethnicity" (Nwangwu, 2000: i.d.) and, as such, has fuelled civil strife in Nigeria. For 
instance, religious conflicts (among other factors) in the northern region of Nigeria, 
where thousands of Igbo and easterners (mainly Christians) were killed in 1966-1967, 
contributed to the declaration of the defunct Republic of Biafra (Nwangwu, 2000; i.d.) 
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which in turn plunged the country into a 30-month civil war. Moreover, Minchakpu 
(2000a: i.d.) reports: 
[b ]etween 1980 and 2000, over 30 major religious conflicts 
have been recorded between Christians and Muslims in 
northern Nigeria. During these conflicts, thousands of 
Christians and Muslims have been killed, and hundreds of 
church buildings have been destroyed. 
Since the return to democratic rule in 1999, Nigeria has witnessed a bewildering 
profusion of religious conflicts, arising especially from the introduction or the 
implementation of Sharia law in most of the states in the north. Table 2 below profiles 
some of the cases of religiously-motivated violence in Nigeria since 1980: 
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Table 2: Religious conflicts in Nigeria, 1982-2004 
State Conflict sketch Casualty profile 
Bomo Christian-Muslim conflicts between 1982 and 2000 Hundreds of Christians and dozens of Muslims killed; 
over 200 churches destroyed. 
(i) Attack on Christian villages by Muslim bandits (1997) (i) 16 persons killed.
Gombe (ii) Attack on Christian villages by Muslim bandits (1999) (ii) 36 persons killed; 42 injured; 433 Christian-owned
houses destroyed.
(iii) Sharia-related violence (iii) 25 persons killed.
Conflict over the adoption of Sharia (2000) Resulted in the death of 609 persons; 1000 houses and
123 churches were destroyed. (Church leaders insisted
Kaduna that 875 Christians alone were killed and that 800
churches were destroyed. 20 pastors also lost their lives.
Several clashes between Christian and Muslims, the most recent Loss of thousands of lives and wanton destruction of 
Kano (in May 2004) being Muslim attacks on Christians in retaliation property in these conflicts. Most recent (May 2004): 30 
for Christian attacks on Muslims in Y elwa, Plateau State. killed, 300 injured, 10,000 Christians displaced. 
(i) Attack on Christian students of the University of Ilorin (i) 20 injured.
(November 1998)
(ii) Clashes between Christian and Muslims after the demolition (ii) Casualty figure not available.
Kwara of the Cathedral Church of God by Muslim fanatics
(iii) Christian-Muslim conflict after Muslim leaders called for
the relocation of Churches located in the state capital, Ilorin (iii) 18 churches burnt.
(1999)
Plateau (i) Attack by Muslims militants on the Church of Christ, Y elwa (i) A Pastor and 48 members of the Church killed.
(February 2004)
(ii) Seemingly retaliatory attack by (Christian militia) on (ii) Resulted in the death of 65 persons.
Muslims (May 2004)
Source: Adapted from Minchakpu (2000a; 2000b) 
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Apart from the conflicts highlighted in Table 2, Muslim fundamentalists, who opposed 
the staging of the Miss World beauty pageant in Nigeria in November 2002, embarked on 
a violent protest which left at least 200 people dead and thousands injured. Twenty-two 
churches and mosques were destroyed (McCaughan, n.d., i.d.). A Christian mob 
retaliated before the crisis was brought under control.16 The violence in Nigeria forced
organisers of the pageant to move the event to London. 
The conflict scenarios in the Middle East, the Sudan, Rwanda and Nigeria as well as in 
the countries listed in Table 1 point to the saliency or the exploitation of religion in the 
eruption and continuation of conflicts. Why does religion lend itself to such destructive 
end or provide justification for violence? The answer is because religion is inextricably 
bound up with all the different components of human identity, which if threatened, tends 
to justify or legitimise violence in the course of protecting that identity. Elaborating this 
point, Rosen (2005: i.d.) states: 
Indeed because religion is so inextricably bound up with 
identity, religion itself acquires far greater prominence in 
times of threat and conflict, nurturing and strengthening the 
identity that senses itself as threatened, in opposition to that 
which is perceived as threatening it. 
Rosen (2005: i.d.) further adds: 
The character that religion assumes under such 
circumstances is often not just one of nurturing, but often 
one of self-preoccupation and paradoxically even one of 
self-righteousness, that disregards "the other" who is 
perceived as not part of one's identity group and even 
demonizes that "other" who is perceived as hostile, often 
portraying the latter ... as 'a perfect picture of malice'. 
In essence, religion fuels or is implicated in conflict because it 1s exploited in 
'characterising one's own cause as righteous while using religiously based enemy images 
which tend to demonise' opponents as the "other" (Williamson, 1990: 246). Religion 
lends itself to the exacerbation of conflict as it is "associated more with partisan insularity 
16 The crisis erupted after an article in a local newspaper, Thisday, speculated that the Islamic Prophet, 
Muhammad might have married one of the contestants if he were still alive and had laid eyes on the beauty 
queens. That was nothing but blasphemy from the point of view of Muslim fundamentalists. 
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if not downright hostility towards the 'other'" (Rosen, 2005: i.d.) even when the issue in discord is not (strictly) about faith. This "us-against-them" characterisation is at the core of the hate language usually employed by religious fundamentalists (and sometimes, leaders) in the legitimisation and continuation of violence. For instance, such characterisation had been employed (albeit occasionally) in the personal disagreements that snowballed into ethno-religious crises in Nigeria. What is more, religious conflicts - or conflicts in which religion plays even a minute role - are difficult to resolve. Why? Because religious conflicts are 'transformed into valueconflicts which have the tendency to become mutually exclusive or zero-sum issues' (Assefa, 1990: 259). Thus, the "standard tools of diplomacy - willingness to compromise, for instance, and to forgive old grievances - can be more difficult to apply when combatants claim God is on their side" (Awake! 2003: 28). The foregoing suggests that apart from its conflict generating capacity, religion can also impede the resolution of conflicts. Given the deep-seated attachment to values on the part of religionists, it is little wonder that conflicts which prove the most difficult to resolve are those with a religious element. Indeed, religion's culpability in numerous murderous adventures has never been in doubt. Whereas some disputes are wrapped in religion, others are ignited by nationalism, grievance or resource scarcity but at times justified or fuelled by religion. Hence, a former president of the Ethics and Public Policy Center in Washington, D. C., Ernest Lefever (quoted in The Watchtower September 1, 1995: 7), concludes: "[f]rom ancient times to the present, very few wars have been fought in which religion has not played at least some part." But what is the contention of the other school of thought vis-a-vis religion and conflict? The literature on religion as the leitmotif for war ignores the potential and demonstrated capacity of religion to facilitate peacebuilding and sustainable development within and across societies. Put differently,· the emphasis on religion 'as the source of violent conflicts around the world obscures the positive role that religion frequently plays in 49 
conflict transformation and peacebuilding' (Smith, n.d., i.d.) [Emphasis added]. Religion 
serves such a positive end by teaching adversaries to 'recognize the essential humanity of 
their political foes and to cultivate the spiritual values of compassion, forgiveness, self­
examination and reconciliation' (Gottlieb, 2002: 74). These virtues, which are integral to 
conflict transformation, have always been projected by religious leaders during their 
facilitation of peace processes. Indeed, a number of scholarly works have been published 
in recognition of the positive role of religion in public life in general and in peacebuilding 
in particular. However, it must be acknowledged that the number of such scholarly 
efforts pales into insignificance when compared to those which mirror the reality that 
points in the opposite direction i.e. the perspective examined above. The reason is that 
'the increasing role of religious leaders, religious institutions, and religiously motivated 
lay figures in conflict resolution is a recent phenomenon - a contradistinction to the 
millennial role of religion as a source of conflict' (Luttwak, 1994: 16). In addition, 'the 
role of religious leaders and institutions in peacebuilding has, until recently, been 
ignored, disregarded or treated as a marginal phenomenon hardly worth noting' (Luttwak, 
1994: 9-10). This study deviates from this analytical trend as it next highlights case 
studies in the positive roles that religion has played in public life with reference to 
peace building. 
Nichols (1994: 65-87) depicts a fascinating example of successful faith-based 
intervention in the peace process in Nicaragua in the late 70s and in the 80s. The 
decade-long conflict was between the Sandinistas and the East Coast Indians over the 
issue of political autonomy for the latter. In an attempt to resolve the conflict, a 
'Conciliation Commission, comprising a small group of Protestant Church leaders, 
became the moving force in push to bring the Sandinistas into negotiations with the 
Indian and Creole leaders' (Nichols, 1994: 65). The Conciliation Commission launched a 
series of extended negotiation sessions between the warring factions. Most of these 
sessions, which produced significant peace accords, were held in the Moravian Church of 
Managua. According to Nichols ( 1994: 81 ), the Conciliation Commission, over the 
course of a decade, helped the belligerents "to move from armed conflict to a cessation of 
hostilities". In 1988, the Commission mediated the accord which ushered in a climate of 
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peace. Nichols (1994: 83) submits that the Commission's success was attributable to "its 
perceived integrity and the trust generated among the participants" during the peace 
process. 
Religiously motivated conciliation was equally attempted during the Nigerian civil war 
(1967-70). Sampson (1994: 89-118) notes Quaker Conciliation's efforts at brokering 
truce between the warring sides: the Federal Government and the secessionist Biafran 
forces. The Quaker Conciliation's role in the peace process consisted of the following: 
opening lines of communication (between General Yakubu Gowon, head of the Federal 
Government, and the Biafran leader, Odurnegwu Ojukwu); reducing suspicions, 
rnisperceptions and fears; and advocating for a negotiated settlement while supporting 
official mediation efforts (Sampson, 1994: 94). Although the success recorded by the 
Quakers was quite limited ( owing to the intransigence of the warring parties), they "won 
the trust, respect, and in some cases, the affection of the Nigerian and Biafran leaders" 
(Sampson, 1994: 106) and thus were able to open the lines of communication between 
the Federal Government and the Biafrans. Sampson (1994: 109-111) implies that the 
limited success of the Quakers, that is, their inability to bring about an end to the civil 
war, was not a failure of religiously motivated conciliation but a function of the interplay 
of economic and political factors within the context of realpolitik. 
The positive role of religious institutions and religious leaders in facilitating peace 
processes also came to the fore during the conflicts in Mozambique and in Burundi. This 
is illustrated by the efforts of the Community of Sant' Egidio (a religious institution) and 
those of Monsignor Jaime Con9alves (the Archbishop of Beira) as they facilitated the 
settlement of the Mozambique civil war (Hurne, 1994: 3-4). These actors equally played 
a crucial role in the resolution of the Burundi conflict through the convocation of talks in 
Rome for the country's warring factions (as part of the Arusha peace process) which 
ultimately extricated Burundi from the throes of war and set it on the path towards peace 
(Carnegie Corporation of New York, 1997). Elsewhere, the Churches have been actively 
involved in efforts at facilitating negotiations between the parties to the conflict in 
Northern Ireland (Falconer, 1990: 273-280). 
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Kraybill (1994: 209-257) notes that religious actors namely the Catholic Church and the 
Quakers played crucial peacebuilding roles during the crises of transition from Rhodesia 
to Zimbabwe. Although the Catholic Church had initially been implicated as the 
"sanctifier of the white-dominated status quo" (Kraybill, 1994: 212), it was to later 
(beginning in 1972), embark on peace advocacy through which it publicised the effects of 
racial injustice. The Church's main channels of engagement were the Commission for 
Justice and Peace (CJP) and the Catholic Institute for International Relations (CIIR). 
These two institutions lobbied the international community and proposed negotiations 
with a view to bringing the impasse in (the then) Rhodesia to a peaceful end. Further, 
they facilitated dialogue between the government and the liberation movements prior to 
the Lancaster House talks which culminated in the settlement of the Rhodesian question 
(Kraybill, 1994: 216-219). 
Of all the intervenors in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, the Quakers "were the most strategically 
involved in negotiation efforts to end the war" (Kraybill, 1994: 233). As part of their 
efforts, the Quakers conducted four peace missions to Africa between 1972 and 1980. 
They also sent delegations to the Geneva and Lancaster House conferences. Their 
involvement revolved around: (i) establishing human solidarity with all parties to the 
conflict; (ii) opening channels of communication; (iii) supporting formal negotiations 
and; (iv) advocating policies and actions in support of reconciliation (Kraybill, 1994: 
233-241). Kraybill's analysis portrays the importance of religion in facilitating peace in
Rhodesia/Zimbabwe with emphasis on Christian leaders and groups acting as 
peacemakers. 
Even in the Sudan where religion has been implicated in the country's conflicts, religious 
leaders and institutions have paradoxically been involved in efforts at building peace and 
offering succour to victims. According to Assefa (1990: 259), religion 'has helped to 
minimize the pain and suffering' resulting from Sudan's conflicts: 
During both civil wars, religious organizations have 
provided much-needed humanitarian assistance and relief 
to war victims . . . the religious umbrella has been a very 
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effective mechanism to mobilize and channel life-saving 
resources. 
In addition, the World Council of Churches (WCC), the All Africa Conference of 
Churches (AACC) and the Sudan Council of Churches (SCC) have mediated in the 
conflicts in the Sudan with a view to finding amicable settlement (Assefa, 1990: 259). 
The roles of these religious actors and formal mediators were instrumental to the 
formalisation of the truce that terminated the first civil war in the Sudan. Elsewhere, the 
remarkable role of South Africa's Archbishop Desmond Tutu in the reconciliation 
process in South Africa (Reychler, 1997), the positive impact of church leaders on the 
conflict dynamic in the Sudan (Badal, 1990: 263.:.272), and the advocacy of non-violence 
by the Catholic Church in the Philippines are all illustrative of the positive role of 
religion in peacebuilding. The aforementioned case studies strengthen the veracity of the 
claim that faith-based networks often play "a reconciling role by inhibiting violence, 
lessening tensions, and contributing decisively to the resolution of conflicts" (Carnegie 
Corporation ofNew York, 1997: i.d.). 
Having considered these positive roles that religious leaders and institutions play in 
promoting peace, the question that follows is: what are the underpinnings or causalities of 
religiously motivated peacebuilding? In other words, what factors underlie the 
involvement of religious networks in conflict transformation? 
A number of variables give religious networks comparative advantage in conflict 
transformation and development processes. For a certainty, religious institutions have the 
capacity to cultivate attitudes of forgiveness and reconciliation (Reychler, 1997). Faith­
based organisations have extensive communication and infrastructural networks, enjoy 
the goodwill and allegiance of their members, and thus provide space for expression and 
for social mobilisation and empowerment especially when the legitimacy of the 
government, the state or international institutions is undermined (Reychler, 1997). The 
Commission for Africa (2005: 121) also notes that "[r]eligion provides the means by 
which to understand and adjust to conflict and tragedy ... It provides language of hope and 
aspiration." 
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Religious actors also help to create environments conducive to negotiations since warring 
parties are almost always more likely to see them (faith-based actors) as non-political and 
humanitarian intervenors. As Assefa (1990: 260) aptly posits, "intermediaries were 
better off if they were considered as 'people of religion' rather than as politicians, even if 
they came from a different faith." The questions of reconciliation, forgiveness and 
suffering - which religious actors often raise during negotiations - go beyond political 
considerations and, as such, are more appealing to warring parties. Assefa (1990: 260) 
concludes that religion's comparative advantage in this regard derives from the 
expectation that religious actors would display such traits as 'honesty, trustworthiness, 
evenhandedness, and a genuine concern for all the parties that are affected by the conflict 
thus enhancing religion's credibility and the trust-base needed to undertake a 
peacemaking role'. 
Bunting (2005) argues that the aforementioned attributes give religious groups 
advantages over the nation state in Africa in several spheres of public life, thus 
underscoring the success of religious organisations where politicians and the state have 
failed. Indeed, many African states have failed to fulfil the aspirations of their citizenry, 
thus necessitating the intervention of non-governmental entities in spheres where the state 
is found wanting. 17 This failure, which represents a decline in statecraft, creates a 
vacuum which religion is filling (Commission for Africa, 2005: 121) in several positive 
ways including the provision of social services and the facilitation of sustainable 
development. 
In this section, the dark side of religion as well as its positive roles across societies has 
been brought to the fore. It has been established that religion is a source of conflict, that 
it justifies or legitimises violence and that it even hinders the resolution of conflicts in 
that primordial transcendental values become entrenched in one's disagreements with the 
17 This study does not advocate the take over of the functions which constitute the exclusive domain or 
preserve of states by non-state actors. Rather, it suggests partnership that emphasizes the complementarity 
between governmental and non-governmental structures in tasks that could be executed with minimal 
constraints while guaranteeing best results in the event of such collaboration. 
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"other". Paradoxically, available evidence suggests that religion has functioned as a 
force for good. Religious actors have, on the strength of their moral character, played 
active roles in peacebuilding. Beyond peacemaking, historical and current realities (in 
Africa for instance) show that religious networks have in a number of cases ( especially in 
the areas of provision of social services) excelled where the state has failed. The 
foregoing typifies the important positive contributions of religion in public life. But what 
conclusion should be reached on this premise of the socially ambivalent function of 
religion? The section that follows, on the strength of the evidence considered thus far, 
attempts to synthesize the contestations in the murky debate on religion and conflict. 
3.3 Towards a synthesis of the debate 
One of the most important findings of cross-cultural 
conflict resolution research is that religion is a perennial 
and perhaps inevitable factor in both conflict and conflict 
resolution (Said & Funk, 2001: i.d.) [ emphasis mine]. 
The above holistic assessment of the nexus between religion and conflict within historical 
and current contexts suggests that religion is a force for both good and bad. On the one 
hand, the cases in which religion has been employed for destructive ends are legion. 
There has been religious justification of such acts as terrorism, genocide and war. On the 
other hand, the positive roles of religion have been exemplified in the areas of social 
services delivery, conflict transformation, and developmental assistance. It is not 
uncommon for scholars of comparative religion as well as cognate sub-disciplines to 
align their research orientations and views to either of these two sides of the 'religious 
coin' - a stereotype which this study does not wholly conform to. Rather than align itself 
with either a sanctimonious or Mephistophelian view of religion, this study takes 
cognisance of the constructive and destructive manifestations of religion and, as such, 
argues for the recognition of religion along the lines of its socially ambivalent character. 
While a further expose on the destructive and positive roles of religion may not provide 
any new insights towards evolving a synthesis, it is apposite to critique the "religion-as-a­
decisive-factor-in-conflict" paradigm. This study contends that a painstaking scrutiny of 
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some of the conflicts that are characterised as religious is more likely to confound 
analysts in that religion is often a fa9ade for the underlying factors which precipitate or 
fuel conflict. In other words, the logic of 'religion-as-a-source-of-war' ignores the reality 
that religion often masks the salient economic, political and strategic elements in conflict. 
Thus, at best, such arguments are often simplistic or even erroneous at the extreme. In 
his commentary on the conflicts in the Sudan, for instance, Assefa (1990: 261) submits 
that 'religion has been a code word or symbol that subsumed many different economic, 
political, and social motives and that it would be utterly simplistic to ascribe the religious 
toga to the civil wars in the Sudan'. Further, Omar (2004: i.d.) argues that the 
articulation of the nexus between religion and violence must be anchored in the 
understanding 'that the religious legitimization of violence does not occur in a socio­
historical or power vacuum but within concrete human setting in which power dynamics 
are paramount - a fact that the hegemonic discourse on religion and violence ignores'. 
Expressed differently, the social, cultural, territorial, economic and political contexts in 
which religion functions, rather than religion itself, are of greater importance in the 
comprehension of the role of religion in violence. What the foregoing suggests is the 
need to peer into underlying conflict causalities rather than play the often dubious 
religious card whenever there appears to be a religious dimension to a conflict. 
If one were to stretch the above argument, then one would invariably strengthen 
Goldstein's (2004: 204) contention that "[n]othing inherent in religion mandates conflict" 
and that as such there is no such thing as a religious conflict. I had, after contemplating 
the import of Goldstein's argument as well as the motivation for it, concluded and argued 
at a forum that the manipulation of religion, not religion per se, is at the core of so many 
crises described as religious such as the Nigerian and Sudanese examples. Nevertheless, 
the fact that religion is susceptible to exploitation for destructive ends makes it a 
potentially dangerous element. 18 Little's (2005: 20) informed opinion that 'conflict is not 
all about religion but about politics, economics and nationalism and a whole range of 
things', appears to lend credence to Goldstein's but takes a detour when Little goes 
further to assert that 'conflict is religiously influenced in a number of cases'. However, a 
18 I am grateful to my supervisor, Dr. Ufo Okeke Uzodike for drawing my attention to this caveat. 
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former member of the U.S. Commission for Religious Freedom, Laila Al-Marayati 
(quoted in McCaughan, n.d., i.d.) tones down the religious factor as she argues that 
'religion plays just one and often irrelevant role in conflict' while she stresses 'the more 
important conflict causalities such as economics, politics, racism, greed, power and 
cultural context.' What is more, the extent to which a typical conflict can be labelled as 
strictly religious is debatable. That said, this study takes the position that Marayati's 
reference to the "cultural context" encapsulates a variety of human/social constructs and 
way(s) of life, which of course, includes religion. Thus, religion is implicated, at least to 
a miniscule extent. 
It is apt to state at this juncture that the several case studies which point to the culpability 
of religion in a number of deadly conflicts need not engender a thesis that casts religion 
exclusively in bad light for there are many other instances that exemplify faith-based 
peacemaking and developmental assistance. In fact, a typical scenario where religion is 
implicated in conflict is counteracted by another in which faith-based actors are 
facilitating not only conflict resolution but also post-conflict healing, reconciliation and 
reconstruction. These contrasting realities thus task the researcher to do more than align 
themselves to either of the perspectives on the nexus between religion and conflict. 
Hence, this study transcends the frontiers of propositions, which see religion essentially 
as a source of conflict on the one hand and inherently as a force for good on the other. 
Consequently, it is argued here that the role of religion should be cast in the light of its 
contradictory manifestations in the public domain. In other words, the constructive as 
well as the destructive ends to which religion is applied should be evenly recognised, 
acknowledged, and apprised. It is vital to approximate all the fragments of evidence 
pertaining to religion's role in conflict rather than to distort or conceal either of the 
critical expressions of religion in conflict situations. 
As pointed out earlier, the perspective which implicates religion in war dominates the 
religion-violence nexus literature much to the non-recognition, suppression or exclusion 
of the "other" reality which points to the positive roles of faith-based actors in 
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peacebuilding. 19 Nevertheless, the imperative of objectivity in conflict research 
( especially in relation to deductions about causalities, catalysts, actors and their roles) 
underscores ample representation of the pros and cons of the phenomenon and the 
variegated roles of faith in conflict situations. To this end, this study contends that 
although religion has caused or played a role in precipitating or fuelling some conflicts, it 
has facilitated the resolution of others. The preceding finds expression in Little's (2005: 
20) observation: "[r]eligion plays a role in conflicts in these three ways: legitimation,
recruitment, and peace settlement." It is possible to subsume these three modes under 
two parameters in which the role of religion in conflict can be interpreted: as a conflict 
trigger and/or as a contrivance for conflict transformation. As McTernan (2003: xii) 
maintains, "religion can be [and has been] as much a part of the problem as a part of the 
solution in resolving conflict". Existential realities prove that religion "is a powerful 
force that can recruit the faithful in support of either violent conflict or peacebuilding" 
(Smith, n.d., i.d.). By way of synthesis therefore, this study contextualises the role of 
religion in conflict paradoxically as a source of conflict and a resource for peace. 
3.4 Liberation theology as a social construct 
[Liberation theology aims at rousing] those on the margin 
of society to realize their own potentiality in envisaging 
social change and taking steps to bring it about; [ thus 
stressing] that neutrality is impossible when considering 
social injustices; and that it is necessary to find the 
sufferings of others intolerable ... and to bear the toils and 
conflicts needed to remove them (Preston, 1975: 157). 
The literature on the role of faith-based organisations in facilitating positive social change 
draws ideological insights from Latin American liberation theology. The theoretical and 
practical roots of religious networks' involvement in processes aimed at ending misery 
and facilitating transformation appeared in the cultural, historical, political and social 
context of Latin America (Tombs, 2002; Gutierrez, 1974) where the Roman Catholic 
19 It is instructive to note that the awareness that religious networks can facilitate (and indeed are 
promoting) conflict resolution is gaining impetus in the analyses of conflict. The works of Coward & 
Smith (2004); Ariarajah (2004); Coffey & Matthewes (2002); Arinze (2002); Smock (1995); and Dear 
(1994) highlight religious networks' positive contributions to political development and peacebuilding in a 
manner that challenges the predominant or the hegemonic thesis on the nexus between religion and war. 
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Church, for instance, committed itself in the early part of the 20th century to the 
emancipation of the oppressed and the afflicted. Although the ingredients of liberation 
theology are said to be European, its provenance essentially has been Latin American 
(Preston, 1975: 157).20 The historical roots of liberation theology have been located in 
the prophetic tradition of religious leaders who decried the poverty, misery, suffering and 
injustice that the ordinary people of Latin American societies experienced in the 1950s, 
the 60s and the 70s. Gayarre (2004: 414) notes that the emergence of liberation theology 
as a revolutionary movement was largely a response to "the extreme social conditions 
endured by most of the population" of Latin America during these periods. In terms of 
the practical manifestation of this theological thought, church leaders transcended their 
mission of ministering to the spiritual needs of adherents by transforming their religious 
formations into social movements with a view to addressing the issues of poverty and 
underdevelopment. These religious leaders situated the need to liberate the people from 
the shackles of oppression and suffering within the context of the heritage of Christian 
commitment to individual/social emancipation. 
Liberation theology as a theoretical construct derives from Gutierrez's (1974) treatise 
wherein theology is conceptualised as "critical reflection on historical praxis." The 
kernel of this definition is its emphasis on contemplation about social realities, arriving at 
a conclusion regarding the desirability or otherwise of the situation and taking necessary 
steps to remedy same if necessary. Hence, Ribeiro (1999: 304) describes the 
methodology of liberation theology as "see-judge-act." It entails examining the social 
context and the main developments that characterise society with an eye to acting (based 
on Biblical reflection) for the sake of betterment. In performance of this role, the 
churches in Latin America operated like 'ideological apparatuses and mediating 
structures', gave expression to the plight of the oppressed and the poor thereby 
functioning as institutions which resonated within the social structure and responded to 
its demands (Torres, 1992: 110) as exemplified by its activities on behalf of the people in 
poor and rural communities. 
20 The elements of liberation theology, which were essentially European, include the theology of earthly 
realities, humanism, social personalism, progressive evolutionism and the social dimension of dogma. See 
Boff and Boff (1987) for details. 
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Against the backdrop of the churches' intervention on behalf of the poor, Haynes (1993: 
98) conceives of liberation theology as "an intensely political phenomenon, a response to
the appalling social and political conditions of many poor people ... in (predominantly, 
but not exclusively) Roman Catholic Third World countries." Liberation theology drew 
insights from the class struggle perspective in its justification of political action on the 
part of religious leaders who believed that more than spirituality was needed in the form 
of 'socio-political conscientization' of man as well as direct involvement in the social 
development process. Expressed in other terms, liberation theology provided the 
ideological base for churches' 'direct involvement with the poor and for justifying some 
form of political action to ameliorate harsh conditions.' The churches, inter alia, 
embarked on mass literacy programmes, engaged the governments over openness, 
development and employment related issues, and galvanised the people into mass action 
for the purpose of actualising humane ends (Haynes, 1993: 98-109). In this regard, 
religious institutions became not only service providers but also forces for social and 
political mobilisation. 
Foroohar (1989: 50) predicates such social action on the Church's interpretation of 
suffering as a "situation of sin" which puts 'pressure on the consciences of Christians, 
thus committing them to remedying the situation.' Moreover, Gayarre (2004: 414) notes 
that the Roman Catholic Church in Latin America, within the context of liberation 
theology, constituted itself into a social movement whose preoccupation was the 
transformation of the climate of (social and political) oppression and the elimination of 
structural injustice. A number of studies on liberation theology highlight the practical 
ways in which the religious networks have given expression to this eschatological 
construct in Latin America. For example, the Roman Catholic Church was instrumental 
in bringing democracy to Venezuela (Lynch, 1991: ix). In Guatemala, Peru and Puerto 
Rico, the Church facilitated negotiations to end political impasse and ethnic conflict 
(Alarcon, Comas-Dias & Lykes, 1998: 781). Liberation theology literature is also replete 
with instances of religious networks' involvement in peacebuilding beyond Latin 
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America. The case studies of faith-based conflict resolution initiatives highlighted in 
Section 3 .2 of this study are a case in point. 
It can be deduced from the above that although liberation theology is a construct, it is 
made apparent by social action. It is not restricted to one's consciousness but expressed 
in the form of social engagement. Gayarre (2004: 414) puts it succinctly when he argues 
that liberation theology "considers the promotion of the struggle for justice to be one of 
the cornerstones of the faith and that this is carried over to the practical plane through 
opting for some political or social movement" in an attempt to remedy a situation the 
church regards as untenable or as sinful from a Biblical viewpoint [ emphasis mine]. 
Biblical reflection on inhumane conditions prompts the church to function as a social and 
political movement in the interest of the poor and those suffering the effects of man's 
inhumanity to man. It is not surprising that Ellacuria and Sobrino (1990) posit that 
liberation theology is directed to the social environment since the church's aim is to 
effect social change. Simply put, the commitment by churches to bring about change 
within the context of liberation theology finds expression in symbolic social action. Such 
action could be unilateral and unidirectional (whereby the churches act alone as 
benefactors and the people, recipients) or synergistic (whereby the churches act m 
collaboration with civil society groups and individuals). 
The bedrock of liberation theology is that people of faith should not remain passive and 
indifferent to the suffering of others. Failure to act is sin and, as such, this realisation 
makes intervention in the social space through conscious, concerted and sustained action 
inevitable. The spirit of liberation theology places on religious actors a demand to work 
for the alleviation of suffering, for the attainment of humane conditions and for social 
transformation. It is this social and political engagement in the public space that 
underscores the definition of religion adopted in this study. This idea is premised on the 
fact that religious networks function as social and 'religio-political' movements a la 
Haynes (1993: 28-30) whenever they commit themselves to action intended to transform 
society. Although such action is anchored in Biblical reflection, its intent and goals are 
secular in that they go far beyond the canonic issue of spirituality to embrace social 
61 
transformation. Having said that, this study contends that since the justification for 
action is the prevalence of inhumane conditions, liberation theology - though an 
ecclesiastical rubric - is a construct whose utility depends on social realities. Thus, 
liberation theology is what I call the religious networks' compass for social action. 
3.5 Conflict transformation: a paradigm shift in conflict analysis 
'Why conflict transformation as opposed to conflict resolution?' That was the question 
one of the respondents put to me during my field research. I had to justify my preference 
for the former rather than for the latter. It is apt to state here that the adoption of the 
notion of transformation is predicated on its very objectives and payoffs which 
encapsulate more elements than offered by the conflict resolution spectrum. 
Accordingly, this section seeks to accomplish at least two tasks: to identify the salient 
differences between both concepts; and to ascertain that the notion of transformation 
indicates a paradigm shift in conflict research. 
Conflict is an ineluctable aspect of the human condition, or as Deutsch (1991: 1) notes, it 
"is an inevitable feature of all social relations." This is understandable given the 
differences in values, attitudes, interests, orientations and goals of persons, groups and 
nation-states. The inability of persons, groups and nation-states to reconcile their 
differences or the clash of these values - in essence, their incompatibility - is the 
underlying basis of all conflicts. Expressed differently, conflict- a phenomenon which is 
characterised by interaction at a level more intense than that of competition - results from 
the clash of values between individuals or groups. More often than not, it is the 
irreconcilability of divergent needs or objectives that leads to frustration or aggression, 
which in tum manifests in or leads ultimately (but not always or necessarily) to violence 
(Shelling, 1960). 
Levels of conflict range from intrapersonal, interpersonal, and group to national and 
international levels. In this study, however, conflict is contextualised within the wider 
societal perspective and, as such, its definition applies to the group-international levels. 
It is instructive to note that the question of differences is common to all conflicts 
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regardless of their levels or the number of actors. Rubin et al (1994: 5) gives expression 
to the idea of divergence as a fundamental element of conflict in their definition: 
"[c]onflict means perceived divergence of interest, or a belief that the parties' current 
aspirations cannot be achieved simultaneously". In the words of Burton (1988: 11), 
"conflict describes a relationship in which each party perceives the other's goals, values, 
interests or behaviour as antithetical to its own." The social definition of conflict is given 
as 'an interaction between actors ... in which at least one actor experiences differences in 
thinking/conception/perception and/or feeling and/or desire in relation to the other actor 
(actors), such that realization is hampered by another actor (the other actors)' (Glasl, 
1994: 14-15). In other words, conflict "is a difference of interests as perceived by at least 
one party in an area of joint social interaction, resulting in a situation where the 
aspirations of the various parties cannot be realized to an equal extent" (Ropers, 1995: 2-
3 ). These definitions allude to the variables that characterise conflict: actors, 
relationship, incompatibility, and differences. However, they omit one important fact. 
The fact that parties in conflict have definite goals, which they seek to achieve, is 
incontrovertible. This ultimate rationale for conflict is integral to every definition and the 
understanding of conflict. Accordingly, conflict refers to an interaction (that is a clash or 
struggle) between at least two actors arising from the incompatibility of values, ideas, 
preferences, and goals in which one actor seeks to neutralise, defeat or eliminate the other 
for the purpose of attaining (a) defined objective(s).21 The goals, which a party seeks to 
achieve, could be tangible (such as the acquisition of territory or natural resources) or 
intangible (such as domination or control). With regard to social conflict, the actors use a 
combination of means including violence and propaganda to defeat the opponent and to 
achieve their aims. Throughout history, organised violence - the basic form in which 
21 Although this study deals with a conflict that is destructive, it should be noted that conflict is not 
necessarily a negative dynamic for it can engender positive changes and development in a relationship or in 
a system. For instance, while arguing that conflict can be healthy, Anstey ( 1993: 17) reckons: "[ c ]onflict 
energises the problem-solving capacities of people, stimulates new ways of interacting, and promotes the 
engagement of parties around issues that might otherwise have been ignored or dealt with in a hostile 
manner". However, it is important to add that conflict serves this "constructive" end only if it is properly 
handled lest it engenders the negative consequences often associated with it. Having said that, "[s]ocial 
scientists are [ still] divided on the question of whether social conflict should be regarded as something 
rational, constructive, and socially functional or something irrational, pathological, and socially 
dysfunctional" (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff, 1981: 187). 
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social conflict is manifested - has been known to unleash a plethora of deleterious 
consequences ranging from colossal losses of lives and the destruction of infrastructure to 
huge refugee flows, psychological trauma, and social dislocation. Often, warring parties, 
humanitarian activists, and other state/non-state actors realise the imperatives to stem the 
tide of conflict and to return to the status quo ante bellum. Such realisation stimulates 
actions intended to create an atmosphere of peace. Conflict management, conflict 
resolution and (more recently) conflict transformation are the main concepts that have 
been developed in conflict research to describe as well as to explain the combination of 
processes, methods and attempts to alter a conflict situation. 
At this juncture, it is pertinent to differentiate the concepts of conflict resolution, conflict 
management, and conflict transformation with a view to laying bare their assumptions. 
Bloomfield and Reilly (1998: 18) describe conflict management as: 
the positive and constructive handling of difference and 
divergence. Rather than advocating methods for removing 
conflict, [it] addresses the more realistic question of 
managing conflict: how to deal with it in a constructive 
way, how to bring opposing sides together in a cooperative 
process, how to design a practical, achievable, cooperative 
system for the constructive management of difference. 
"Conflict management correctly assumes that conflicts are long term processes that often 
cannot be quickly resolved" (Irish Peace Society, n.d., i.d.). It holds that conflicts are 
ineradicable and that resolving conflicts is unrealistic: "the best that can be done is to 
manage and to contain them, and occasionally to reach a historic compromise in which 
violence may be laid aside and normal politics resumed" (Miall, 2005: 3). Conflict 
management theorists argue that conflicts only become dysfunctional but are not 
resolved. Conflict is conceptualised as an ever-present phenomenon that spins in cycles 
but does not wither away. Often, powerful actors with enormous resources succeed in 
inducing warring parties to halt the spectre of violence (Miall, 2005: 3) but not with a 
view to addressing the underlying causes of the conflict or resolving the conflict. Hence, 
the "goal of management is to control volatility rather than to address the underlying 
source of the problem" (Irish Peace Society, n.d.). In other words, conflict should be 
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allowed to continue under as much fair 'management' as possible in the expectation that 
it could be resolved at a stage when it is 'ripe' for resolution. 
The emphasis on the control of instability or the reduction of volatility as opposed to 
building sustainable peace presupposes that the factors which engender conflict are 
overlooked as the effects of conflict ( economic and humanitarian) do not receive 
adequate attention. In addition, "the notion of [conflict] management suggests that 
people can be directed or controlled as though they were physical objects" (Irish Peace 
Society, n.d.). The assumption that it is always possible to manage parties and their 
differences so as to keep volatility at the barest minimum fails to acknowledge the 
complexity of human behaviour and the fact that humans are fundamentally different 
from apparatuses in the natural scientist's laboratory. That said, one is wont to argue 
(given the logic of conflict management) that it is foolhardy to deal with the effects of 
conflict during the peace process as the conflict is bound to recur sooner than later, thus 
necessitating its further management or attempts to check its volatility. Conflict 
management smacks of a stopgap measure in dealing with conflict; it does not offer a 
long-term, durable solution and, as such, it does not resonate easily among peacebuilding 
activists. 
Perhaps the most popular concept in the analysis of conflict intervention is conflict 
resolution. Lederach and Maiese (2003: i.d.) states the obvious: the notion of conflict 
resolution is "more well-known and widely accepted in mainstream academic and 
political circles." Conflict resolution refers to the process of building bridges between 
warring parties, working to clarify issues in conflict, and creating opportunities for 
developing new relationships on the basis of peaceful change (International Alert, 1998: 
28). The concept holds 'that it is possible to transcend conflicts if parties can be helped 
to explore, analyse, question and reframe their positions and interests with a view to 
ultimately assisting them to move from zero-sum, destructive patterns of conflict to 
positive-sum constructive outcomes' (Miall, 2005: 3) [emphasis original]. Conflict 
resolution is aimed at reaching a win-win solution that caters to the interests and 
aspirations of parties to the conflict. Bush and Folger (1994: 51) associates the process 
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with the manipulative search for an agreement that is acceptable to the warring parties, to 
the third party(ies ), and to the latent interests all the actors represent. In the words of 
Burton (1991: 81) conflict resolution points to an outcome that the parties see as a 
permanent solution to the problem. 
Conflict resolution has come under a barrage of criticisms in recent times. For instance, 
Lederach (1995) asserts that the term 'resolution' implies that conflict is bad and thus 
should be ended. Expressed in other words, it assumes that conflict is inherently 
negative. Besides, the conflict resolution perspective relies heavily on human rationality. 
Yet, it is irrefutable that humans rarely exhibit rationality during conflict situations or 
during peace processes. Also, conflict resolution theorists further assume that conflict is 
a short-term phenomenon that can be resolved permanently through intervention 
processes. Another major drawback of the concept is its emphasis on resolution, which 
often does not address the deep-seated, value-laden and relational aspects of conflict. 
Hence, the idea that conflicts can be resolved once and for all has been superseded 
(Rupesinghe, 1995) by one, which not only recognises the dialectical nature of conflict 
but also argues for the transformation of conflict while taking pertinent cognisance of 
personal, relational, structural and cultural factors in conflict. 
The conflict transformation school contends that intervention in contemporary conflict 
situations "require[ s] more than the reframing of positions and the identification of win­
win outcomes" (Miall, 2005: 4). It is important for intervenors to seek constructive 
change rather than simply satisfy the demands of warring parties as there are causalities 
(in conflict) that are more fundamental and expressed than at the level of disputes 
(Auvinen & Kivimaki, 1996: 3). Thus, conflict transformation is "a process of engaging 
with and transforming the relationships, interests, discourses, and if necessary, the very 
constitution of society that supports the continuation of violent conflict" (Miall, 2005: 4). 
It is the process through which 'people change situations, relationships or structures so 
that they become less violent, less conflictual and less unjust by addressing the root 
causes of violent conflicts with a view to preventing their emergence or resurgence' 
(International Alert, 1998: 28). In the words of Spencer and Spencer (1995: 162) conflict 
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transformation "can be thought of as a redefinition of the dispute situation by the actors 
themselves, one that may lead to opening space for cooperation and peace". The concept 
focuses on the 'very structure of parties and relationships which are embedded in a 
pattern of conflictual relationships that extend beyond the particular site of conflict' 
(Miall, 2005: 4). To the preceding must be added the philosophy behind this perspective, 
namely that structural causalities in conflict could be located in economic, political, 
cultural and social dynamics. 
Conflict transformation - popularised by conflict research scholar John Paul Lederach -
is both a descriptive and prescriptive concept. Lederach and Maiese (2003) posit that 
transformation as a concept describes conflict dynamics and prescribes the overall 
purpose of peacebuilding. Its descriptive element is seen in its recognition of the 
dialectical nature of conflict and its underlying philosophy that conflict is not necessarily 
a bad phenomenon.22 At the prescriptive level, the concept emphasizes the need to 
change the perceptions of parties about not just the issue in dispute but the environment 
in which they interact. The focus of conflict transformation is long-term and broader 
than those of conflict management and conflict resolution given that its objective is not 
the containment or mitigation of conflict or the solving of immediate problems but the 
shifting of the attitudes of parties, and transforming structures and relationships for 
durable peace and harmonious coexistence. In the words of Wallensteen (1991: 130), 
"[a] successful case of conflict transformation is one where the parties, the issues and 
expectations are changed so that there is no longer a fear of war arising from the 
relationship". As stated earlier (in the discourse on the nexus between religion and 
conflict), a party's perception about the "other" is a critical element in conflict formation 
and perpetuation. Conflict transformation goes deep to promote a healthy view of the 
other as it transforms the structural conditions that trigger conflicts or bring about their 
recurrence. Table 3 below summarises our discussion thus far by juxtaposing the 
concepts of management, resolution and transformation: 
22 The descriptive facet of the conflict transformation perspective draws from Galtung's (1996: 90) analysis 
ofthe dialectics of conflict. He notes that conflicts undergo a variety of transformational processes ranging 
from articulation or disarticulation, conscientisation or de-conscientisation, complexification or 
simplification, to polarisation or depolarisation, and escalation or de-escalation. 
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Table 3: Conflict Management, Resolution and Transformation: A Brief Comparison of Perspectives 
Conflict Manae:ement Conflict Resolution Contlict Transformation 
Framework Realism Idealism Radicalism 
Understanding of Power politics; inherent in man Unsatisfied human needs Structural inequalities 
conflict 
Actor and structure Emphasis on actor from an objective Emphasis on actor from an inter- Emphasis on structure from a holistic 
perspective subjective perspective perspective 
Change Static Linear Dialectical 
Process and strategy Competitive Problem-solving Empowering 
(Un)ending conflict Unending conflict; balance of power; Ending conflict; satisfying human Open-ended; institutional/systemic change 
stability needs 
The key question How do we contain something How do we end something not How do we end something destructive and build 
inevitable? desired? something desired? 
The focus It is phenomenon-centred It is content-centred It is relationship-centred 
The purpose To mitigate, contain, or reduce To achieve an agreement and solution To promote constructive change processes, 
volatility/ crisis to the present problem creating the inclusive of - but not limited to - immediate 
crisis solutions 
The development It is built around the issue of It is embedded and built around the It is concerned with responding to symptoms 
process volatility and its reduction immediacy of the relationship where and engaging the systems within which 
the present problems appear relationships are embedded 
Time frame The horizon is spasmodic and short- The horizon is short-term The horizon is mid- to long-range 
term 
View of conflict It is inevitable and unresolvable It envisions the need to de-escalate It envisions conflict as a dynamic of ebb 
conflict processes ( conflict de-escalation to pursue constructive 
change) and flow ( conflict escalation to pursue 
constructive change) 
Lacunae Lacks theoretical understanding of Lacks theoretical understanding of Lacks theoretical understanding of actor, 
intra-state conflict, institutions, power asymmetry, institutions, intentionality, strategic interaction 
peacebuilding, culture peacebuilding, culture 
Sources: Adapted from Lederach and Maiese (2003); Aggestam (1999); and researcher's deductions from conflict literature. 
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It can be deduced from the analysis in this section that conflict transformation differs 
from both conflict management and conflict resolution in fundamental respects. It is the 
only perspective that takes a holistic view of conflict and seeks to transform not only the 
parties' perceptions but also the environment within which conflict occurs. According to 
Lederach and Maiese (2003: i.d.), there are four central modes which conflict 
transformation targets and impacts on in building sustainable peace: personal/actor 
transformation, relational transformation, cultural transformation, and structural 
transformation. Miall (2005: 10) modifies Lederach and Maiese's typology and adds 
context and issue transformations to the list. 
Furthermore, the goal of conflict transformation is brought to the fore in each mode. At 
the personal level, conflict transformation seeks to "[ m ]inimise the destructive effects of 
conflict and maximise the potential for personal growth at physical, emotional and 
spiritual levels" (Lederach & Maiese, 2003: i.d.). Relational transformation deals with 
the 'minimisation of poorly functioning communication and the maximisation of 
understanding.' The structural mode underscores the 'understanding of and dealing with 
the root causes of violent conflict; the promotion of non-violent mechanisms; the 
minimisation of violence; and the fostering of structures that meet basic human needs as 
well as the maximisation of public participation.' The cultural dimension focuses on the 
'identification and the understanding of the cultural patterns that contribute to the rise of 
violent expressions of conflict; and the identification of cultural resources for 
constructively handling conflict' (Lederach & Maiese, 2003: i.d.). Against the backdrop 
of these priorities, it is indisputable that conflict transformation targets the essentials in 
the human mosaic in its attempt to build sustainable peace. The foci of these modes are 
summarised in the table below: 
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Table 4: Conflict Transformation Modes 
Mode Focus 
Context transformation change in local, national, regional and international 
environment 
- change from asymmetric to symmetric relations
Structure transformation - change in power structures
- changes of markets of violence
Actor transformation - changes of leadership
- changes of goals
- intra-party change
- changes in party's constituencies
- changing actors
Issue transformation - transcendence of contested issues
- constructive compromise
- changing issues
- de-linkine. or re-linking issues
Personal/elite transformation - changes of perspective 
- changes of heart
- changes of will
- gestures of conciliation
Source: Miall (2005). 
In the absence of a war, conflict transformation's commitment to long-term, structural 
and relational transformation translates to peacebuilding. Therefore, it is no surprise that 
the concept is often linked or equated with peacebuilding. In fact, the following elements 
are cardinal to both: identifying and dealing with fear, grief, and bitterness on the part of 
parties and rebuilding trust; reconciliation; developing a new perception of the "other"; 
demobilisation and demilitarisation; increasing justice and equality; equitable resource­
sharing; reintegration of displaced populations; jump starting the economy; and 
reconstruction among others. Essentially, conflict transformation seeks to attain these 
objectives under the rubric of three components: (i) analysis of the present situation (ii) 
the mapping of the horizon of preferred future; and (iii) the development of change 
processes linking the two. It is all about ending something not desired (pain and 
suffering) and building something that is desired (sustainable peace) (Lederach & 
Maiese, 2003: i.d.). The factors that contribute to the success of this process include 
forgiveness, reconciliation, (re-)establishment of functional relationships and institutional 
capabilities as well as reconstruction (Rasmussen, 1997: 40). 
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In spite of its utility, the concept of conflict transformation has been criticised. For one 
thing, the concept overemphasizes structures and, as such, gives less attention to human 
personality and to strategic interaction. While noting that conflict transformation's 
emphasis on structures helps in the understanding of indirect violence, Aggestam (1999: 
23) contends that 'it is an abstract notion as it tends to reduce individuals to the role of
victims without revealing or attempting to analyse the more complex and contradictory 
understanding of the interplay between individuals and structures.' It should also be 
added that conflict transformation is too value-laden given the primacy of such notions as 
justice, mercy, compassion, empathy, breaking down the "us-versus-them" barrier, 
forgiveness and reconciliation - some or all of which do not necessarily exert influence 
on warring parties and profiteering networks in conflict situations and during peace 
processes. The question is, to what extent could these virtues/moral codes influence 
parties within a conflict environment that is basically driven by realpolitik? 
The above shows that even though conflict transformation goes further and deeper than 
the other two perspectives, the fact that it has its own fair share of shortcomings is not in 
doubt. (Perhaps, it should be stated here that no human construct is flawless). In relation 
to the perspectives examined here, Nicholson (1992: 22) states that they are somewhat 
illusory and pretentious, focusing more on social engineering than on social science. 
Nevertheless, the adoption of the conflict transformation perspective derives from the fact 
that 'the goal of transformation is unique in that it involves a supreme value that the other 
concepts do not encompass' (Bush & Folger, 1994: 81). The strength of the concept of 
conflict transformation is its comprehensiveness in addition to addressing the root causes 
of conflict. In this regard, Vayrynen (1991: 23) reckons: 
[v]iolence and conflicts may be managed by instrumental
action, but they can be eliminated only by identifying their
root causes. Those causes and their functions are, however,
ever changing with the economic and social transformation
of societies. That is why any argument that a conflict has
been solved for good, that history has ended, is based on an
ahistorical illusion. The only historically viable approach is
to aim to eliminate the violence in present conflicts and to
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trace the new socioeconomic transformations which create 
new sources of violence. 
The conflict transformation perspective 'addresses a range of dimensions largely ignored 
in the other schools of thought; it aims to develop capacity and to support structural 
change, rather than to facilitate outcomes or deliver settlements'. Conflict transformation 
'seeks to engage with conflict at the pre-violence and post-violence phases and with the 
causes and consequences of violent conflict, which usually extend beyond the site of 
crisis' (Miall, 2005: 17). Therefore, this approach holds greater promise for altering the 
conflict scenario and for building sustainable peace. This realisation underscores the 
growing scholarly interest in the concept of conflict transformation. Although the 
concept of conflict resolution is still very much popular, the orientation towards the logic 
of transformation represents a paradigm shift in conflict research. 
3.6 A review of literature on the conflict in the DRC 
Several scholarly works focus on the causal basis, the dynamics, the 
regionalisation/intemationalisation and the implications of the conflict in the DRC. This 
section reviews some of these works. However, it should be borne in mind that almost all 
the published works on the DRC crisis "risk" being overtaken by new/unforeseen realities 
within a relatively short time given the celerity at which developments unfold in DR 
Congo (This thesis might as well suffer the same fate). 
Ajibewa (1997) traces the pedigree of events that culminated in the DRC crisis. 
According to Ajibewa, the contradictions of colonialism and the foreign policy of the 
United States in Central Africa are significant underlying factors in moving DR Congo 
inexorably towards volatility. American foreign policy in the central African region, 
which was aimed at containing (the spread of) communism, bolstered Mobutu's 
(mis)rule. Furthermore, such factors as nepotism, mismanagement of the economy, 
human rights abuses and the near-total shrinking of the political space - all associated 
with the Mobutu regime - engendered frustration and consequently, rebellion which 
ousted Mobutu and brought (the late) Laurent Kabila to power. Ajibewa notes that 
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regime change notwithstanding, the negative aspects of autocracy were still a feature of 
the Laurent Kabila regime in its early period. 
Nzongola-Ntalaja (2004: 7), like Ajibewa, contends that the "past weighs heavily on the 
present in the [DR] Congo." The legacies of colonialism and authoritarianism (a la 
Mobutu) lurk at the background of the DRC's crisis. In addition, the fallout of the 1994 
genocide in Rwanda was a defining factor of the conflict, not only in the DRC but also in 
the Great Lakes region as a whole. Mobutu's support for the defeated Forces Armees 
Rwandaises (FAR - Armed Forces of Rwanda) and the Interahamwe militia - both 
perceived as responsible for the genocide - engendered tensions in the region and 
ultimately provided the new Rwandan government with a rationale for supporting 
Laurent Kabila's insurgency which toppled Mobutu as well as underpinned Rwanda's 
intervention in DR Congo afterwards. Nzongola-Ntalaja (2004: 15) describes the conflict 
in the DRC as 'the war for the country's natural resources' - an allusion to the pillaging 
of DR Congo's resources by invading armies of Rwanda and Uganda as well as other 
profiteering networks. In addition to Mobutu's legacy of authoritarianism, Nzongola­
Ntalaja (2004: 18-21) identifies the inability or unwillingness of Laurent Kabila to 
manage the political transition effectively and to undertake economic and social 
reconstruction as a factor that exacerbated the crisis. Nzongola-Ntalaja (2004: 21) 
concludes with a note on the implications of the DRC crisis for the region: "[t]he long 
term stability of the Great Lakes region cannot be sustained without a stable and effective 
government in the DRC." This conclusion is not farfetched given the strategic importance 
of the DRC in the Great Lakes region. 
Although Wamba-dia-Wamba's work (1998) explores "Mobutuism" (the philosophy of 
Mobutu's personality and leadership style as well as his legacy), he concurs with both 
Ajibewa and Nzongola-Ntalaja that Cold War politics, which underpinned Western 
complicity in the assassination of DR Congo's first post-independence Prime Minister, 
Patrice Lumumba, and the support for Mobutu was significant in making DR Congo 
tempestuous. However, Wamba-dia-Wamba notes that the conference nationale 
souveraine (CNS) - sovereign national conference - in 1991 and 1992 undermined 
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"Mobutuism" and that the end of the Cold War did weaken the external foundations of 
the philosophy. The crux of Wamba-dia-Wamba's work is whether "Mobutuism" was 
completely eliminated after the demise of Mobutu's regime to which he gives an answer 
in the negative. According to Wamba-dia-Wamba, Kabila's regime was not free from 
such "Mobutuist" tendencies as patronage; expedited, militarist and non-consultative 
decision-making; and intolerance of criticism. The continuation of these tendencies 
during Laurent Kabila's regime thus complicated the DRC crisis. 
Rosenblum (1998: 193-200) argues that the culture of resistance, which the Congolese 
had developed overtime, undermined the authority of the "Mobutuist state" and was 
likely to do the same for Laurent Kabila given the latter's attempt to consolidate his 
power like his predecessor. However, Rosenblum points out that Mobutu's definition of 
political life for more than thirty years created problems for Kabila's regime. In its bid to 
redress the situation, Kabila's government made further mistakes: individuals with 
questionable characters occupied key government positions and the generality of 
Congolese felt alienated from the regime given that it was initially dominated by 
returning exiles that were not in tune with events in the country. This domestic 
discontent coalesced with security concerns in Bujumbura, Kampala and Kigali to 
undermine the (Kabila) regime's foundations. The intensification of these factors 
ultimately precipitated the war against Kabila. 
Reyntjens (1998: 10-13) discusses the DRC crisis within the broader regional context 
with reference to the conflicts in the Great Lakes region, in Sudan and in Angola. He 
argues that the proximity of these locations and the adoption of the "logic of 'my 
enemy's enemy is my friend"' by political actors have brought these conflicts together 
with concomitant implication for the geostrategic situation in the whole of central Africa. 
This is not farfetched given the regionalisation of the DRC crisis. Reyntjens further notes 
that the interests of members of Kabila's alliance changed and clashed after the defeat of 
Mobutu and that the success of the rebellion (against Mobutu) did not resolve two 
fundamental problems that had precipitated the conflict: the status of the "populations of 
dubious nationality" (a reference to the "Rwandophones" in eastern DRC) and Rwanda's 
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security problems which emanated from the cross border raids into Rwanda by the ex­
p AR and the lnterahamwe based in DR Congo. These unresolved issues provided some 
justification for unilateral intervention in the DRC by Rwanda in particular. But 
Reyntjens states that countries that invaded DR Congo have also made economic gains. 
Reed (1998: 18-21) criticises works that focus on Kabila's persona and his rule but ignore 
the structural factors that underlie the war in the DRC. He contends (rather strongly) that 
the policy options of whoever occupied the presidential mansion in Kinshasa would be 
constrained by two structurai factors which would not be products of the incumbent but 
inherited from the past. The first of the two factors is the protracted period of patronage 
bequeathed by Mobutu, one that has led to the emergence of structures opposed to the 
state but contemporaneously reduced the effectiveness of the state as a political base. 
The second factor is the truncated nature of the armed struggle of (Kabila's) Alliance des 
forces democratiques pour la liberation du Congo-Zaire (Alliance of Democratic Forces 
for the Liberation of Congo - AFDL) that prevented it from developing a domestic or 
external base and effective institutional structures of its own. According to Reed, these 
two factors have combined to impede the process of political consolidation. The Kabila 
regime, on account of these factors, especially the first, had few resources and a few 
institutions through which it could operate. Hence, it became vulnerable and was forced 
to utilise the inherited administrative structures and personnel. In addition, ethnic and 
national interests with the AFDL made the alliance ill-suited to handle the task of 
political consolidation and state reconstruction in the post-Mobutu era. Reed posits that 
Kabila's rule and policies reflected the limited options that any successor to Mobutu 
would have confronted and that this realisation should inform a more balanced 
understanding ofKabila's regime predicament and of the overall Congolese situation. 
Kabemba (1999) argues that the spiral of conflict in the DRC derives largely from the 
internal collapse of legitimate government rather than from the activities of external 
actors. It is the collapse of legitimate government that has allowed external powers to 
influence events in the DRC. Kabemba also identifies both remote and immediate causes 
of the DRC conflict. The remote factors include the legacies of colonialism, Cold War 
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politics, the failure of democratic transition, the unresolved "Banyamulenge question" 
(that is, the citizenship of the Congolese Tutsis). The immediate factors include the 
failure of the AFDL rebellion to transcend Mobutu's legacies, the security concerns of 
Rwanda and Uganda, and external actors' attraction to DR Congo's resources (which 
partly accounted for the intervention by neighbouring countries). Kabemba posits that 
initiatives at resolving the crisis may not yield the desired results unless the conditions 
that led to the weakening of state were addressed. He also contends that building 
sustainable peace in the DRC will depend on the simultaneous resolution of all the 
conflicts in the Great Lakes region rather than on attempts to resolve the conflict in the 
DRC independently of other crises. 
Although Owoeye and Amusan (2000: 172-188) focus on the sub-regionalisation of the 
DRC crisis, they attribute the conflict to (the legacies of) Belgian colonial policies and 
Mobutu's misrule, including his "exportation" of crisis to neighbouring countries. After 
Mobutu, Laurent Kabila's government continued, almost without significant variations, 
along "Mobutist" lines. Kabila favoured his close friends, relations and his Balubakati 
ethnic group whilst he became suspicious of the alliance that brought him to power. 
Owoeye and Amusan recall that Kabila's anti-Tutsi stance and his decision to expel 
foreign troops, including those who helped him to oust Mobutu, led to the August 2nd
1998 rebellion against him. The Banyamulenge (Congolese Tutsis) began the rebellion 
and quickly got the support of Rwanda and Uganda. On the other hand, Angola, Namibia 
and Zimbabwe took sides with Kabila. This scenario, according to Owoeye and Amusan, 
effectively internationalised the conflict. The authors also contend that the interlopers 
were drawn into the conflict primarily because of their economic interests. Furthermore, 
sub-regional initiatives (by the SADC) at defusing the crisis failed initially as a result of 
the confusion within the organisation - some member states favoured military 
intervention whilst others favoured a negotiated solution to the DRC conflict. The 
authors add that the (defunct) OAU [now the African Union - AU] could not secure an 
early resolution of the crisis because its efforts were confined to backing the SADC 
initiative. 
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Wolpe (2000: 27-42) notes that the DRC conflict has huge consequences for, not only the 
country itself, but also its nine (immediate) neighbours. According to Wolpe, the 
involvement of a number of state and non-state actors defines the complexity of the war. 
With regard to resolution, Wolpe posits that the Lusaka Peace Accord (LPA) provided a 
useful roadmap to ending the conflict in that the agreement addressed what was perceived 
as the immediate priorities of the belligerents, regional actors and the international 
community. He however argued that the LPA was not the only ace to resolving the 
conflict but that building regional peace and security required the concerted efforts of 
parties to the conflict mutually reinforced by a strong commitment on the part of the 
international community. (It should be stated here that other initiatives and agreements, 
mainly the Sun City agreement later superseded the LP A). 
Geldenhuys' work (2000: 43-50) focuses on the process of rebuilding the DRC. He 
agrees with Wolpe that the LP A was just the first phase of the implementation of the 
DRC's peace process. Moreover, Geldenhuys asserts that rebuilding the DRC goes 
beyond the issue of peacekeeping which the LP A subscribed to overwhelmingly. 
Although peacekeeping, peace enforcement and the provision of humanitarian assistance 
ought to be crucial imperatives in the DRC's peacebuilding process, Geldenhuys 
identifies two key aspects to the process of state reconstruction: the restoration and 
improvement of state institutions and state functions that have deteriorated or collapsed 
altogether; and the overhauling of state structures that had operated in an authoritarian 
clime so as to function in a democratic environment. He identifies the key elements in 
this process of structural and institutional transformation as good governance, 
democracy-building, reconciliation (which does not obviate the need for justice) and 
tremendous support from the international community. 
Ibeike-Jonah (2001: 1-6), like other scholars mentioned above, posits that the war in the 
DRC is part of the country's woes and that its causal basis are to be located in its colonial 
legacy, the politics of the Cold War, Mobutu's (mis)rule and Laurent Kabila's 
malfeasance which was not significantly different from his predecessor's modus 
operandi. Kabila's antics alienated him from the Congolese and spawned more 
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opponents within the ranks of his former allies. Ibeike-Jonah argues that Laurent Kabila 
was part of the problem in that he blocked almost all, if not all the initiatives aimed at 
ending the crisis. It was not until after his assassination in 2001 that the peace process 
seemed to move forward. According to lbeike-Jonah, the accession of Joseph Kabila to 
the presidency of the DRC - following the assassination of his father - brought about a 
new climate in DR Congo as the younger Kabila was more conciliatory towards parties 
opposed to the government in Kinshasa. Yet, Ibeike-J onah states that the success of the 
peace process depends on a number of key factors: addressing the legitimate grievances 
of the warring parties; [the ability and willingness to make] compromises; reconstruction 
with spatial balance in mind; support from the international community; the resolution of 
the refugee problem; and justice. 
Lumumba-Kasongo (2001) launches a staunch defence of Laurent Kabila and his regime 
whilst denouncing his/its critics. Lumumba-Kasongo views the assassination of Laurent 
Kabila as part of the conspiracy by the West against the struggle for genuine Congolese 
independence. He seeks to buttress this argument by juxtaposing Kabila' s assassination 
with that of DR Congo's first Prime Minister, Patrice Lumumba. Lumumba-Kasongo 
traces the historic revolutionary struggles by Laurent Kabila against Western imperialism 
and its agents within the Congolese society. Lumumba-Kasongo is of the opinion that 
Laurent Kabila's struggle against Mobutu in the heydays of the Cold War was invariably 
a fight against the West and that the latter never liked Kabila for that. By and large, 
Lumumba- Kasongo rationalises Laurent Kabila's actions as DR Congo's president as 
part of attempts to 'adjust to the political realities in Kinshasa.' 
On the other hand, Lumumba-Kasongo criticises writers who contend that Laurent Kabila 
stood in the way of the implementation of the peace process (mainly the LP A). 
According to Lumumba-Kasongo, the United Nations (not Laurent Kabila) was to blame 
for its lack of seriousness vis-a-vis the implementation of the LPA. Major powers 
(namely the United States, France and Great Britain) were also to blame for their lack of 
support and commitment to troop deployment as part of the implementation of the LP A. 
In his spirited defence of Laurent Kabila, Lumumba-Kasongo argued against the 
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assessment of Kabila's achievements but his process. According to him, Laurent Kabila 
tried to solve the Congolese problem but was constrained by such difficulties as the lack 
of ideological cadres within Kabila's alliance; the overwhelming task of reinventing 
governmental institutions; high expectations in the DR Congo but non-existent means to 
satisfy them; and Western opposition to Kabila (which was second to opposition to 
Cuba's Fidel Castro). The DRC's travails notwithstanding, Lumumba-Kasongo 
envisions the consolidation of Laurent Kabila's philosophy which ultimately will free the 
country from the shackles of Western imperialism in order to promote the pan-African 
agenda. Suffice it to say that the distinguishing feature of Lumumba-Kasongo's article is 
its Marxist orientation. 
This section has highlighted the salient issues in DR Congo's war through a review of the 
relevant works on the conflict. A separate section (see Section 2.2 above) gives an 
overview of the conflict and depicts its dynamics as well as its consequences, some of 
which the Congolese and third party intervenors are still grappling with. Having said 
that, there have been concerted efforts by the international community and Congolese 
civil society with regard to building sustainable peace in the war-tom country. The next 
chapter examines such efforts by faith-based organisations in the process of building 
peace in the DRC. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE ROLE OF RELIGION IN DR CONGO'S CONFLICT ENVIRONMENT Since the Second World War, peace has been the subject of several studies in almost all [religions]. [Most religions recognise] the necessity of commitment to attempt to establish and maintain peace. But such awareness sometimes gives rise to the question of knowing what would be the specific contributions of [religious groups] to establish peace in a geographically and historically precise context (Ngangura, 2004: 98). 
4.1 The role of religious networks in DR Congo's conflict transformation process A significant dimension to the conflict in the DRC - prior to the phased withdrawal of foreign forces - had been the occupation of strategic parts of the country's territory by rebel forces and the invading armies of Rwanda and Uganda (the anti-government elements) as well as by the troops of Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe (Kinshasa's allies). It goes without saying that military intervention by countries opposed to the regime in Kinshasa and their occupation of parts of DRC's territory presupposed that the government was not in control of the entire country. The government had to deal with the invasion and the occupation of the DRC by foreign forces and, as such, could not fulfil ( or work towards fulfilling) its responsibilities towards its people, typifying the failure of governmental authority and portraying a semblance of state collapse. A typically complex conflict scenario characterised by the implosion of state authority over national territory (such as that in the DRC) understandably gives non-governmental, religious, and international organisations comparative advantage in assisting the affected to adjust to conflict as well as to stimulate and facilitate the search for peace. In addition, it is apposite to recall that non-governmental civil society organisations and religious networks had been active in DR Congo even before the onset of war. For instance, they had channelled their energies towards expanding the country's political space through activism, which was intended to emasculate Mobutu's authoritarianism (Nzongola­Ntalaja, 2002: 244). The eruption of conflict, no doubt, necessitated increased activism by these organisations, not least in the sphere .or peacebuilding. Against the backdrop of the war in the DRC and the failure of the state to nieetthe expectations of the people, the 80 
pivotal role of religious groups in social services delivery, development processes and 
peacebuilding has become more salient and needs to be explicated. Accordingly, this 
chapter explores the specific interventionist measures that have been undertaken by faith­
based actors within the context of transforming the conflict and building sustainable 
peace in the DRC. 
4.1.1 The role of the Roman Catholic Church in DR Congo's peace process 
The Catholic Church, regarded as a proto state by many a Congolese on account of its 
immense influence in DR Congo, has been the foremost non-governmental intermediary 
in the peacebuilding process. Its moral and spiritual authority has provided it with 
leverage to play pivotal social and political roles, including social service delivery and 
political activism. Prior to the eruption of conflict in the DRC, the Roman Catholic 
Church - given its superior logistical infrastructure - had been at the forefront of the 
provision of services that fall within the purview of the state such as education, health 
care, and postal services. On the basis of the preceding, Prunier (2001: 13 9) aptly notes 
that the 'Catholic Church has come to wield enormous influence in the DRC, particularly 
in the context of a declining state or in the quasi-absence of a disintegrating state'. 
Therefore, it is only logical that the Roman Catholic Church would play prominent roles 
in the gamut of processes and initiatives aimed at attenuating the conflict as well as 
providing succour to the affected. 
The performance of such role was at first exemplified by the Church's disposition 
towards the AFDL rebellion that toppled Mobutu. The Church, apparently taking 
cognisance of, or identifying with, the general understanding within civil society of the 
liberating mission/character of the AFDL rebellion, did not denounce the attempt at 
unseating Mobutu. What is remarkable, however, is the Church's position on the modus 
operandi, strategies, and the demeanour of AFDL troops. The Roman Catholic Church, 
at the onset of the insurgency, had called on Kabila's forces to respect the fundamental 
rights of civilians as well as to allow the delivery of humanitarian services in the areas 
under the control of the forces (Interview with SKN, Kinshasa, 08 November 2005). It is 
worth noting that the church denounced human rights abuses perpetrated by AFDL troops 
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during their blitzkrieg campaign such as the alleged massacre of Rwandan (Hutu) 
refugees in camps within DR Congo (Interview with BSN, Bandundu, 10 November 
2005). Apart from denouncing such atrocities, the Roman Catholic Church provided 
trauma counselling, medical services and relief supplies to victims of the conflict in 
Katanga, the Kivu areas, Kenge, Kisangani and Lubumbashi (Interview with BSN, 
Bandundu, 10 November 2005). 
The Roman Catholic Church's involvement in DR Congo's peace process assumed 
greater saliency in the wake of the Rwandan and Ugandan-backed insurgency against 
Kabila. In the view of many church leaders, the rebellion was nothing but the invasion of 
DR Congo's territory by Rwanda and Uganda, not to emancipate the Congolese but to 
further their own (Rwanda and Uganda's) private agendas. Hence, the church's initial 
reaction to the conflict was that of condemnation, followed by an appeal to the 
international community to exert pressure on the governments of Rwanda and Uganda to 
withdraw their forces from the DRC. It is also instructive to note that the Roman 
Catholic Church was consistent in its decrying of the invasion and occupation of DR 
Congo by Rwandan and Ugandan troops. In addition, the church rallied and/or 
collaborated with sections of Congolese civil society in its advocacy for the pulling out of 
foreign troops. Within this context, the Roman Catholic Church did denounce the 
"unholy alliance" between (foreign) occupation forces, informal (patron-client) networks, 
and a few Congolese elite who profiteered from the war (Interview with Reverend Father 
FGM, Katanga, 18 November 2005). As far as the church was concerned, the key 
motivation for foreign occupation of Congolese territory was economic, thus lending 
credence to the characterization of the war as one of plunder. In a specific instance in 
2000, Archbishop Emmanuel Kataliko of the Roman Catholic Church in (then rebel-held) 
Bukavu criticised "foreign powers, together with some Congolese, [ who were waging 
war, using the DR Congo's] resources" (Internet 12). The rebels of the Rassemblement 
Congolais pour la Democratie (RCD - Congolese Rally for Democracy) reacted by 
'declaring Monsignor Kataliko persona non grata in Bukavu and prevented him from 
returning to his diocese' for some time (Simpson, 2000: i.d.). It should be stated that the 
anti-Kabila movement construed the church's role at this time as siding with Kinshasa 
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(Interview with Reverend Father FGM, Katanga, 18 November 2005). No doubt, the 
rebels' perception of the Roman Catholic Church as pro-Kabila (or pro-Kinshasa) did 
pose enormous problems for - and, more importantly risks to - church leaders. 23
Nonetheless, the church's neutral disposition was exemplified by its call on the 
Congolese government to honour its own commitments as enshrined in the Lusaka Peace 
Accord, including dealing with the issue of the Rwandan genocidaires in DR Congo. 
Beyond moralism, criticisms and denunciations, the Roman Catholic Church's 
involvement in the DRC peace process came to be action-oriented. A major 
peacebuilding initiative by the church, aimed at transforming the attitudes of the 
Congolese as well as notions that engender discord within Congolese society, was peace 
education. In other words, the church's country-wide advocacy in the wake of the 
conflict underscored the imperative of peace, one that could be attained only on the basis 
of honest self-examination, attitudinal change/change of heart and the "rehumanisation" 
of the "other". This message of peace was a focal point of sermons in parishes across DR 
Congo. But the message was not confined to religious sermons as the church (whilst 
providing amenities in local communities) preached a message of peace and hope, stating 
that peace was sine qua non for efficient service delivery and sustainable development. 
Expectedly, this message of peace resonated in local communities inhabited mostly by 
war-weary beneficiaries of church aid (Interviews with Pastor JPM, Kinshasa, 30 March 
2006; Mr. ANK of the CJPC, Kinshasa, 9 February 2006; Reverend Father FGM, 
Katanga, 18 November 2005). Although church leaders played prominent roles in peace 
advocacy within church circles and outside it, the Roman Catholic Church's engagement 
for peace was carried out under the aegis of the church's main community-oriented 
23 It is instructive to note here that religious actors in the DRC have engaged in conflict transformation 
work at great cost to themselves. It is on record that some religious leaders and workers have been killed or 
have had their fundamental rights curtailed while implementing peacebuilding programmes. A case in 
point in 2000 pertains to the murder of Remis Pepe, a Catholic priest and two of his parishioners, 'at the 
Roman Catholic Church parish in Kiliba, north of the [then] rebel-held city ofUvira in eastern DR Congo'. 
Conflicting sources blamed rebels, militia groups and rebels' allies for the murder of the religious actors 
(Simpson, 2000: i.d.). In August 2005, Reverend Franyois Djikulo of the Diocese ofManono 'on his own 
initiative went on a peace mission to try to convince the rebel leader - Kyungu Kyungu, also known as 
Gedeon - to disarm and to stop terrorising the local people' but "[t]or months nothing was heard of his 
whereabouts. Only in November was it known that Fr Djikulo and his companion Simon Kayimbi had been 
savagely mutilated and then burned alive in Mutendele, district of Pweto, about 75 km from the parish of 
Dubie diocese ofKilwa Kasenga." (Fidei Voces, 2005: i.d.) 
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institutional framework, the Commission Justice et Paix Congo (the Justice and Peace 
Commission of the Congo - CJPC). A respondent did posit (while I was doing field 
research) that the CJPC engaged with local communities and civil society in the 
promotion of the ideas of human dignity and solidarity and justice by way of 
consultations, workshops, campaigns and lobbying with a view to mobilising the 
Congolese for peace (Interview with AP [Civil Society], Likasi, 25 November 2005). 
A logical corollary of the church's peace advocacy efforts was its prominent role in the 
conception, nurturing and the concretisation of the notion of a national dialogue to 
resolve the issues that were not only at the core of the DRC conflict but those that would 
define DR Congo's future. It is apparent that the Roman Catholic Church's role in this 
regard was predicated on the belief that solutions to DR Congo's problems could only be 
generated by the Congolese themselves through an all-inclusive, consensus-building and 
participatory mechanism of dialogue. The foregoing brings to mind the church's 
overwhelming support for the CNS held in 1991-92. In a similar vein, several church 
leaders had expressed the need to have a clean break from the politics of the past (for 
instance, "Mobutuism" or politics a la Mobutu) in the aftermath of Laurent Kabila's 
assumption of power (Interview with AP [Civil Society], Likasi 25 November 2005). 
The church not only identified with the initiatives that culminated in the Lusaka peace 
deal but also endorsed the agreement as the essential compass for addressing the concerns 
of warring parties and for ultimately attenuating the conflict. (But Laurent Kabila's 
rejection of the Lusaka Accord undermined the peace process and necessitated the 
intensification of efforts at resolving the issues - both national and regional - that 
precipitated the conflict in the first place and those that were subsequent to it). Within 
this milieu, the Roman Catholic Church (in collaboration with non-religious actors in 
civil society) mounted a vigorous campaign for the convocation of the ICD at a time that 
Kabila was not favourably disposed towards the idea (Interview with AP [Civil Society], 
Likasi 25 November 2005). Their efforts yielded the desired fruits (but only after 
Kabila's death) as the ICD convened at Sun City, South Africa in April 2003. It is worth 
noting that the Roman Catholic Church not only sponsored a number of delegates to the 
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ICD, it had ample representation at that forum and at the consultative meetings that 
preceded the ICD (Interview with a Congolese journalist, Kinshasa, 22 November 2005); 
thus underlining the church's commitment to peace as well as giving expression to its 
constructive role in DR Congo's public space. 
Perhaps the foremost initiative by the Roman Catholic Church during the war has been 
the provision of humanitarian and development assistance to the affected in consonance 
with Catholic social teaching that emphasizes the alleviation of human suffering. In 
terms of humanitarian assistance, the Roman Catholic Church in the DRC has been 
engaged in the provision of basic items (including offering shelter) and health care to 
!DPs in Bukavu, Goma, Ituri, Katanga, Kinshasa, the Kivu areas and Uvira. Also, the
church has had to establish nutritional feeding centres in some areas that have long been 
"safe havens" for !DPs. In November 2005 for instance, the Roman Catholic Church had 
to open a nutritional feeding centre for some 60,000 people in Dubie in the Katanga 
province after they had been 'uprooted' by fighting between the Congolese army and 
local Mayi-Mayi ( or Mai-Mai) militiamen resisting demobilisation. Bishop Fulgence 
Muteba (Interview with IRIN, Lubumbashi, 23 November 2005, received via e-mail) 
stated that the !DPs who arrived at the centre in Dubie were 'totally destitute and almost 
naked' thus potentially stretching the capacity of the Roman Catholic Church to deliver 
humanitarian services to the tethers. It should be added that, in a number of instances, 
the Roman Catholic Church in the DRC has collaborated with the Church's main 
international aid agency, Catholic Relief Services (CRS) in the provision of humanitarian 
assistance to !DPs. Also worthy of note is that such assistance has been broadened to 
encapsulate helping victims to adjust to conflict through psychological support. 
Furthermore, the Roman Catholic Church has been involved in another aspect of 
humanitarian assistance - the relocation of IDPs and other vulnerable persons. The 
reality in the DR Congo is that refugees and !DPs are vulnerable and constantly under 
threat arising from ethnic and political cleavages. In part, the alleged massacre of the 
Banyamulenge in refugee camps in the 1996-97 AFDL insurgency against Mobutu as 
well as the fratricidal/genocidal character of the Hema-Lendu war illustrate the 
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vulnerability of the Congolese and foreigners in those camps. It should be said that the 
church takes cognisance of the implications of ethnic cleavages in the DRC and, as such, 
has (in the recent past) taken steps to protect those susceptible to attack by ethnic 
militiamen. In this regard, the Roman Catholic Church operates an early warning 
"radar", one through which church leaders and workers conduct periodic "risk 
assessment" to ascertain the extent of the vulnerability of refugees and IDPs. The use of 
"hate language" or the eruption of ethnic tension often suggests that a target group is 
vulnerable and that prompt action is needed to avert fratricide/genocide. Usually, the 
Roman Catholic Church responds by relocating refugees and/or IDPs at risk. For 
instance, between 1999 and 2001, the church moved hundreds of refugees and IDPs 
under threat from volatile areas to (relatively) safer Rutshuru territory during one of its 
operations in Goma (Interview with AP [Civil Society], Likasi, 25 November 2005). 
Having said that, it is not unusual for the church to provide social and nutritional support 
to transferred refugees and IDPs. 
Against the backdrop of the realisation that conflict transformation entails the 
fundamental alteration of actors' attitudes and behaviours as well as the (re )imagining 
and (re )making of structures/realities that undergird social interaction (including those 
that fuel conflict), the Roman Catholic Church has undertaken the task of reinserting 
former combatants into society. Although the church lacks the (military) capacity to 
demobilise militiamen, it has demonstrated its commitment to disarmament, 
demobilisation and reintegration by extending opportunities for vocational training to 
(ex-)combatants. In addition, the church provides micro-finance to former combatants so 
that they could start small scale businesses thus creating the incentive for militiamen to 
return to normal life rather than resist demobilisation (Interview with Reverend Father 
FGM, Katanga, 18 November 2005). As is common to almost all conflicts in Africa, the 
war in the DRC has been characterised by the involvement of child soldiers in combat 
operations. Accordingly, there has been a "child soldiers' reintegration" component to 
the Roman Catholic Church's peacebuilding role vis-a-vis creating the ambience for 
demobilisation. The church has been at the forefront of the (re)integration of former 
child soldiers into the formal school system while peace education has been built into the 
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curricula of its educational institutions. This initiative, in the view of church leaders, has 
been undertaken with a view to changing the hearts of the youth and nurturing the desire 
for peace (Interview with Reverend Father FGM, Katanga, 18 November 2005). It can 
be said that this initiative aims at transforming individuals and their social realities while 
building up local capacity for constructive activities. 
More importantly, a measure of political stability in the DRC has enabled the Roman 
Catholic Church to extend its activities to reconstruction and the rebuilding of 
infrastructure. In the quasi-absence of a state or in view of declining statecraft and state 
authority, the church has had to play a major social and economic role in Congolese 
society. Even after the successful completion of the ICD, the relative political stability in 
the DRC has yet to translate to improved state authority, especially over the entire 
country. In fact, the eastern region has remained volatile and state control over this area 
has been almost non-existent as a handful of rebel and militia groups have been battling 
for the control of towns and villages in order to access resources. Moreover, skirmishes 
between the Hema and the Lendu have continued in the region. Government and 
MONUC troops have had to fight fierce battles with armed gangs in eastern DRC in 
recent times (Interview with ZF, Kisangani, 6 February 2006). The logical consequence 
of the situation in the eastern region is that the government could not do much (if 
anything at all) in terms of reconstruction when it has had to fight time and again in order 
to establish control over all of its territory. Within this milieu, the roles of the Roman 
Catholic Church and other religious networks, in reconstruction and development assume 
greater significance. [See Table 5) 
Apart from the sporadic conflagrations in the eastern region, the DRC has enjoyed 
relative political stability since mid-2003. This much-improved political situation is a 
function of MONUC's peacekeeping operations, the successful conclusion of the ICD, 
the formation of the transitional government, and the willingness of some rebel leaders to 
serve in the government. Relative peace in the DRC has enabled the Roman Catholic 
Church to embark on reconstruction and social service delivery in Bandundu, Katanga, 
Kinshasa, and in parts of North and South Kivu. Among others, the church has renovated 
87 
schools, hospitals and communications equipment in the aforementioned areas (Interview 
with ANK of the CJPC, Kinshasa, 9 February 2006). Although the task of reconstruction 
seems overwhelming for the Roman Catholic Church, it has demonstrated that it can 
provide efficient social services given adequate resources and manpower which are 
accorded it by its extensive international connections (Callaghy 1984: 176). Its effort in 
terms of providing communications services in the absence of a national postal system 
illustrates the foregoing. In this regard, the Commission for Africa (2005: 120) reports 
that the 'Catholic Church is the only reasonable coherent organisation in the country and 
functions as a post office in the absence of a national postal service'. I learnt during my 
field research that all that was needed to post a letter within the DRC was to go to the 
nearest Catholic Church. This point reflects the extent to which DR Congolese state has 
failed and underscores the constructive role of the Roman Catholic Church in the 
reconstruction of the DRC. 
DR Congo took a significant step towards political stability and state resuscitation in 
December 2005 when it organised a referendum on a new constitution. Roman Catholic 
Church leaders played a vital role in the processes leading to the drafting of the new 
constitution and the holding of the referendum through the sensitisation of its members. 
It is worth noting that prior to the referendum, the church "played an important part in 
making sure voters, many of whom are illiterate, were properly informed and able to vote 
according to their conscience" (Internet 13). The overwhelming 84 percent "yes" vote in 
the referendum bolstered efforts to ensure that the Congolese supported other aspects of 
the democratisation process, including the elections that were to follow. Following the 
successful holding of the referendum, Church leaders continued their country-wide 
sensitisation campaigns around electoral issues. For instance, the Archbishop of 
Kinshasa, Cardinal Frederic Nzambi Bamungwabi Etsou, indicated in a pastoral letter 
dated January 8, 2006 that the Roman Catholic Church intended to "promote CIVIC
education ahead of the country's first multi-party poll in 40 years" (Internet 13). 
It is apt to add here that the Catholic Church undertook the promotion of voter education 
in local communities (Interview with returning Congolese student, Pietermaritzburg, 
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South Africa, 10 February 2006) until the final stages of the democratic transition which 
culminated in the presidential run-off on 29 October 2006, after the first round of 
presidential elections held on 21 August failed to produce an outright winner with fifty 
percent plus one vote (50% + 1). And following the violent clashes (between the 
supporters of the two presidential candidates, (incumbent) President Joseph Kabila and 
opposition leader Jean Pierre Bemba) in Kinshasa after the release of the results of the 
first round of the presidential elections, "[t]he Catholic bishops ... called for vigilance 
and respect for the rule of law as the country [prepared] for the second round of 
presidential and provincial elections" (Internet 14). Although tension prevailed before 
both the first and second round of the elections, the Roman Catholic Church appealed to 
all parties to support the transition process, highlighting the significance of the elections 
for the future of the country. The Catholic bishops also "expressed appreciation to all 
who took part in the civic and electoral education which enabled [Congolese] to vote with 
responsibility" during the first round of the presidential elections and "invite[ d] the 
national and international communities ... to help [the Democratic Republic of] Congo 
avoid further harm" (Internet 14 ). One of the positive elements of the elections was the 
"participation of the people en masse" (Internet 14), a feat that could not have been 
achieved without the mobilisation of Congolese by civil society actors, including the 
country's religious groups. Besides, it is worth noting that the country's electoral 
commission (which comprises church members) in conjunction with MONUC ran an 
effective voter education campaign and electoral sensitisation process across DR Congo 
during the period leading to the elections. 
Empirical evidence presented thus far highlights the crucial roles of the Catholic Church 
in transforming a belligerent DR Congo. Suffice it to say that the involvement of the 
church in such activities typify the important influences of religious networks in 
transforming conflict situations with a view to engendering sustainable peace and 
development. In the case of the Roman Catholic Church, its involvement in the peace 
process goes beyond addressing the immediate needs of those affected by the conflict but 
extends to the range of activities that falls under the rubric of conflict transformation. 
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4.1.2 Pentecostal Churches and the search for peace in the DRC 
Like the Roman Catholic Church, Pentecostal churches in the DRC have played equally 
crucial roles in the process of extricating the country from the throes of conflict and 
putting it on the path to recovery and sustainable development. Pentecostal churches 
have proliferated in DR Congo as elsewhere in Africa, a significant development that 
typifies resurgent religiosity in the wake of state incapacitation as well as social and 
economic pressures. Given their sheer number, divergent leanings and 
relative/differentiated influence within the Congolese society, it is impossible to 
undertake an exhaustive analysis of all the Pentecostal churches vis-a-vis their role in the 
DRC's peace process. That said, the aggregation of DR Congo's Pentecostal churches 
under one umbrella, namely Eglise du Christ au Congo (the Church of Christ in the 
Congo - ECC), is of utility in the study of DRC's religious networks. Sixty-two 
Pentecostal churches make up the ECC. 'Within the DRC, the ECC is popularly referred 
to as The Protestant Church, as it federates the vast majority of the Protestants in the 
country' (Internet 15). Historically, the government has always reached out to 
Pentecostal churches through the ECC. Currently, the ECC represents DR Congo's 
Pentecostal constituency. Hence, the involvement of Pentecostal churches in the DRC's 
peace process is analysed against the backdrop of the ECC's peacebuilding initiatives. 
Although the ECC has collaborated with other religious networks and non-religious 
actors in the conflict transformation process, there are specific region or province-based 
efforts that it has undertaken in the period that falls within the scope of this study. 
A significant programme of action by the ECC since 2002 has been the alleviation of the 
suffering of war affected people in the provinces that have been epicentres of the war. In 
North Kivu, Manirema, and Orientale provinces, ECC member churches have been 
involved in the provision of relief and humanitarian assistance to IDPs. For example, the 
ECC has been at the forefront of providing essential materials such as tents, blankets as 
well as food items and medication for IDPs in these provinces. In addition, IDPs - those 
uprooted by war and victims of natural disasters - in Goma have benefited from the 
ECC's programme on trauma counselling. Victims of gender-based violence (females 
who have been sexually abused) have been the primary beneficiaries under the 
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programme. The humanitarian assistance component of ECC's peace work is similar to 
that of the Roman Catholic Church in one important regard: the establishment and 
operation of nutritional support centres. ECC had at least an average of three nutritional 
feeding centres in Goma and Beni (North Kivu Province), Kisangani and Bunia 
(Orientale Province) between 2002 and 2004 (Interview with a Congolese journalist, 
Kinshasa, 22 November 2005). The essence of the programme was to curtail mortality 
( especially that of infants) while helping victims to adjust to conflict. 
Another activity covered by ECC's relief assistance programme was the rehabilitation of 
educational institutions. Its school rehabilitation project was conceived to complement 
the humanitarian component. It was reckoned that reintegrating children (uprooted by 
war) into the formal school system would help them to adjust to conflict and speed up the 
healing of trauma. Thus, humanitarian assistance to IDPs was undertaken simultaneously 
with the enrolment of children in schools. But some of the schools in both North Kivu 
and Orientale provinces had to be rehabilitated before pupils' enrolment as they had been 
destroyed during the war. Apart from renovating school buildings (including supplying 
desks and benches), the ECC gave out school kits to thousands of students and teacher 
kits to about two hundred teachers (Interview with ECC member, Kisangani, 12 January 
2006). In addition, the ECC has had to sustain its commitment to the process of 
rebuilding and running the school system through the emplacement of school 
management committees in its areas of operations in Beni, Bunia, Goma and Kisangani. 
To a remarkable extent, the role of the ECC vis-a-vis the rehabilitation of educational 
institutions has helped to bring about a semblance of normality in those areas. However, 
a major drawback of the programme is that rehabilitation and reconstruction has been 
restricted to educational institutions owned by ECC member churches in the identified 
provinces. Therefore, ECC's programme of action in this regard has had a lesser impact 
on the Congolese when juxtaposed with the Roman Catholic Church's interventions that 
tend to reach more people. The reason for this is not farfetched as the Roman Catholic 
Church is the single largest religious denomination in the DRC, followed by the 
agglomeration of Protestant churches that make up the ECC. 
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ECC has equally played a leading role in peace and reconciliation in North Kivu and 
Oriental Provinces. Prior to the eruption of the (receding?) conflict in DR Congo, these 
two provinces had been plagued with communaVethnic conflicts that have disrupted 
livelihoods and intensified ethnic antagonisms. As Prunier (2001: 139) observes, the 
Kivu areas in particular 'have been the theatre of an almost separate conflict that fed the 
greater DR Congo war and partly (but not completely) blended into it.' The conflict, 
described by Prunier (2001: 139) "as simultaneously regional, ethnic, national and 
international", had erupted and had been blended into the DR Congo war 'because of the 
problem of "dubious nationality" as it still relates to the status of the Kinyarwanda­
speak:ing minorities in the Kivus'. A war within a war situation (as one would 
characterise the Kivu conflict) provided an outlet for the expression of hatred by ethnic 
chauvinists in the provinces. It is within this context that one could understand the role 
of the ECC with reference to peace and reconciliation in North Kivu and Orientale 
Provinces. In its attempt at promoting ethnic harmony, peace, and reconciliation, the 
ECC established peace support committees in its member churches in the provinces. 
Peace support committees played the role of mediators in local conflicts and organised 
training programmes in negotiation and mediation for church members. Their 
interventions as neutral panel mediators or peacemakers have helped to foster peace and 
reconciliation in a number of places such as Ituri. There is an ongoing ECC peace and 
reconciliation initiative in Bunia as at the time of writing (Interview with ECC member, 
Kisangani, 12 January 2006). 
ECC's commitment to fostering dialogue has not been restricted to North Kivu and 
Orientale Provinces. It has played vital roles in promoting national reconciliation and 
peace. A case in point was the ECC Secretariat's support for the convocation of the ICD. 
ECC, through its ICD sensitisation committee, mobilised church members for this all­
important national consultation through awareness raising regarding the critical issues of 
the DR Congo war, the objective criteria for its settlement, the question of nationality, the 
future of the DRC, and the role of the individual in the promotion of peace, forgiveness, 
national reconciliation, and stability. Given the historical synergy between religious 
networks and the non-religious constituency of civil society (especially regarding 
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democratisation in the DRC), the ECC Secretariat held consultations with civil society 
organisations (CSOs) in the weeks leading up to the final leg of the ICD at Sun City, 
South Africa. With the successful conclusion of the ICD and the formation of a 
transitional government of national unity, the ECC has (since 2003) focused on political 
education vis-a-vis the other aspects of the democratic transition process (Interview with 
ECC member, Kisangani, 12 January 2006) leading to the general elections in 2006.24
Human security has been a significant component of the ECC's peacebuilding 
programme since 2002. It was the view of the ECC Secretariat staff that dealing with the 
issues of national security without paying proportionate attention to the satisfaction of 
human basic needs would compromise (the prospects of) peace and stability. The ECC in 
its wisdom identified vulnerable groups namely IDPs, refugees, and (ex-)combatants as 
the primary beneficiaries of its human security development initiative. This was done 
against the realisation that such people were at risk of endangering the peace process if 
their needs were not addressed or more importantly, satisfied. Therefore, ECC's human 
security initiative entailed the provision of family support services that could engender 
long-term personal security. Although the ECC lacked the wherewithal to provide 
employment for persons uprooted by conflict, it embarked on an ambitious programme 
aimed at ensuring food security in the Kivus and the Orientale Province. As part of its 
food security programme, the ECC organised vocational training in farming for displaced 
IDPs, distributed seeds and agricultural tools to them (Interview with FK, Lomami, 18 
April 2006). 
Overall, the aim of the programme was to make vulnerable persons self-reliant, albeit at 
the level of subsistence. A secondary motivation was to forestall their mobilisation for 
destructive ends by engaging them in productive/constructive activities. In this regard, 
ECC's human security programme ultimately transforms individuals and their 
perceptions about their own mobilisation for destructive activities. According to a 
24 It is instructive to note that ECC members are playing prominent roles in DR Congo's political space in 
other significant ways. And their co-optation into structures of governance is an interesting case in point. 
For example, Monsignor Marini Bodho, the President of the Senate (as the upper house of the Congolese 
Parliament is known), and the vice president of the independent electoral commission are ECC leaders 
(Interviews with AP [Civil Society], Likasi, 25 November 2005 and FN, Kinshasa, 22 December 2005). 93 
member of the ECC (Interview Kisangani, 12 January 2006), beneficiaries of ECC's 
agricultural and food supply assistance have "have renounced violence, turned a new 
lease of life and now yearn to live in peace since they could now do something 
productive and enriching with their lives." The ECC is of the conviction that such 
individuals hold the ace to building sustainable peace in the DRC. On the other hand, 
vulnerable persons that have not been assisted as such - for instance, to acquire 
vocational skills - are at risk of becoming tools for further destabilisation of the country 
as politicians and militia leaders may choose to deploy this category of persons in 
furtherance of parochial/sectional interests. This potential risk is further heightened by 
the possible frustration that the recently concluded elections might spawn. 
Apart from implementing its action plan on human security, the ECC has lent its support 
to localised peacebuilding efforts. For instance, the ECC (between 2002 and 2003) 
organised training programmes in conflict resolution for members of village peace 
committees in Bandundu, Goma, and Kisangani. The village peace committees have 
demonstrated enthusiasm for conflict resolution in local communities tom apart by ethnic 
strife. While acknowledging and appreciating the commitment of members of the 
committees to peace, the ECC identified the lack of expertise as one of the problems that 
undermined the success of their efforts. Hence, the ECC organised a series of training 
programmes intended to build local capacity for conflict transformation. Training 
programmes focused on sundry issues of conflict mapping, identifying the (unspoken) 
fears of parties, dealing with emotions, fears and frustrations, and building consensus. As 
at the end of 2004, a few members of the village peace committees had been co-opted 
into the ECC's peacebuilding programme (Interview with ECC member, Kisangani, 12 
January 2006); thus, making its intervention more community-centred or community­
driven. In fact, it is not uncommon for people seeking assistance to knock at the church's 
door. 
4.1.3 The Kimbanguist Church in the DRC's peace process 
The involvement of the Kimbanguist Church - the third largest religious network in the 
DRC - in the conflict transformation process has been as multifaceted as those of the 
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Roman Catholic Church and the ECC. The difference, however, is that unlike the 
country-wide intervention of the Roman Catholic Church and (to a large extent) of the 
ECC, the peacebuilding efforts of the Kimbanguist church have been restricted (for the 
most part) to the Bas-Congo region which apropos is its "stronghold" in the DRC. 
Research findings indicate that the Kimbanguist Church's involvement in DR Congo's 
peace process comprised four cardinal initiatives: humanitarian assistance; mediation; 
peace education; and reconstruction. The activities, which the church embarked on in 
the Bas-Congo region between 1999 and 2004, constitute its peacebuilding role in 
Congolese society, one that replicates but (more importantly) complements the 
constructive efforts of other religious networks. A brief narrative on each of the church's 
peacebuilding activities is pertinent at this juncture. 
Humanitarian assistance: As has been the case with other religious networks, the 
provision of humanitarian aid has been the foremost initiative in the Kimbanguist 
Church's peacebuilding profile. Hence, the church has had to deploy field workers to 
implement its humanitarian assistance programme in the Bas-Congo region. 
Humanitarian ( church) workers distributed such items as blankets, food and medication 
to alleviate the suffering of those that had been displaced by the war. Besides, the church 
provided shelter for persons that had to flee their homes on account of violence. More 
often than not, many IDPs arrived at the church-designated "safe havens" without any 
personal effects, including clothing. In such instances, the church and non-religious 
humanitarian organisations (working either independently or in collaboration) have had 
to supply clothing and other basic items to IDPs. The Kimbanguist Church has also 
assisted households by distributing agricultural equipment to them in an effort to improve 
food supply and to revive the agrarian economy in parts of Bas-Congo (Interview with 
JPK, Muanda, 16 March 2006). In delivering humanitarian assistance, the Kimbanguist 
Church has gone a step further by rehabilitating the homes of its members affected by the 
war, thus helping them to live reasonably normal lives. The foregoing has been 
accompanied by the provision of such services as trauma counselling and psychological 
support to people in need. Where relevant, rape victims and former child soldiers have 
received help from the church (Interview with TMW, Bas-Congo, 8 February 2006). By 
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and large, its humanitarian assistance programme has helped to restore and improve 
livelihoods in Bas-Congo. 
Mediation and peace education: The Kimbanguist Church has played the role of a 
mediator by facilitating negotiation and consensus building between its members that are 
of different ethnic backgrounds. Church leaders have had to sponsor or organise talking 
and reconciliation groups in their local congregations in order to douse ethnic tension or 
hatred and, more importantly, to promote peaceful coexistence. Leaders of the 
Kimbanguist church have also organised public meetings that have brought non­
Kimbanguists together to discuss issues of forgiveness and reconciliation. In this 
capacity, the church has trained leaders at the grassroots level in the art of negotiation and 
mediation. Reportedly, during their consultations with community and ethnic leaders and 
members of the public, trainers (mostly Kimbanguists and a few from non-governmental 
organisations - NGOs) always emphasised the non-violent approach to dealing with 
frustration, rather than recourse to aggressive behaviour (Interview with TMW, Bas­
Congo, 8 February 2006). In 1999, 2001 and 2003, the Kimbanguist Church- in what it 
termed "gospel-based non-violence crusade" - undertook special campaigns to raise 
awareness about non-violence and the need to promote peaceful coexistence amongst 
ethnic groups in Bas-Congo. In addition, the church has continued to educate the people 
about peace through both the radio and printed materials (Interview with TMW, Bas­
Congo, 8 February 2006). 
Given the vital historical role of the Kimbanguist Church in promoting nationalism in DR 
Congo and in entrenching same in the citizens' political consciousness, it is not illogical 
that the church has broadened its political engagement in the aftermath of the ( official 
declaration of the) cessation of conflict. Since 2003, the church has been raising 
awareness around key political issues that impinge on the country's future. Cases in 
point include its church and community-based campaigns on the ICD, the voter 
registration exercise, the national referendum on a new constitution, and the 2006 general 
elections. The Kimbanguist Church did mobilise its members in particular and the Bas­
Congo populace in general to take part in these civic activities. Issues of human rights, 
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rule of law, and justice have also been integrated into the church's peace and good 
governance advocacy efforts (Interview with a Congolese journalist, Kinshasa, 22 
November 2005). 
Reconstruction: Given that state bureaucracy has existed in name alone for most of DR 
Congo's post-independence epoch, faith-based organisations have had to develop social 
infrastructure in addition to meeting the spiritual needs of their members. And the onset 
of war necessitated greater involvement of religious networks in the provision of basic 
services. More than that, the cessation of conflict called for monumental reconstruction 
and social rebirth. Since 2003, the Kimbanguist Church has been playing a prominent 
role in the reconstruction of the Bas-Congo region. For example, the church has 
embarked on the rehabilitation of health clinics, schools, roads, city halls, and parks 
(Interview with TMW, Bas-Congo, 8 February 2006). Initially, the church directed its 
reconstruction efforts at its own properties and those of its members. However, its 
activities were subsequently expanded to the rebuilding of non-church social 
infrastructure. In 2005, the Kimbanguist Church's peacebuilding role vis-a-vis the 
reconstruction of Bas-Congo took the added dimension of building (local) capacity for 
self-help projects at the grassroots level. In this regard, the church organised workshops 
and training programmes for its members, community and youth leaders and social 
workers on how to pool efforts and resources -human and material -at the local level 
for the purpose of building, maintaining, and rebuilding social infrastructure (Interview 
with TMW, Bas-Congo, 8 February 2006). However, it must be noted that the 
Kimbanguist Church's efforts in the reconstruction of Bas-Congo have been impeded by 
inadequate financial resources and the paucity of raw materials. 
4.1.4 DR Congo's peace process: The Islamic perspective 
Muslim peace-building organisations are relatively difficult 
to identify. This seems to result from a lack of 
institutionalization. Peace-building activities are 
undertaken by individual actors (such as imams and 
sheikhs) in their personal capacity, often in an ad hoc and 
informal manner (Bouta, Kadayifci-Orellana & Abu­
Nimer, 2005: ix). 
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As far as the involvement of the Islamic community in DRC's peace process was 
concerned, my experience during fieldwork validates the observation above. Apart from 
the "lack of institutionalisation," which is cited as a reason for the relative 
imperceptibility of Muslim-based peacebuilding, the scenario in DR Congo is a peculiar 
case study in that 'Islam has not yet been officially recognized in spite of its [reported] 
large number of adherents' (Hassan, 2003: i.d.). As a matter of fact, the position and 
roles oflslam in DR Congo's public space are relatively obscure. This stems partly from 
the reality that Muslims are poorly represented in DRC's political institutions and 
decision-making structures. Take for instance, the report that "Muslims are ... all but 
poorly represented in the Congolese Parliament, with only three members of 450 MPs in 
the legislature ... no Muslims occupy posts of ministers, deputy ministers or governors" 
(Hassan, 2003: i.d.). Besides, "Congolese Muslims do not own any of the infrastructural 
facilities, such as hospitals, health centers, universities, schools, and ... the few they have 
are not up to par" (Hassan, 2003: i.d.). And it was not until 2003 that the National 
Islamic Council (NIC) was established to represent the collective interests of Muslims in 
DR Congo. All of these factors put together underlines the limited role (if any) of Islam 
in Congo's social and political space. 
Nevertheless, the involvement of Muslims in DR Congo's peace process has not been nil. 
Although they lack( ed) the sophistication or extensiveness that other faith-based 
organisations (such as the Roman Catholic Church, the ECC and the Kimbanguist 
Church) possess, Muslims in the DRC have not hidden their preference for a state at 
peace with itself and with its neighbours. Hence, the Islamic community since 2003 has 
played certain constructive but minimal roles in the DRC's peace process under the aegis 
of the NIC. For example, the 'NIC has held courses for Imams and offered relief supplies 
to Muslims stricken by tribal disturbances that have beset DR Congo' (Hassan, 2003: 
i.d.). The courses that have been held focused on humanitarian activities, conflict
transformation and inter-faith/inter-religious cooperation. Furthermore, the NIC 
(working through imams and sheikhs at the local mosques and at larger Muslim 
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gatherings) has been involved in community-based peace education in Kinshasa since 
2000 (Interview with AP [Civil Society], Likasi, 25 November 2005). 
More importantly, the limited roles of DR Congo's Islamic community in the country's 
peace process have been exemplified by its collaborative efforts within the framework of 
the Inter-religious Council of the Democratic Republic of Congo (IRC-DRC). Yet, it is 
remarkable that the IRC-DRC had been involved in the DRC's peace process prior to its 
official inauguration on November 12, 2005.25 Hence, the Islamic community has been 
part of the country's peacebuilding efforts for (as long as) the period that the IRC-DRC's 
conflict transformation initiative has been on course. Indeed, there are interesting cases 
in point that highlight the Islamic community's collaborative efforts with other religious 
networks in promoting peace under the auspices of the IRC-DRC. For instance, the 
Islamic community was part of the following peacebuilding initiatives: peace workshops 
in Lusaka (September and October 1998), Harare (June 1999), Kinshasa (October 1999); 
national consultations and dialogue initiated by religious leaders in November 1999 and 
between February 24 and March 11, 2000; and a peacebuilding seminar in Kinshasa, 
December 5-10, 2004 (Internet 17). In addition, the NIC was a major participant in the 
IRC-DRC's peace advocacy visits to the United Nations, New York and to Brussels, 
Belgium in January and February 2000 respectively (Internet 18). Nevertheless, my 
research findings did not indicate the Islamic community's involvement in DR Congo's 
peace process in ways other than those identified in this section, thus illustrating the 
limited but constructive role oflslam in the conflict (transformation process). 
4.1.5 Other/Minority religious networks in DR Congo's peace process 
Research findings indicate that apart from the religious networks identified above, there 
are other faith-based actors that have played significant roles in the domain of conflict 
transformation in the DRC. In this category are internationally operating faith-based 
organisations as well as multi-faith actors. This section highlights the activities of a few 
25 The IRC-DRC comprises the Roman Catholic Church, Protestant Churches [represented by the ECC], the 
Kimbanguist church, the Methodist Church, the Mokichi Okada Association Congo (MOA), the 
Presbyterian Church, the Unification Church, the Islamic Council, African Traditional Religions and the 
Church of Light {Internet 16). 
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of these actors, beginning with the Mennonite Central Committee (MCC).26 In 2002-
2003, the MCC lent its support to village peace committees in the localities affected by 
conflicts. The geographical scope of its operations in this regard included Bandundu, 
Goma, Kinshasa, and the Kivus. During the same period, it developed the peace 
education curriculum for primary schools across DR Congo as part of an effort to 
inculcate the notion and value of peace in young minds. Moreover, the MCC funded 
peace theology training programmes for 30 local peace organisations in Bandundu, 
Goma, Kinshasa, and the Kivus. And it was not left out of the processes that led up to the 
convocation of the ICD. What is noteworthy, however, is that the MCC sponsored four 
delegates to the ICD held at Sun City, South Africa in 2003 (Internet 20). 
IDPs in Kinshasa and the Kivus have been receiving humanitarian assistance since 1999 
through a collaborative engagement between the Salvation Army and Christian Aid in the 
DRC. Both organisations have also provided funds for civic education and for the 
teaching of peacemaking skills in Kinshasa. They have also opened field offices in 
Kinshasa and in the Kivus for the purpose of implementing their programmes on food 
security, health education, HIV/AIDS counselling, and human rights education. The 
Salvation Army and Christian Aid have also imported health equipment into DR Congo 
to meet the health needs of IDPs and others affected by the conflict. These organisations 
have deployed field staff in the aforementioned areas of operations in the DRC for the 
purpose of administering medical treatment and giving nutritional support to children in 
particular (Internet 21). There is no gainsaying the fact that their humanitarian and peace 
support operations have gone a long way to giving succour to those affected by the war. 
In line with its tradition of peacebuilding through mediation in societies tom apart by 
strife, the Community of Sant' Egidio (beginning in 2005) has played the role of a neutral 
mediator in the DRC crisis. It has been working 'behind the scenes in DR Congo' to 
nurture peace and reconciliation. Bouta, Kadayifci-Orellana and Abu-Nimer (2005: 73) 
report that the Community of Sant' Egidio's initiative in the DRC was aimed at 
26 The MCC is a 'relief, service, development, and peace agency of the North American Mennonite and 
Brethren in Christ churches' (Internet 19). 
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facilitating the return of the Interahamwe/ex-F AR to Rwanda, thus guaranteeing 
Rwanda's national security and ultimately restoring peaceful relations between DR 
Congo and Rwanda. 
A fairly extensive engagement for peace in DR Congo on the part of the United 
Methodist Church (UMC) also deserves mention here. In 2002, the UMC organised a 
conference in Kinshasa to discuss the imperative and modalities for building sustainable 
peace in the DRC. Two years later, the UMC moderated a number of peace accords with 
a view to resolving local conflicts in Katanga and parts of eastern DRC (Interview with a 
Congolese journalist, Kinshasa, 22 November 2005). The humanitarian assistance 
component of UMC's peacebuilding programme has been coordinated in DR Congo by 
the United Methodist Church Committee on Relief (UMCOR). UMCOR launched its 
operations in the DRC in October 2002 and has since been working primarily in Katanga 
province. In addition to opening a food security office in Pweto, UMCOR has assisted in 
the rehabilitation of the agricultural economy in the region by providing farm implements 
to families. UMCOR has also been implementing 'programmes in the areas of 
reconstruction of roads, bridges and public buildings as well as the reintegration of ex­
combatants' in Katanga (Internet 22). In October 2003, UMCOR distributed essential 
items such as food, mosquito nets and agricultural equipment to IDPs and returnee 
refugees (previously in Angola) accommodated at the Kasapa camp in Lubumbashi. 
Moreover, children of school age in the camp have been assisted by UMCOR through its 
Education for Development and Democracy Initiative (EDDI). Such assistance has been 
in the form of payment of pupils' tuition and the provision of school materials including 
uniforms (Internet 23). [Photos of a few of UMCOR's operations are attached to the 
appendix]. 
At this juncture, it is apposite to state that the initiatives by faith-based actors in DR 
Congo illustrate the constructive role(s) of religious networks in public life. In this 
chapter, roles of religious networks in transforming the conflict situation in DR Congo 
have been brought to the fore. Remarkably, these roles have overlapped or coalesced at 
times and have been undertaken independently or collaboratively. In addition, some 
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religious networks have implemented their peacebuilding initiatives across DR Congo 
while others have had theirs geographically-confined. By way of summary, the table 
below highlights the specific roles of faith-based organisations vis-a-vis the conflict 
transformation process in DR Congo: 
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Table 5: Religious networks' peacebuilding initiatives in DR Congo 
Relie.ious network Activitv Geographical Scope Period 
Health care delivery (health clinics, hospitals and pharmaceutical Country-wide 1990s -date 
services) 
Creation of charity and development offices Country-wide (but pre-eminently 1990s-date 
in North Kivu) 
Networking with civil society organisations for peaceful settlement NorthKivu 2001 
The Roman Catholic Church of the conflict 
Censure of activities of interlopers, including war-related human North Kivu 2001 
rights abuses 
Moving refugees under threat to safety Goma 1999 -2001 
Voter education Country-wide 2004-2006 
Eglise du Christ au Congo Provision of humanitarian relief to IDPs North Kivu, Manirema, 2002-2005 
[ECC) i.e. the Church of Orientale 
Christ in the Congo Trauma counselling for victims of violence Goma 2002 
Rehabilitation of educational institutions Orientale 2002-2003 
Mediation and reconciliation North Kivu, Orientale 1999-2001 
Humanitarian assistance Bas-Congo 1999-2004 
Mediation Bas-Congo 1999-2004 
The Kimbanguist Church Peace education Bas-Congo 1999-2004 
Reconstruction Bas-Congo 1999-2004 
Peacebuilding seminar Kinshasa 5 - 10 December 2004 
Peace advocacy visit to the United Nations New York January2000 
Inter-religious Council of DR Peace advocacy visit Brussels, Belgium February 2000 
Congo (which includes the Consultative forums on justice, peace, unity, reconciliation and Kinshasa 2000-2004 
National Islamic Council) democracy in the DRC 
Churches-civil society forum within the framework of the Lusaka Kinshasa 4 -9 October 1999 
Peace Accord 
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Table 5 (continued) 
Relieious network Activity 
Support for village peace committees engaged in conflict 
transformation 
Peace education curriculum for primary schools 
Sponsored four delegates to the Inter-Congolese Dialogue, Sun City, 
Mennonite Central Committee South Africa 
Support for a mission and peace project 
Funding for 30 local peace organisations vis-a-vis peace theology 
training 
Field offices focusing on: 
(i) food security
Christian Aid and The (ii) health education, HIV/AIDS counselling and treatment
Salvation Army (iii) emergency assistance to internally displaced persons
(iv) peacebuilding and human rights programme
(v) funding for civic education and peacemaking
One-day conference on peace prospects in DRC.
Emergency relief, food aid, spiritual comfort.
Coordination of the national consultation for peace
The United Methodist Church Moderation of peace accord, settlement of local conflict 
Scholarship and educational support to 1500 indigent primary school 
girls 
Farmers' support programme 
All Africa Council of National consultations on the peace process 
Churches (AACC) Capacity building for local groups working for peace 
CBCN�', CELPA�• and Provision of health care services. 
CEPAC29 [with the Norwegian 
Baptist Union, the Pentecostal Health equipment worth US$17 million (19 complete surgery units, 
Mission of Norway and the 45 hospital units and 16 nursing units) shipped to the DRC 
Christian ReliefNetwork] 
21 Communaute Baptiste du Congo Nord i.e. the Baptist Community of Northern Congo. 
Geoj!raphical Scope 
Bandundu, Gama, Kinshasa, 
Kivu province 
Country-wide 
Eastern province of South Kivu 
Bandundu, Gama, Kinshasa, 
Kivu province 
Kinshasa, the Kivu region 
Kinshasa 
Kinshasa, Katanga, eastern DRC 
Kinshasa 
Katan_g_a 
Kinshasa, Katanga, eastern DRC 
Kinshasa, Katanga, eastern DRC 
Kinshasa 
Bukavu, Bandundu provinces 
Country-wide 
28 La Communaute des Eg/ises Libres de Pentec6te en Afrique i.e. the Community of the Free Churches of Pentecost in Africa 
29 Communaute des Eglises de Pentec6te en Afrique Centrale i.e. the Community of the Churches of Pentecost in Central Africa. 
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Period 
2002-2003 
2002-2003 
2003 
2002-2003 
2002-2003 
1999- date 
2002 
2000-2004 
February 24 -March 11, 2000 
2004 
2003 
2003 
2000-2004 
2000-2004 
November 2004 
-
. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
RELIGION AND CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION IN DR CONGO: 
AN APPRAISAL 
5.1 Local responses to religious networks' role in the peace process 
People and government [appreciate] the involvement of 
religious [groups] in [the] peacebuilding process (AP, 
interview: Likasi, 25 November 2005). 
There have been diverse reactions to the involvement of faith-based organisations in the 
DRC's peace process. Local responses to faith-based initiatives aimed at building 
sustainable peace have ranged from utter condemnation and cynicism to gratitude. Not a 
few Congolese were sceptical about the rationale, justification, efficacy, and benefits of 
religious networks' involvement in the peacebuilding process against the backdrop of the 
complicity of the churches during the 1994 genocide in neighbouring Rwanda. In fact, 
during my fieldwork, some Congolese had - at the outset of faith actors' intervention -
drawn parallels between religious groups and politicians and had been of the view that 
the interests of the ordinary citizens had always been subordinated to those of religious 
leaders and politicians (E-mail from ZF in Matadi, DR Congo, 24 December 2005). In 
other words, national interest - or put differently, the public good - has been undermined 
on those occasions when the material interests and personal ambitions of both church 
leaders and politicians have coalesced. The import of AP's (Interview: Likasi, 25 
November 2005) opinion rather than grammatical expressions is of relevance here: 
Even though some time people have the impression that 
religious group are (sic) ... playing the game of politician, 
the[y] some time forget the population considering their 
own interest, some religious leaders are not constant; some 
of them seem to be corrupted. Some people begin to lose 
confidence to the religious group (sic), their role being very 
dark. As soon as they have a politic (sic) responsibility, 
they forget [the] people, they are getting far from people. 
Given this mindset, a few Congolese were cynical about, or in fact were critical of, faith­
based intervention in the conflict transformation process. Not to be overlooked was the 
'risk' of proselytism, which the activities of faith-based organisations posed. 
Nevertheless, the fact that state bureaucracy was almost non-existent in most parts of DR 
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Congo compelled even those critical of religiously motivated peacebuilding initiatives to 
accept help from the religious constituency. 
At another level, a number of community leaders and a few politicians had deemed faith­
based peacebuilding as being of little value given the fact that religious networks lack( ed) 
the ability to enforce peace and to undertake demilitarisation and demobilisation 
unilaterally. Apart from their moral and spiritual influence over adherents and within the 
communities in which they enjoy support, religious groups generally do not possess the 
capacity to enforce compliance with their whims let alone impose a settlement in the 
event of the eruption of conflict. To some politicians and belligerents who had expected 
a zero-sum military solution to the conflict, the involvement of faith actors in 
peacebuilding, or more broadly, a peaceful resolution of the conflict, was not an attractive 
option. Until the convocation of the ICD, each of the parties to the conflict had believed 
that it could secure "victory" through the use of force. Therefore, the intervention of 
religious groups, which is usually premised on morality and other humane considerations 
(outside the realm of realpolitik), was bound to undermine the prospect(s) of armed 
victory. It was not until the warring parties realised the impossibility of military conquest 
that they readily accepted the option of peaceful settlement, which involved third party 
intervenors. Furthermore, the realisation on the part of many Congolese that politicians 
had fared badly in areas where the churches had succeeded (such as the provision of 
education or health care) engendered a positive attitude towards faith-based intervention 
in the peace process (Interview with ANK of the CJPC, Kinshasa, 9 February 2006). 
Sections of Congolese civil society and political class have criticised the restriction of 
humanitarian services to church members by a few faith-based organisations or actors. It 
seems that a number of denominations (though mainly in the minority) had, for 
undisclosed reasons, limited their humanitarian activities (including the provision of 
relief materials) to their members or, at best, given preference to their members over and 
above other Congolese (Interview with ZF, Kisangani, 6 February 2006). The foregoing 
engendered disappointment and the feeling of alienation on the part of individuals so 
excluded, and cynicism from many observers. To these persons, the intervention of faith-
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based organisations in the conflict transformation process in the form of 
denominationally-confined initiatives inadvertently 'opens new wounds' while trying to 
deal with conflict and its effects on the people. In this regard, the inclination to focus on 
their own members (as opposed to all persons) on the part of these religious groups raises 
a question about the overall benefit of faith-based initiatives to the community. Critics of 
these religious networks, namely those excluded by faith actors, had argued that while 
some religious groups discriminate in terms of service delivery, non-religious NGOs' 
programmes are more likely to promote the public good by targeting and providing 
benefits to all and sundry irrespective of their religious affiliations (Interview with ZF, 
Kisangani, 6 February 2006). Although this reaction to faith-based intervention in the 
peacebuilding process was neither strident nor pervasive, it nonetheless highlighted the 
potential pitfall of religious networks' involvement in the public domain. But generally 
speaking, reactions to religious networks' intervention in the conflict transformation 
process have been overwhelmingly positive rather than negative or scathing. 
The fact that "[p]eople really wanted religious [groups] to be involved m the 
peacebuilding process" (Interview with BSN, Bandundu, 10 November 2005) 
underscored the widespread positive response to their intervention. Most Congolese have 
not only witnessed the invaluable contributions of faith-based networks to education, 
health care, and infrastructure development but also have been beneficiaries of these 
services. Over time, the generality of Congolese have been confronted by the reality of 
state failure while contemporaneously the churches have demonstrated their capacity to 
'fill the vacuum' through the provision of social services. Perhaps the churches' 
reputation in this regard did underlie the expectation on the part of the people regarding 
the intervention of faith actors in the conflict transformation process. If religious 
networks had played prominent roles in social service delivery while relative peace 
prevailed in the DRC, then their involvement for the sake of promoting peace assumed 
saliency in the wake of the conflict that undermined state authority. In fact, "many 
people knocked on the doors of the churches for help" during the conflict and "had to rely 
on the churches for daily supplies without which they could not survive" (Interview with 
PA, Manirema, 29 November 2005). Given this scenario, the majority of Congolese not 
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only viewed the intervention by religious networks as an absolute necessity but also 
appreciated their specific roles aimed at alleviating war-related suffering as well as 
attenuating the conflict. 
It is instructive to note that no respondent described the involvement of faith-based 
organisations in the peacebuilding process as negative. Twenty five percent of 
respondents posited that religious networks' role in the peace process was somewhat 
positive whilst seventy five percent stated that faith-based peacebuilding in the DRC was 
extremely positive. According to a respondent (Interview with TWM, Kinshasa, 22 
November 2005), 
the churches, mainly the Catholic Church and the Eglise du 
Christ au Congo, played the social, political and economic 
roles that were expected of the government before, during 
and after the war. Add to that, the intervention of the 
churches did save lives that otherwise would have been 
lost. Many children are now going to schools owned by the 
churches; the parents of these children have also been 
assisted to support their families. The people of [DR] 
Congo are therefore grateful to the churches for their help 
during the difficult period [emphasis added]. 
Given that religious networks apparently filled the vacuum created by state failure, many 
Congolese did not have reservations about expressing their gratitude for the positive 
contributions of faith-based organisations towards peacebuilding as well as the 
improvement of human security. Furthermore, the impact of faith-based initiatives no 
doubt engendered positive response as could be deduced from the activities of the ECC in 
Kisangani. Tygesen (2000: i.d.) reported that the 'ECC had been supporting 15 health 
centres which provided basic care for 920,000 persons who had no one else [but the 
church] to turn to.' In an interview in Kisangani, one of the beneficiaries of ECC's 
initiative, Jeanette (quoted in Tygesen, 2000: i.d.) explained: "[w]e only find hope in the 
church, and we are praying every day for the world to hear us" [emphasis mine]. Having 
'found hope in the church' in the face of the international community's inaction and/or 
belated intervention, it was/is not surprising that the intervention of religious networks in 
the peacebuilding process has engendered positive responses from many Congolese. 
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At this juncture, it is pertinent to highlight the government's responses to religious 
networks' intervention in the conflict transformation process. A striking feature of 
Kinshasa's disposition towards religiously motivated peacebuilding initiatives in DR 
Congo was its ambivalence. At the onset of the rebellion against the government of 
President Joseph Kabila, the Congolese government had misgivings about the activities 
of religious groups in rebel-held areas. At a largely superficial level, government 
officials were wont to believe that faith-based actors could not operate effectively in 
rebel-controlled areas if they were not in accord with the insurgents. On the other hand, 
Kinshasa did not have any apprehensions about the peacebuilding activities of religious 
actors in government-controlled areas (Kinshasa in particular) as it could monitor their 
operations. However, this ambivalence soon gave way to a wholly positive official 
disposition towards faith-based peacebuilding before the convocation of the ICD as the 
people, community leaders, religious leaders, and civil society groups began to censure 
the activities of (Rwandan and Ugandan-backed) rebels in territories that the latter 
controlled. Religious leaders and civil society groups in rebel-dominated eastern DRC 
called for the withdrawal of foreign forces and the demobilisation of militias (Interview 
with MK, Lubumbashi, 25 November 2006). Government officials could not be more 
pleased with such denunciation of "external aggression." Religious groups' mobilisation 
of the Congolese for popular and effective participation in the ICD apparently gave the 
government an added reason to endorse the intervention of faith actors in the peace 
process. 
Furthermore, evidence from the DRC points in the direction of government's positive 
appreciation of religious networks' peace building role. Respondents allude to the 
appointment of religious leaders into senior government positions as a mark of official 
endorsement of the constructive roles by Congolese religious networks. Cases in point 
include the appointments of ECC leaders - Monsignor Marini Bodho, an ECC bishop, as 
president of the Senate (the upper house of the Congolese parliament), and another ECC 
leader as the vice president of the Commission Electorate Independante (CEI - the 
Independent Electoral Commission) (Interviews with AP [Civil Society], Likasi, 25 
November 2005 and FN, Kinshasa, 22 December 2005). On occasions, a number of 
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politicians, including President Joseph Kabila, have commended religious groups for 
their constructive roles which have been "complementing the efforts of government in 
building a peaceful and prosperous [DR] Congo" (Interview with Reverend Father FGM, 
Katanga, 18 November 2005). A meeting between President Kabila and bishops of the 
United Methodist Church (in Washington, D.C., USA in November 2003) during which 
the President commended the church for its efforts in promoting peace and rebuilding the 
state (Internet 24) also underscored the official endorsement of faith-based peacebuilding 
in DR Congo. 
Apart from the government, local and international (non-)governmental and non-religious 
organisations have expressed positive sentiments, at various times, regarding the 
peacebuilding role of religious networks in the DRC, especially in the area of 
collaboration between faith actors and other civil society groups. It is impossible to give 
expression to the sundry dispositions of all non-religious actors in this section of this 
study. However, it is apt to note that international non-governmental actors working in 
DR Congo (such as the International Rescue Committee - IRC, Oxfam, Human Rights 
Watch - Africa, and the International Crisis Group - ICG) have published reports, 
periodically, of their activities which not only highlight the roles of faith actors in conflict 
transformation but also applaud such constructive efforts.30 The foregoing implies that 
positive reactions to religious networks' peacebuilding role have not been entirely 
localised; sections of the international community have also endorsed the intervention of 
faith actors in the conflict transformation process while noting the actual and potential 
benefits of such involvement. But how can one contextualise the involvement of 
religious groups in DR Congo's peacebuilding process? To what extent has their 
intervention facilitated social services delivery and peacebuilding? Put differently, what 
are the effects of their peace building efforts? And what are the strengths and weaknesses 
of religious peacebuilding in the DRC? The next section provides empirical answers to 
these questions that probe the overall profile of religious actors' intervention in what has 
been labelled 'Africa's First World War'. 
30 Details of the engagement by these international non-governmental organisations in DR Congo (and 
elsewhere) could be accessed on their websites. 
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5.2 Assessment of religious networks' roles in the conflict transformation process 
assessing the impact of [religious networks'] 
peacebuilding initiatives continues to be a challenge 
(Bouta, Kadayifci-Orellana & Abu-Nimer, 2005: 38). 
Having noted what is clearly an obvious difficulty, Bouta, Kadayifci-Orellana and Abu­
Nimer (2005: 38) proffer two approaches to measuring the effect of faith-based 
peacebuilding: (i) assessing "the impact through narrative evaluations in which the 
activities at stake are described along with events or processes that followed on the 
activity" and; (ii) "strategically [integrating] ... peacebuilding activities into relief and 
development programs, to which relatively common monitoring and evaluation tools 
could be applied." This study synthesizes these two approaches in the effort to surmount 
the challenge of measuring the impact of religious networks' peacebuilding efforts in the 
DRC. Such synthesis is required in that the activities of faith actors in DR Congo could 
be simultaneously "described along with events and processes that followed" and situated 
within the context of 'relief and development programmes'. In doing this, this study first 
of all contextualises the involvement of faith-based organisations in the DRC's peace 
process. So, what are the plausible reasons for the intervention by religious actors in the 
conflict transformation process? 
It should be stated at the outset that several reasons account for faith actors' involvement 
in the DRC' s peace process. According to respondents interviewed during my field 
work, one significant motivation for peacebuilding by religious networks - including the 
implementation of 'relief and development programmes' - was the pleas by the war­
weary and beleaguered people of DR Congo for religious networks to get involved in the 
alleviation of war-related suffering. For many years, most Congolese have had to hinge 
their hope for a better future in the religious constituency. And the outbreak of war 
underscored the need to cling to hope amidst despair - a "therapy" that is often provided 
by religion. Besides, DR Congo's religious networks had demonstrated their capacity to 
perform social, economic, and political functions for the sake of the people. Hence, 
people's recourse to the religious constituency in order to adjust to the conflict and to 
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build peace was not only considered absolutely necessary but also expedient. A report by 
the United Methodist Church implied that the people wanted religious networks to get 
involved in DR Congo's peacebuilding process as President Kabila reportedly requested 
the church's assistance in transforming the country: 
The 32-year old president of [DR] Congo is asking the 
United Methodist bishops to help his impoverished and 
war-tom nation as he moves to bring peace and, eventually, 
free elections to his people (Internet 24) [emphasis added]. 
Clearly, in asking the church for help President Kabila not only accentuated an awareness 
of the peacebuilding potential ofreligious networks but also acknowledged them as major 
actors in society and as agents of (positive) social change. It is also apt to recall that 
"many people [had] knocked on the doors of the churches for help" during the conflict 
and "had to rely on the churches for daily supplies without which they could not survive" 
(Interview with PA, Manirema, 29 November 2005). Having been "invited" to facilitate 
the peacebuilding process, it was/is not surprising that the involvement of religious 
groups has attracted positive local responses. The point being made here is that the 
request by the Congolese (for the involvement of faith actors) provides a significant 
justification for the involvement of religious networks in the conflict transformation 
process. 
More importantly, there are reasons that border on the unique character of faith-based 
organisations as catalysts for peace. In other words, certain factors give religious 
networks comparative advantage ( over other civil society groups) in the peace building 
process. One of these is the logic of liberation theology which emphasizes the absolute 
necessity for . social action by religious actors in order to alleviate suffering. By 
implication, failure to act - by way of preventing or stemming injustice and suffering -
constitutes a sin. Expressed differently, religious actors are impelled by the obligatory 
mission of liberation theology in the performance of roles aimed at bringing about 
positive social change. As far as DR Congo's religious networks were concerned, 
neutrality or inaction was not only impossible in the face of the extensive suffering 
caused by the war but also may be regarded as tantamount to complicity or transgression. 
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According to a Roman Catholic priest (Interview with Reverend Father FGM, Katanga, 
18 November 2005), the roles of the churches in attenuating the conflict and providing 
succour to Congolese were a replication of the churches' mission as underscored by the 
gospel of Christ. His view harmonises with the "see-judge-act" essence of liberation 
theology (Ribeiro, 1999: 304) which provides the ideological base for religious actors' 
involvement in peace building. Therefore, one cogent reason for religious groups' 
engagement for peace in DR Congo was the dictate of liberation theology which puts 
'pressures on the consciences of religious actors and commits them to remedying 
undesirable situations' (Foroohar, 1989: 50). 
In its assessment of faith-based peacebuilding in the DRC, this study draws from the 
empirical analysis by Bouta, Kadayifci-Orellana and Abu-Nimer (2005: 143-146) 
regarding certain "contextual, institutional and personal factors" that give religious 
networks comparative advantage in the peacebuilding process. With respect to the 
contextual dimension, the authors note that in "various conflict-affected areas the state 
apparatus is weak or is absent and religious structures are some of the strongest 
institutions in place". In addition, "religion is, on a wide base, deeply rooted in society" 
(Bouta, Kadayifci-Orellana & Abu-Nimer, 2005: 143). It is possible to extrapolate the 
authors' submissions to assess faith-based peacebuilding in DR Congo. This study's 
profiling of DR Congo's religious demography reveals that religious networks are the 
strongest institutions in the country and have been the most prominent civil society actors 
in the face of state deflation or (near) collapse. DR Congo's religious groups also wield 
extensive influence over the population and, as such, religion is deeply rooted in 
Congolese society. These factors make religious actors visible and necessitate their 
involvement in activities that touch on the lives of Congolese. The non-involvement of 
faith-based organisations in DR Congo's peacebuilding would have meant the exclusion 
of the strongest constituency from the processes that impinged on the lives and future of 
the majority. 
Bouta, Kadayifci-Orellana and Abu-Nimer (2005: 144) identify the institutional factors 
on which faith-based peacebuilding is predicated. They include: (i) religious actors are 
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regarded as moral beacon; (ii) religious networks' presence before, during and after 
conflict; (iii) political leverage; (iv) international network or alliances, and; (v) adequate 
organisational structure. In the DRC, faith-based organisations are generally perceived as 
a "moral beacon" and 'oasis of integrity in the desert of corruption'. Hence, their 
reputation did enhance their capacity as facilitators of the peacebuilding process in 
contradistinction to politicians. The long presence of religious networks in DR Congo's 
society and the political leverage they have in the eyes of the country's politicians also 
lend credence to their involvement in the conflict transformation process. Moreover, DR 
Congo's religious groups possess adequate organisational structure and extensive 
infrastructure as well as international connections that typically promote faith-based 
peace building. 
At the personal level, Bouta, Kadayifci-Orellana and Abu-Nimer (2005: 144-5) identify 
indispensable attributes that give religious actors an edge in peacebuilding. These 
include their spiritual authority, their ability to persevere against overwhelming odds, and 
their commitment to principles or values such as truth, justice, respect, tolerance, 
humility and reconciliation. The spiritual authority which religious leaders enjoy "either 
through their ties with a religious institution or through the trust evoked by a personal 
spiritual charisma" (Bouta, Kadayifci-Orellana & Abu-Nimer, 2005: 145) has been 
replicated in DR Congo's peace process even at great costs - thereby underscoring the 
need for perseverance. Religious networks in the DRC have demonstrated by their 
prominent roles in the conflict transformation process that, indeed, they possess 
considerable authority that cannot be ignored. Having highlighted the rationale for faith­
based intervention in DR Congo, this study, against the backdrop of one of its research 
questions, next evaluates the extent to which the activities of faith actors have facilitated 
peacebuilding within the context of 'relief and development programmes'. 
"Religious [networks'] involvement in the conflict transformation process has 
contributed significantly to the creation of peace in [DR] Congo" (Interview with JTK, 
Kisangani, 28 November 2005). In its assessment of the roles of faith-based 
organisations in the DRC's peace process, this study aligns itself with the dominant view 
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m Congolese society to the effect that religious groups have been appreciably 
instrumental to the attenuation of conflict and the building of peace in the country. Faith 
actors' involvement in the form of mediation, facilitation of the ICD, peace education, 
demobilisation (and reintegration of ex-combatants), humanitarian assistance and 
reconstruction has contributed to the transformation of the conflict. As noted earlier in 
this study, each of these peace supporting activities (undertaken by DR Congo's religious 
networks) is integral to the conflict transformation process. In sum, faith actors' 
engagement in the aforementioned activities has helped (to a large extent) to transform 
individuals, structures and situations that engendered conflict in the DRC to the extent 
that it triggered local and international optimism regarding the successful conduct of 
2006 general elections. The elections, held in July (first round) and October 2006 
(second round), were generally peaceful, except for the clashes between supporters of 
President Joseph Kabila and opposition leader, Jean Pierre Bemba, in Kinshasa after the 
declaration of the results of the first round of voting which did not produce a winner with 
absolute majority of votes. 
Religious groups' intervention in the DRC crisis went beyond providing relief assistance 
or assisting the people to adjust to conflict; it embraced the transformative potential and 
intent of faith-based peace building by way of reconstruction, infrastructural development 
and economic empowerment. These efforts, no doubt, typically create disincentive for 
post-conflict violent behaviour (on the part of previously excluded persons or groups) and 
promote an atmosphere conducive to the consolidation of peace. In other words, DR 
Congo's religious networks' peacebuilding initiatives have been devised and 
implemented with a view to addressing people's fears and the structural underpinnings of 
conflict as illustrated by their efforts in terms of peace education (including the attempt to 
rehumanise the "other") as well as their facilitation of the ICD. Drawing from the 
foregoing, the evaluation of faith-based peacebuilding in the DRC against the backdrop 
of components of conflict transformation ineluctably underscores the conclusion by many 
Congolese that religious networks have made significant contributions to peacebuilding. 
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However, an objective assessment necessarily illustrates the inherent limitations or 
shortcomings of religiously motivated peacebuilding. Although DR Congo's religious 
networks have responded to the crisis in the country without being politically 
encumbered, their apparent lack of coherence or unanimity in terms of efforts, strategies, 
and their focus groups resonated in some of the responses to my research questions. 
Furthermore, a few Congolese do not readily acknowledge the contributions of religious 
networks to peacebuilding. Others are wont to argue that faith-based organisations have 
embarked on humanitarian activities in order to attain certain benefits including growing 
the number of adherents. This point is illustrated, for instance, by the distribution of 
essential items in churches after religious services. I gathered during field research that 
minority religious networks in DR Congo (in certain isolated instances though) had 
rendered humanitarian services in a way that exemplified partisan social action. Owing 
to the preceding, religious networks' initiatives potentially discriminate against non­
members in such a manner that could reinforce differences in belief systems. By 
implication, efforts that are intended to build sustainable peace inadvertently foster 
alienation and disenchantment which could lead (inexorably) to aggressive behaviour. 
Paradoxically, faith-based peacebuilding potentially counteracts conflict transformation 
as it unwittingly exacerbates differences that engender conflict. For faith-based 
peacebuilding to succeed, religious actors need to promote non-partisan social action as 
they harness the potential benefits of religiously motivated peacebuilding. 
Apart from the issue of partisanship, faith-based peacebuilding in DR Congo has been 
undermined by the lack of resources and expertise. DRC's religious networks have had 
to rely on other actors such as (secular) local and international non-governmental 
organisations for the provision of services and the implementation of initiatives aimed at 
attenuating the conflict. At the height of the conflict and its attendant humanitarian crisis, 
it was not unusual for the churches in particular to appeal for external financial and 
logistical assistance in providing services to those affected by the war. Generally, 
religious leaders undertook peacebuilding initiatives such as mediation, demobilisation, 
peace education, and reconstruction on the basis of their religious mandate, not 
necessarily because they possess( ed) the requisite skills or expertise. The apparent lack 116 
of professionalism in faith-based peacebuilding in the DRC underscored the need for 
significant support both from other actors in civil society and from international 
humanitarian and development agencies. But rather than constitute a criticism of 
religious networks' roles in DR Congo stricto sensu, support from non-religious 
communities demonstrates the complementarity between faith-based and secular 
peacebuilding. The reality that DR Congo's religious networks have facilitated 
peacebuilding, as opposed to inaction or indifference in the face of war-related suffering, 
lends credence to the positive role of religion in public life. What next for faith actors in 
post-conflict DRC? 
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
6.1 Religious networks in post-conflict DRC 
... for many years, the Church has had to take the role of the 
state. . . [ and the performance of that role represents] a 
moral obligation (Iyananio Molingi of the Diocese of 
Kasongo, Manirema Province, quoted in e-mail from IRIN 
News, 29 March 2006: "Civic education crucial ahead of 
poll, officials says"). 
As noted earlier, religious networks had been engaged in public service delivery prior to 
the eruption of conflict in the DRC. Further, the onset of war did make religious groups' 
constructive intervention in public life absolutely imperative. And the formal declaration 
regarding the end of hostilities ( or the end of the transition process) does not obviate the 
need for faith-based social action as the Congolese government is still struggling to 
establish state authority across the country as at the time of writing in 2006 (and probably 
in the foreseeable future). Government's control over Congolese territory has been 
hampered in the not-too-distant past by the military operations and atrocities on the part 
of the Mayi-Mayi and other militias in the eastern part of DR Congo. However, in recent 
times, the Kabila administration and MONUC have been making efforts to deal with the 
security situation in the east. Overall, all the provinces of the DRC were made 
(relatively) safe for the general elections that were held in August 2006 (the first round) 
and in October 2006 (the second round). Given the relative peace ( or the cessation of 
pervasive hostilities) in DR Congo and the successful conclusion of the elections, the 
focus of peacebuilding initiatives by religious networks and other civil society 
organisations will (expectedly) shift to (medium to long term initiatives at) promoting 
reconciliation and fostering national unity as well creating the ambience conducive to 
reconstruction and the resuscitation and/or overhauling of state institutions. 
The first half of 2006 was marked by an increased national awareness campaign intended 
to sensitise voters about the 2006 elections. Against the backdrop of an obvious 
realisation of the powerful influence of religious groups, the Commission Electorate 
Independante (CEI - or the Independent Electoral Commission) co-opted faith-based 118 
organisations into its preparations for the elections. The CEI equally carried along other 
non-religious civil society actors in the implementation of its mandate. While launching 
its voter education campaign in April 2006, the CEI distributed sensitisation materials 
and presented its operational plan for civic action and electoral education to civil society 
actors including DR Congo's religious organisations. The CEI's operational plan 
underscored "the participation of multiple actors in the campaign, including the media, 
non-state actors, civil society organisations, such as churches, syndicates and other 
traditional leaders" (Wisniewska/MONUC, 2006: i.d.) in the political process [emphasis 
mine]. Specifically, the CEI trained religious leaders and other civil society actors as part 
of its capacity-building efforts that would enable them to promote awareness about the 
elections. 
At another level, the United Nations also held consultations with non-state actors with a 
view to promoting their participation in the electoral process. For instance, Jean-Marie 
Guehenno, the Under-Secretary General for UN Peacekeeping Operations, visited the DR 
Congo in March 2006 to consolidate the collaboration between the UN and other 
stakeholders in the political process. Alwira/MONUC (2006: i.d.) reported that "Mr. 
Guehenno met Archbishop Laurent Monsengwo, Chairman of the Episcopal Conference 
in the DR Congo to promote civil society involvement in the [2006 general] elections." 
On that occasion, Archbishop Monsengwo had "told the media that civil society networks 
would do all they [ could] to discourage and appease those trying to create tension in the 
democratic process in the DRC" (Alwira/MONUC, 2006: i.d.). Archbishop 
Monsengwo's statement lends credence to the capacity of DR Congo's religious groups, 
as well as other civil society groups, to promote a culture of peace and to mobilise 
citizens towards massive participation in constructive national processes. 
Accordingly, religious groups in DR Congo's post-conflict epoch have intensified peace 
education and electoral sensitisation campaigns within their constituencies and in local 
communities at large. This initiative was undertaken against the realisation that a 
peaceful and stable DRC - in essence, the country's future - will be determined by the 
successful conduct of the 2006 general elections and, more importantly, the people's 119 
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acceptance of outcomes of the process (Interview with JDK, Pietermaritzburg, 30 April 
2006). Therefore, the task before religious groups in the aftermath of the elections is to 
foster reconciliation (first between aggrieved politicians) and to intensify peace advocacy 
in communities where the recourse to violence - perhaps due to disappointment at the 
outcomes of the democratic transition - is likely. 
However, the success of the elections and post-transition peace is being threatened by a 
number of factors: the resistance to disarmament and demobilisation and, more 
significantly, the threat of violence by some supporters of defeated presidential candidate, 
Jean Pierre Bemba.31 The significance of these factors brings the implications of the 
elections to the fore. Although elections per se do not automatically translate to stability, 
the successful conclusion of the DRC elections - described as "the most significant in 
Africa since Nelson Mandela was elected as South Africa's president in 1994" (Internet 
11) - offers Congolese a window of opportunity to build sustainable peace. The elections
hold the potential to help establish the framework for a legitimate government in which 
case the (elected) leaders could count on the people's support for reconstruction and 
rebuilding efforts in the post-transition period. It can be said that the elections can create 
the ambience for stability, which the DRC needs in order to put itself on the path to 
sustainable development. The success of the elections is also crucial for central Africa: a 
peaceful DRC is sine qua non for a stable regional neighbourhood. Indeed, a peaceful 
DRC stood the chance of becoming an economic powerhouse in central Africa and this 
should give impetus to the process of regional integration and development. 
However, harnessing these (potential) positive gains of a successful democratic transition 
will depend on the acceptability of the election results by losers (and their supporters). 
The fact that some Congolese were disinclined towards a Kabila victory (and 
consequently, a Kabila presidency) which they view as a recipe for chaos, does not bode 
31 The results of the second round of the presidential elections, as announced by the CEI on November 15, 
2006, showed that incumbent president, Joseph Kabila, had won 58.05 percent of the vote and opposition 
leader Jean Pierre Bemba, 41.95 percent. However, Bemba's camp immediately denounced the results, 
alleging vote rigging by Kabila, thereby heightening fears of possible post-election violence (Internet 11). 
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well for the DRC.32 Notable political figures opposed to Kabila (Jean Pierre Bemba and 
Etienne Tshisekedi being the prominent ones) enjoy massive support across the country 
(Interview with JDK, Pietermaritzburg, 30 April 2006) and their supporters might seek to 
undermine the authority of the new government unless these political leaders demonstrate 
a strong commitment otherwise. In fact, the DRC may lapse into crisis or slide back into 
the throes of another war if the frustration arising from electoral defeat was not 
satisfactorily addressed. The contestations of the post-transition epoch might become 
new sources of tensions that could undermine the success of the elections and 
consequently threaten the relative but fragile peace and stability that the country enjoys at 
the moment. Abbe Paulin Kalala, a Roman Catholic Church priest in Mbuji Mayi, puts it 
poignantly: "[i]t is possible and even probable that after the elections there will be 
conflict and even war, unless we enter into the process of negotiation [to deal with the 
issues in contention]" (quoted in e-mail from IRIN News, 08 June 2006: "To vote, or not 
to vote"). It is also "feared that the]... warlords [might] go back to fighting [in which 
case the] failure [of the elections] will be so catastrophic, [with the possibility that] the 
country [might] be divided up like Yugoslavia ... " (E-mail from IRIN News, 08 June 
2006: "To vote, or not to vote"). In view of the foregoing, religious leaders have a role to 
play in "healing the wounds" of the democratic transition. In view of these implications, 
one may conclude reasonably that the prospect for peace in the DRC is either sound or 
parlous, depending on the commitment of political actors and continuous support from 
the international community. 
The recent intervention by religious groups in terms of defusing tensions prior to the 
presidential elections provides a pointer to continuous faith-based engagement for peace 
in the future. Even before the release of the second round of presidential election results, 
DR Congo's religious groups have been emphasizing the need for the political class to act 
responsibly and to put the country first, rather than to allow parochial interests to scuttle 
the democratic transition (Interview with a Congolese student, School of Theology, 
32 A cross section of Congolese society has consistently questioned Joseph Kabila's nationality. This group 
of people alleges that Kabila is not Congolese, that he is a puppet of the international community (read, the 
West) and that his election to DR Congo's presidency will further divide the country and exacerbate the 
crisis (Internet 25). 
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University of KwaZulu-Natal, 06 November 2006). This is not unprecedented, for the 
Roman Catholic Church, for instance, through its Pastoral Letters, had stressed the 
absolute necessity for politicians to build bridges of understanding as the democratic 
transition neared its terminal stages (Interview with a university professor, Lubumbashi, 
14 May 2006). Moreover, Laurent Monsengwo - the Archbishop of Kisangani, the 
president of the Conference episcopate nationale du Congo (CENCO) [the National 
Episcopal Conference of Congo] and head of the Roman Catholic Church in the DR 
Congo - a key political mediator in the country since the time of the late president, 
Mobutu Sese Seko, envisions a greater role for religious groups in promoting sustainable 
peace and facilitating the collaborative approach towards handling differences arising 
from the democratic transition. As at the time of completing this thesis, the Roman 
Catholic Church, in collaboration with other faith-based networks and civil society 
actors, is contemplating the convocation of consultative forums for the reconciliation of 
political differences and for consensus-building which, of course, is germane to creating 
the conditions necessary for long-term stability and economic prosperity in the DRC 
(Interview with a Congolese student, School of Theology, University of KwaZulu-Natal, 
06 November 2006). In the light of the foregoing, Congolese can look forward to 
increasing civil society engagement (including religious networks' involvement) in DR 
Congo's public sphere with a view to building on the potential gains of a successful (at 
least so far and baring recourse to war) democratic transition. 
It is worth noting that the international community has supported the people of the DRC 
in their efforts to build peace. Apart from the peacekeeping role of the United Nations, 
regional and global actors were also instrumental in giving impetus to the democratic 
transition. Suffice it to say that the international community's engagement has taken 
cognisance of the need to collaborate with DR Congo's civil society actors. The United 
Nations Security Council's "whirlwind working tour" of the DRC in mid-June 2006 is a 
case in point. In an apparent recognition of the role of faith-based networks in the (post­
conflict) democratic transition process, the UN Security Council delegation's itinerary 
included "a meeting with the heads of the various religious organisations in the DRC" 
which have been recognised as one of the "many important actors in the Congolese 
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election process" (Young/MONUC, 2006: i.d.). Such engagement by the international 
community, one which lends critical support to local initiatives, assumes greater 
significance in view of the massive challenges facing the Congolese state in terms of 
sustaining peace after the elections, reconstruction and asserting state authority over the 
entire DR Congo territory. In fact, it would be illogical for the international community 
to disengage precipitately after the elections ( or after the inauguration of the new 
government) as that would be a recipe for crisis. 
Against this backdrop, the international community has an all-important role to play in 
building sustainable peace in the DRC. The main role of the international community in 
the short, medium and long-term periods should be to lend critical support to initiatives 
by the Congolese people to foster reconciliation, rebuild infrastructure and resuscitate 
state institutions. The United Nations in particular, through MONUC, will have to 
sustain the process of demobilisation of ( ex-)combatants and militias especially in eastern 
DRC. The people of DR Congo require sustained, active and even greater engagement 
by international actors on the long road to recovery and stability. The new government 
will need the assistance of the international community in resolving the crisis of 
governance, reviving the health and education systems and creating conditions necessary 
for investment and for economic growth. It is in these areas that the specialised agencies 
of the UN will have to play vital roles. In the long-term, the international community (in 
collaboration with local actors) will have to assist the Congolese to nurture a culture of 
(unwavering commitment to) peace. Within this context, one can envision sustained 
commitment on the part of all actors, including the United Nations and indeed, religious 
networks, to the peacebuilding process in the DRC. 
By and large, DR Congo's religious groups in the post-conflict period have focused on 
supporting the democratic transition through civic education and advocating 
responsibility by the political class. The import of their role in the post-conflict epoch 
has been the nurturing of an environment within which a successful transition may be 
conducted. This role is underscored by the realisation that the recently concluded 
elections were crucial to the future stability of the Congolese state. The successful 
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conduct of the elections and (hopefully) the parties' deference to the wishes of the 
electorate as expressed during the polls, will open a peaceful, stable, and prosperous post­
transition chapter in the DRC's history. Hence, one may ask, 'what will be the role(s) of 
DR Congo's faith-based networks after the democratic transition'? Would the cessation 
of conflict, the successful conduct of elections and the subsequent inauguration of a 
democratically elected government (buoyed by the people's mandate) obviate the 
involvement of religious networks in DR Congo's social and political space? The next 
section conjectures the roles of religious actors in the post-transition epoch and thereafter 
concludes with recommendations that should inform faith-based peacebuilding. These 
recommendations will draw from the empirical findings ( of this study) on religiously 
motivated peacebuilding in the DRC. 
6.2 Religious networks and the future of DR Congo 
An accurate prognostication about the future of a phenomenon in the social sciences is 
very difficult. Expressed differently, it is difficult to predict with absolute certainty what 
future trends or situations will be. This problematique arises inter alia, from the 
complexities of social science phenomena, the limitation of human episteme and the fact 
that events do not necessarily follow linear or unidimensional logic. This prognostic 
complexity notwithstanding, the predictive facet of social science research remains an 
important element in empirical scholarly inquiry. As a matter of fact, it is the element of 
prognostication that often provides the background or justification for further research as 
it provokes 'new' thinking or the 'other' view, which may lead to the substantiation, or 
revision, or invalidation of theories, for instance.33 However, it is apt to add that the 
"fear" of being confuted has not been and should not be too strong to deter scholars from 
embarking on prognostic analysis of social science phenomena. Here too, this study 
undertakes a futuristic analysis, but of the roles of faith-based actors in the DRC. Suffice 
it to note that prognostication is often based on the objective interpretation of, and 
deductions or inferences from, past and current realities. In other words, past and present 
scenarios tend to define the future, and scholars often draw from these scenarios when 
33 Take for example, Samuel Huntington's "clash of civilizations'' prognostic thesis (as it then was), which 
subsequently engendered a robust scholarly engagement vis-a-vis the main factors that would precipitate 
conflict in the post-Cold War international system. 
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making predictions, albeit with due recourse to the ceteris paribus caveat. In line with 
this 'tradition', this section forecasts the expected roles of religious networks in the post­
transition period in the DRC. 
The analysis in this section derives from the incontrovertible conception that state 
deflation or state collapse incapacitates institutions of governance. Typically, a post­
conflict environment creates the necessary imperative to reconstitute the state or rebuild 
its institutions as the case may be. And the advent of a new administration in the 
aftermath of a successful post-conflict transition process is more often than not 
accompanied by multifarious challenges, which the new regime may not be (adequately) 
equipped to surmount. A new regime may be faced with the tasks of establishing and/or 
consolidating its authority, reforming the security sector, reconstruction, national 
reconciliation, and the provision of basic social services. The enormity of these 
challenges may even overwhelm the new regime such that this state of affairs gives civil 
society actors comparative advantage in the public sphere. Posner (2004: 239-240) posits 
that state collapse (or deflation) undergirds civil society's role in governance in which 
case non-state actors provide public goods and substitute for a state that cannot yet fully 
function. In the case of the DRC, not even the expected inauguration of a new 
democratically elected government would obviate religious actors' engagement in the 
delivery of 'public goods'. As a matter of fact, insufficient state capacity will underpin 
the continued provision of social services by religious networks, which represent the 
foremost collective in DR Congo's civil society constituency. 
In conjunction with other non-state actors, faith-based organisations will, for the 
foreseeable future, play pivotal roles in the public sphere. There is little or no doubt that 
a future post-transition regime in Kinshasa would be constrained by challenges to its 
authority from various quarters. Within this context for instance, the reluctance or, more 
significantly, the resistance to demobilisation and disarmament by some militias, 
especially in the eastern part of the DRC will present future challenges for security sector 
reform and for DR Congo's long-term stability. It can be reasonably forecast that the 
new government would have its hands full vis-a-vis the containment of violence and the 
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maintenance of security. Civil society actors or (as the case may be) the most powerful 
non-state actors such as religious networks would then have to step in to perform certain 
public functions that otherwise should have been the preserve of the government. 
As the future government tries to consolidate its authority and build security (in the 
eastern part of the DRC in particular), faith-based organisations would find themselves, 
perhaps, as the only actors that are capable to deliver 'public goods' .34 In fact, DR 
Congo's religious networks have a rich reservoir of history and experience to tap from as 
far as the performance of social and political roles is concerned. It is predicted that faith­
based actors would be involved in the rehabilitation of public infrastructure such as roads, 
hospitals, and schools (Interview with Pastor JPM, Kinshasa, 30 March 2006) in DR 
Congo's post-transition period. In addition, the churches, in collaboration with both local 
and international non-governmental and governmental organisations - as at the time of 
writing - have been implementing an ambitious programme that supports former 
combatants (those who have been demobilised or disarmed) in order to prevent their 
recourse to violence. This role is expected to continue even after the inauguration of the 
new administration, thus laying credence to the conflict transformational role of religious 
actors. More than that, the performance of the aforementioned functions by religious and 
non-religious civil society actors compensates for insufficient state capacity. 
Another pointer to the anticipated continued performance of pivotal roles by DR Congo's 
religious groups in the post-transition period came in March 2006 during the UN 
Secretary General Kofi Annan's visit to the country. While in Kinshasa, Annan held 
talks with a number of stakeholders in the DRC's peace and transition processes, 
including religious leaders. On that occasion, Laurent Monsengwo, the President of the 
country's Catholic Bishops' Conference and the Archbishop of Kisangani presented a 
request to the UN to the effect that an International Criminal Court (ICC) be set up for 
the DRC to try perpetrators of war crimes not just for the sake of retributive justice but to 
34 It is however necessary to point out that the extent to which religious networks (and other civil society 
actors) could function in this regard would depend partly on the level of security or stability in the DRC. 
There is no gainsaying the fact that non-state actors cannot function effectively where the necessary 
prerequisites of stability and security are lacking in the polity {Posner, 2004: 247). 
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also ensure that compensation is paid to victims, 'individual families and the Catholic 
archdiocese alike' (Internet 26). Having made the request for a tribunal for DR Congo, it 
is anticipated that the country's religious groups would play a prominent role in the 
processes that would culminate in the prosecution of perpetrators of war crimes and 
crimes against humanity even though the ICC at The Hague has jurisdiction to entertain 
such cases - a factor that might render the setting up of an ICC for the DRC a duplication 
of efforts by the international community. Whether or not an ICC is set up specifically 
for DR Congo, one can foresee a role for DRC's religious groups in the process of 
accounting for the past and forging reconciliation. This brings us to another hoped-for 
pivotal engagement by DR Congo's religious actors in the post-transition period -
serving as catalysts for national reconciliation. 
Faith-based actors in the DRC are convinced of the need for national reconciliation after 
the 2006 elections. Ex-fighters and even politicians (especially those who might lose out 
in the ongoing transition process) need to be reconciled. Religious leaders recognise this 
imperative and are therefore bracing up to handle this task. At this moment, religious 
leaders are working behind the scenes to galvanise public interest in the national 
reconciliation process. Besides, faith-based actors have been holding consultations with 
other civil society actors in order to establish the modalities for a post-transition country­
wide process of reconciling aggrieved parties (Interview with Pastor JPM, Kinshasa, 30 
March 2006). Hence, it is anticipated that in the foreseeable future, perhaps shortly after 
the inauguration of the new government, religious groups would be actively involved in 
the national reconciliation process either as its custodians ( one primarily driven by them) 
or as facilitators (one in which they support the government's reconciliation efforts). 
There is no doubt that the conflict in the DRC has had a concomitant deleterious effect on 
not only physical infrastructure but also the country's human resources. So many 
Congolese, including the country's "best brains", are outside of the shores of the DRC. 
The new regime would sorely need the best human resources possible in order to deliver 
'public goods' and promote sustainable development. Even when some Congolese 
abroad do return home, the core of the country's public service would consist of those 
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who had remained in the DRC. It is most likely that the regime would have to work 
through a civil service that is heavily disoriented, de-motivated and emasculated by 
autocracy and corruption - some of the infamous legacies of 'Mobutuism'. This 
challenge, if the new administration were to surmount it, would necessitate considerable 
reform in public service in terms of orientation and service delivery. 
One can safely prognosticate that the success of the regime, say with regard to good 
governance and social service delivery, will depend to a large extent on individual and 
institutional capacity building. Here again, civil society, which embraces DRC's 
religious networks, will play a role in building the capacities of public servants towards 
promoting good governance and effective social service delivery. The Roman Catholic 
Church, for example, has demonstrated its ability to lend support to capacity building for 
good governance in many African countries through its Justice, Development and Peace 
Commissions. In the DRC, Roman Catholic Church leaders are not oblivious of the need 
to do the same in the post-transition epoch (Interview with Reverend Father FGM, 
Katanga, 18 November 2005). Its extensive international connections give the Roman 
Catholic Church considerable leverage to implement capacity building programmes for 
political leaders and public servants. The Church could collaborate with both local and 
international (non-)governrnental organisations for the sake of bringing this idea to 
fruition. Given religious groups' antecedents, therefore, one can expect to see the Roman 
Catholic Church - just one of the faith-based actors in the DRC - embark on political 
conscientisation and activism in some way similar to its advocacy in the Mobutu era. 
Such engagement, it should be noted, would be geared towards ensuring good 
governance on the part of the new government that derives its mandate from the people. 
Against the backdrop of the pivotal place of religious networks in the DRC and their 
strategic leverage as agents of social mobilisation, it can be said that they are important 
stakeholders in the project of charting the DRC's future. Although DR Congo's religious 
groups do not, stricto sensu, measure up to groups that have the means to precipitate 
violence on a massive scale or the means to subdue it (such as militias, the national army, 
MONUC), the country's faith-based organisations hold the allegiance of the generality of 
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Congolese. Hence, religious networks have the capacity - no matter how minuscule - to 
either promote stability or subvert the peace process and, ultimately, jeopardise the 
country's future depending on what they "feed" their members with. As has been 
highlighted in this study, religious groups can mobilise their members for both 
constructive and destructive ends. Therefore, the end to which DR Congo's faith-based 
organisations mobilise their members will impinge on the country's future. Should 
religious networks continue with their constructive roles in the post-transition period, 
they would be contributing to the building of a sustainable climate of peace which, in 
tum, would guarantee a stable and secure future for the DRC. Suffice it to add that 
Africa's renaissance agenda needs a DRC that is at peace with itself and its neighbours. 
Religious groups have made immense positive contributions to the conflict 
transformation process and it is inconceivable that they would tum around in the future to 
undermine their own efforts at building sustainable peace by mobilising their members or 
deploying their resources for destructive ends as that would be most illogical. In fact, it 
is only their sustained preoccupation with building sustainable peace that can guarantee 
their continued existence which, in tum, promotes the realisation of their own objective 
to "save souls". For now, it can be safely prognosticated that religious networks would 
continue to make decisive positive contributions to the social, economic and political 
development of the DRC. Having said that, this study next concludes with logical 
inferences from its empirical findings vis-a-vis religious networks' role in the DRC's 
conflict transformation process. 
6.3 Concluding remarks 
This study has explored the positive roles of faith-based organisations in the DRC's 
conflict transformation process. The performance of such crucial peacebuilding roles by 
religious actors typifies the constructive element inherent in religion. However, this 
study equally acknowledges that religion could be a contrivance for destructiveness, 
especially when it is used to legitimise or justify violence. Recourse to empiricism in 
establishing the opposite ends that religion potentially serves illustrates the ambivalence 
of religion. Hence, it does not come as a surprise that the role of religion in conflict is 
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still a contested terrain within the academic community. That said, most scholarly 
analyses of the nexus between religion and conflict present an overarching bias, which 
essentially "demonises" religion by conceiving it, fundamentally, as a hue in the human 
mosaic that triggers and exacerbates conflict. The potential and actual ( established) 
constructive roles of religion in conflict situations, more often than not, is marginalised or 
ignored in conflict analyses. But the reality of the positive roles of faith-based actors in 
conflict transformation processes (including more significantly when and where state 
actors are not trusted) underscores the need to rethink the role of religion in conflict, if 
only to give expression to its ambivalence. This study gives cogent representation to the 
"other" side of religion that has long been ignored in conflict discourse - the constructive 
roles of religion building sustainable peace in societies tom apart by the spectre of 
violence. 
In its exploration of the conflict transformation role of religious actors in the DRC, this 
study predicates the performance of positive social, economic and political functions by 
faith-based groups on the notion of liberation theology. Although having eschatological 
foundations, liberation theology is essentially a social construct that underscores positive 
collective action towards alleviating pain and suffering. For DR Congo's religious 
networks, inaction in the face of untold suffering (caused by war) was not only 
unthinkable but also a sin against the Supreme Being. This study posits that the 
involvement of the DRC's faith-based organisations in the public domain (either as 
agents of development in the pre-war years or as facilitators of the peacebuilding process 
during the conflict period) speaks to the intent and spirit of liberation theology. Other 
underlying causalities in the involvement of DR Congo's religious actors in the conflict 
transformation process have also been identified in this study. For a certainty, religious 
networks in the DRC have comparative advantage in the performance of functions that 
otherwise should constitute the government's core mandate. In a country where state 
bureaucracy exists only in name (except for Kinshasa, perhaps), the majority of 
Congolese have had to rely on non-state actors in the area of provision of social and other 
crucial life-support services. The onset of conflict in the DRC, this study contends, 
deepened the imperative for religiously motivated social action for peace and 
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development. In fact, it is apt to recall here that even war-weary Congolese citizens 
craved for the involvement of faith-based actors in the peacebuilding process. 
The peacebuilding initiatives undertaken by DR Congo's religious networks can be aptly 
situated within the context of conflict transformation. Rather than conducting a 
manipulative search for an agreement that is acceptable to the warring parties or one that 
merely satisfies the interests of the parties to the conflict, DRC's religious networks' have 
undertaken roles intended to generate the cumulative effect of shifting the attitudes of 
parties, transforming structures as well as relationships for durable peace and harmonious 
coexistence. The country's faith-based actors have been seeking to transform not only 
the parties' perceptions but also the environment within which the DRC conflict has 
occurred. Conflict transformation speaks to a long-term commitment to peace. Such 
commitment is exemplified by the deconstruction of structures and attitudes that 
engender violence and the nurturing of 'new' attitudes and modes of organisation, 
interaction, and social cohesion which promote sustainable peace. Therefore, it is only 
logical that the involvement of DR Congo's religious networks in the country's conflict 
has taken on added significance in the post-conflict period. Since the conclusion of the 
ICD, religious groups' initiatives have been directed more at the nurturing of a climate 
that is conducive to sustainable peace. One reality that illustrates the foregoing is their 
efforts at facilitating the country's democratic transition, promoting national 
reconciliation and undertaking infrastructural reconstruction. It is this study's submission 
that the performance of such roles with the goal of enduring social transformation in 
mind, and the increasing attention to it in scholarly discourse, represent a paradigm shift 
in conflict analysis. 
It is apposite to state at this juncture that the saliency of religious networks' positive roles 
in the DRC's conflict transformation process is underscored by state deflation/collapse 
(or what may be referred to as declining statecraft). In fact, the scenario in the DRC 
exemplifies the increasing socio-political role of religion within the context of declining 
statecraft in Africa's conflict zones. It is indisputable that faith-based actors have made 
(and are making) significant contributions to the peacebuilding and development 
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processes in the DRC. And local and international reactions to religious networks' roles 
in the public domain have been overwhelmingly positive, albeit a few respondents are 
cynical of religiously motivated peacebuilding. These divergent responses have been 
highlighted in this study. Granted, an objective assessment of faith-based actors' 
involvement in peacebuilding indicates that religious organisations have given 
momentous impetus to the peace and development processes in the DRC. However, it is 
noted that some religious institutions target only their members in terms of provision of 
humanitarian assistance in which case such intervention inadvertently alienates those who 
profess other faiths thus deepening divisions in society. Suffice it to add that those who 
have been marginalised in this regard have been "compensated" by non-religious civil 
society actors (whose assistance to war-weary Congolese has not been defined by such 
factors as creed or religious affiliation), thereby mitigating the frustration and aggression 
that might have resulted from religiously motivated parochial or partisan assistance. 
As a corollary of the foregoing, this study acknowledges that a number of non-religious 
civil society actors as well as international donor or humanitarian and governmental 
agencies have made vital contributions to the process of building peace in the DRC. In 
some way, the preceding speaks to the complementarity of the peacebuilding efforts by 
DR Congo's religious networks and local or international non-religious civil society 
actors. However, this study has focused primarily on the roles of faith-based actors in 
the DRC's conflict transformation process. In tackling its essential concern as described 
above, the study recognises that faith-based peacebuilding in the DRC has not been 
without its drawbacks and, therefore, concludes with recommendations that should 
underpin religiously motivated efforts at building sustainable peace in societies tom apart 
by conflict. 
The first recommendation draws from a significant drawback in faith-based 
peacebuilding. As noted in this study, some of DR Congo's religious networks have 
embarked on peacebuilding initiatives that can be described as partisan in that their 
programmes do not address the needs of the wider society but those of their members 
only. The implication of this is the alienation of those excluded in the communities in 
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which case the actions of religious networks, albeit potentially, inadvertently engender 
divisions and ultimately conflict. In such instance, faith-based actors might contribute to 
the intensification of factors that precipitate conflict rather than create the conditions for 
unity or social cohesion and peace. Having said that, one has to acknowledge that 
religious organisations have a primary obligation to undertake programmes that target 
their followers at particular times. But given the inadvertent consequences of partisan 
faith-based social and engagement, this study recommends that religious networks focus 
on high profile projects that show them as having the capacity and interest to look beyond 
denominations and religion. For a certainty, the implementation of high profile non­
partisan conflict transformation initiatives by DR Congo's religious networks will 
contribute to fostering reconciliation and social cohesion. 
Research findings suggest that many of DR Congo's religious actors, especially religious 
leaders, have been implementing peacebuilding initiatives in their personal capacities. 
Besides, their performance of peacebuilding functions has been predicated on the "social 
mission" drawn from religious convictions rather than professionally enabled or 
enhanced personal capacities. In other words, religious actors lack the professionalism 
required in conflict transformation processes. Hence, there is the need to build the 
capacities of DRC's religious actors to complement the theological underpinnings of 
faith-based conflict transformation work. In so doing, faith-based actors can anticipate 
the replication of successes attained by other (professionally) trained civil society actors 
involved in peacebuilding. 
A corollary of the foregoing is the need to separate religiously motivated social action (in 
this case peacebuilding) from a purely religious mission such as proselytizing. Some 
Congolese are critical of faith-based organisations' involvement in public life as churches 
often provide social services in order to induce conversion. In fact, some are 
unreservedly cynical of (the motivations for) faith-based peacebuilding. Although the 
underlying basis for faith-based social action is religious (as it derives from liberation 
theology), the goal of such involvement should not be the conversion of persons but 133 
rather to complement the efforts of local and international (non-)govemmental agencies 
in alleviating the effects of political instability. 
Research findings indicate that DR Congo's religious groups have broadened their 
peacebuilding initiatives to embrace several processes in the conflict transformation 
spectrum. For instance, it is not uncommon to find that a faith-based organisation is 
involved in several processes (such as peace advocacy; humanitarian or relief services; 
negotiation, mediation, or reconciliation; demobilisation or reintegration of ex­
combatants; and reconstruction) at the same time, in which case its efforts are dispersed 
and do not yield homogeneous results. Therefore, it is necessary that religious groups 
identify areas of comparative advantage and competence in the realm of conflict 
transformation. This will make for thorough involvement and deeper engagement in 
which case the benefits of intervention can be harnessed and enjoyed more fully. 
Respondents during my field research attested to the positive results of religious 
networks' peacebuilding efforts. Indeed, DR Congo's faith-based organisations have 
undertaken some of these initiatives on their own - more often than not without the 
involvement of other religious groups or civil society actors - and thereby limiting the 
extent to which they could impact on the broader or national conflict transformation 
process. Although some of the DRC's faith-based organisations have been collaborating 
with other stakeholders in the peacebuilding process, it is noted that the opportunities for 
effective synergy have not been fully harnessed. Hence, this study advocates the 
integration of religiously motivated and secular peacebuilding efforts for far-reaching 
results. This recommendation is premised on the benefits derivable from the 
complementarity of secular and faith-based initiatives. That said, the constructive roles 
of religious networks in the DRC's public sphere, particularly their involvement in the 
conflict transformation process, lends credence to the fact that religion does not always 
have to be a negative factor in society. 
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Appendix 1: Map of the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
Source: International Crisis Group (ICG), 2006. 
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Appendix 4: UMCOR distributes mosquito nets at Kasapa camp for IDPs in Lubumbashi Photo credit: UMCOR, DR Congo (2003) 156 
Appendix 5: UMCOR school enrolment programme for children of IDPs at Kasa pa 
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Appendix 7: UMC Bishops meet, pray with Kabila for peace in the DRC 
Photo credit: UMC (2003) 
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Appendix 8: Archbishop Monsengwo works for peace Archbishop Laurent Monsengwo urges Congolese to shun violence; seeks to promote civil society involvement in peacebuilding and the democratic transition Photo credit: MONUC (2006) 160 
Appendix 9: UN appreciates religious networks' role in the DRC's peacebuilding process UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan meets with Archbishop Monsengwo in Kisangani where he (Kofi Annan) thanked the Archbishop for his support for the peace process. Photo credit: MONUC (2006) 161 
Appendix 10: Research tool - Questionnaire Questionnaire Dear respondent, I am doing Research Masters (Political Science) on the topic "Religion and Conflict Transformation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 1999-2004" at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg, South Africa. The main objective of the research is to investigate the roles of various religious groups in the peacebuilding process in the DRC. Your responses to the questions that follow will be highly appreciated. All your answers will be kept COMPLETELY CONFIDENTIAL. Very many thanks! A. Age [Please indicate into which of the following age ranges you belong.]18-25 0 26-30 0 31-35 0 36-40 041-45 0 46-50 0 51-55 0 56-60+ 0B. Gender [Please check the box which describes your gender]Male D Female DC. Education [Please indicate the highest level of education you have attained.]None D Primary D Secondary D Tertiary DD. Home region in DR Congo [Please check the region you come from in the DRC.]Bandundu D Bas-Congo D Equateur D Kasai-Occidental DKasai-Oriental D Katanga D Kinshasa D Manirema D Nord-Kivu DOrientale D Sud-Kivu D Other (please specify) ___________ _E. Occupation [Please choose the occupational group to which you belong.]Civil Servant D Non-governmental D Self-employed D Religious leader DUnemployed D Other (please specify) ____________ _F. Religious affiliation [Could you please tell me which of the following describesyour religious denomination? Please remember that all responses are totallyconfidential.]None D Roman Catholic D Pentecostal/ECC D Kimbanguist DIslam D Other (please specify) ______________ _ G. Cause(s) of the conflict in DR Congo [There are different views about thecause(s) of the conflict in the DRC. Please indicate which ones you consider to be'Very Significant', 'Significant', 'Of Some Significance', 'Of Little Significance' or'Of No Significance' at all.]Causes of Conflict Very Significant Of Some Of Little Of No Significant Significance Significance Significance Colonial legacies Ethnicity Natural resources Bad governance 
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Imperialist/Territorial ambitions on the part of neighbours Other causes; please specify H. Reasons for continued conflict in the DRCReasons Very Significant Of Some Of Little Significant Significance Significance The failure of politicians to build consensus around key national issues Funding of insurgents by foreign states The allure of natural resources The failure to resolve the "ethnic question" Instability in Central Africa Proliferation of arms in the Great Lakes region Other reasons; please specify 
I. Consequence(s) of conflict in DR CongoConsequences Very Significant Of Some Of Little Significant Significance Significance Massive loss of lives Destruction of infrastructure Displacement of people (including internally displaced persons and refugees) Widespread/deepening poverty Psychological depression Other consequences; please specify 
J. The role of religious groups in peacebuildingPlease indicate the extent of your awareness about the involvement of religious networks in the conflict resolution process? Very Well D Moderately Well D Not at all well D Not familiar D
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OfNo Significance OfNo Significance 
. 
Could you please tell me what you consider as the underlying reason(s) for religious 
networks' involvement in the DRC's peace process? 
Reasons Very Significant Of Some Of Little 
Significant Significance Significance 
The incapacitation of state 
structures 
The lack of political will to effect 
change on the part of politicians 
The failure of the international 
community in providing succour 
Religious groups' high moral 
ground, huge support base, divine 
calling and social commitment 
Request by the war-weary and 
beleaguered population 
Other reasons; please specify 
Please indicate below the religious groups, their specific peacebuilding activities, their 
areas of operations and periods covered by activities. 
OfNo 
Significance 
Religious network ( e.g. Activities (e.g. peace Region ( e.g. Bandundu, Period covered 
ECC, Catholic Church, education, negotiation, Equateur, Kinshasa, (e.g. 1999-2001, 
Islamic Organisations, humanitarian assistance, Nord-Kivu, Orientale, 2004,2000,May-
Methodist Church, reconstruction etc) Sud-Kivu etc) August 2000 etc) 
Kimbanguist etc) 
How would you describe the effect(s) of religious networks' involvement in the DRC's 
peace process? 
Extremely negative D Somewhat negative D No impact D Somewhat positive D
Extremely positive D
[Thank you]. 
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Appendix 11: Research tool - Interview questions 
Interview 
Research topic 
"Religion and Conflict Transformation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 1999-2004" 
Interview opening statement: 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this research. I do hereby provide assurances of 
confidentiality and anonymity regarding your participation and responses to the following 
questions. 
Respondent's home region in DR Congo: --------------
Respondent's occupation: _______________ _
Place of interview: ------------------
Date: 
Interview questions 
1. What is/are the underlying cause(s) of the conflict in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo?
2. What are the factors that have most influenced the continuation of conflict in
the DRC?
3. What would you say are the political, social and economic effects of the
conflict in DR Congo?
4. What is/are the plausible reason(s) for the involvement of religious networks
in the peacebuilding process in the DRC?
5. What are the specific interventionist measures that religious groups have
undertaken in the conflict resolution process? Where and when?
6. What do you think are the benefits and constraints/drawbacks of religious
networks' involvement in peacebuilding in DR Congo?
7. What has been the response of both the people and the government to the
involvement of religious groups in the conflict transformation process? Does
the government see their involvement as a usurpation of its functions?
8. To what extent has the engagement of faith-based networks in conflict
transformation and social services delivery facilitated peacebuilding in the
DRC?
9. What do you envisage as future role(s) for religious groups in post-conflict
DR Congo?
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